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CIS Security White Paper Extracts Published

PM2311165393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Nov 93 First Edition p 8

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Secrets for Which Spies Were Arrested and Decorated"]

[Excerpts] The paper that we are presenting to readers today was only issued at the end of this year. IZVESTIYA has obtained the exclusive right to quote excerpts from it—it is entitled "Toward Security Through Cooperation." It is a report from the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces to the heads of the CIS countries and the leaders of their military departments on the state of the CIS's national armies, the organization of collective defense, their collaboration in this sphere, and the development of the strategic situation in the world and on Commonwealth territory.

Giving IZVESTIYA a reprint copy prepared for publication, Major General Georgiy Klimchuk, chief of the information and intelligence sector [napravleniye] at the CIS Joint Armed Forces Staff, said:

"This is the first time in world practice that we are offering for free distribution unprecedentedly full official analytical materials on the CIS Armed Forces based on 70 government documents. We are revealing the aims, principles, content, structure, and practical activity of our armies. Stripped of unnecessary secrets, this information can and should serve as a source of confidence among the governments and peoples of our countries.

"The paper has been drawn up by the CIS states' Center for Information and Analytical Support in conjunction with the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces High Command. Leading military scientists, including specialists from the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, and other academies, took part in writing it. It is to be published in Russian and English in three versions—a concise edition in the form of a 150-page booklet; a regular, 600-page edition; and an expanded edition including all the acts of legislation adopted in the Commonwealth states on the question of armed forces organizational development, with photographs and biographical information on the leaders of the CIS military departments.

"All the factual information is current as of May 1993. Amendments will be made a year later in the next edition, if one is published," Gen. Klimchuk stated.

He also said that it is hard as yet to say how big the print run will be—specialists are looking at the demand for the paper and the number of requests for it, but a decision has already been made to send a folio free of charge to the leaders of states, including major world powers, to the United Nations and NATO, and to CIS states' power ministries; other citizens and organizations will be able to acquire the "White Paper" for hard currency or its equivalent.

It will comprise the following rubrics—the state's geopolitical position, military doctrine, the organization of defense, armed forces organizational development, the system of manpower acquisition, and social and legal protection for servicemen. We do not have room to quote from each of these—we will select what are, in our view, the most substantive points.

The System of Organizing Military Cooperation in the Commonwealth

The system underlying the organization of military cooperation in the Commonwealth can be tracked on the following flowchart. Incidentally, it was first published in IZVESTIYA No. 158 in July 1992. There have been few changes to it over the past 18 months. [passage omitted]

Structure and Composition of CIS Strategic Forces

The structure and composition of the CIS strategic forces. These comprise the Strategic Rocket Forces, naval strategic nuclear forces, and airborne strategic nuclear forces.

The memorandum of understanding establishing initial figures in connection with the START Treaty between the USSR and the United States lays down that the grouping of intercontinental strategic missiles will comprise 1,398 missiles.

Where are the missiles actually deployed and how many nuclear warheads do they carry? This is covered by the following table:

Missiles	Number of missiles deployed	Number of warheads	Deployed at (number of missiles)
RS-10 (SS-11)	326	326	Bershet (60), Teykovo (26), Krasnoyarsk (40), Drovyanaya (50), Yasnaya (90), Svobodnyy (60)
RS-12 (SS-13)	40	40	Yoshkar-Ola (40)
RS-16 (SS-17)	47	188	Vypolzovo (47)
RS-20 (SS-18)	308	3,080	Dombarovskiy (64), Kartaly (46), Derzhavinsk (52), Aleysk (30), Zhangiz-Tobe (52), Uzhur (64)
RS-18 (SS-19)	300	1,800	Khmelnitskiy (90), Kozelsk (60), Pervomaysk (40), Tatishchevo (110)

Missiles	Number of missiles deployed	Number of warheads	Deployed at (number of missiles)
RS-12M (SS-25)	288	288	Lida (27), Mozyr (27), Teykovo (36), Yoshkar-Ola (18), Yurya (45), Nizhniy Tagil (45), Novosibirsk (27), Kansk (27), Irkutsk (36)
RS-22 (SS-24) rail-mobile	33	330	Kostroma (12), Bershet (9), Krasnoyarsk (12)
RS-22 (SS-24) silo-based	56	560	Pervomaysk (46), Tatishchevo (10)
Total	1,398	6,612	

More than 20 percent of the intercontinental strategic missiles deployed on the territory of the CIS countries are mobile, and 90 percent of their warheads are multiple warheads. Incidentally, the prestigious annual British publication "The Military Balance 1992-1993" published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies confirms the figures on strategic missiles published in the "White Paper."

Sea-launched strategic nuclear forces are located: in the Northern Fleet—at the Nerpichya base (six Typhoon-class nuclear submarines with 120 RSM-52 missiles, each missile equipped with 10 nuclear warheads. IZVESTIYA also discussed these boats in Nos. 50-52 in February 1992 ; at the Yagelnaya base (six Navaga-class nuclear submarines with 96 RSM-25 missiles, four Delta II nuclear submarines with 64 RSM-40's, one Navaga-M nuclear submarine with 12 RSM-45's, and three Delta III, IV submarines with 48 RSM-50's); at the Olenya base (two Navaga III, IV nuclear submarines with 32 RSM-50's, and seven Dolphin nuclear submarines with 112 RSM-54's); and at the Ostrovnoy base (9 Delta I nuclear submarines with 108 RSM-40's).

Pacific Fleet: at the Rybachiy base there are three Navaga-class nuclear submarines with 48 RSM-25's, three Delta I's with 36 RSM-40's, and nine Delta III, IV's with 144 RSM-50's; at the Pavlovskoye base there are three Navaga nuclear submarines with 48 RSM-25 missiles and 6 Delta I nuclear submarines with 72 RSM-40's.

In all, the Russian Navy has 62 nuclear submarines with 940 strategic missiles.

The ICBM stockpiles for the submarines, the plants where the missiles are produced, test ranges, and the sites where missiles are loaded onto the submarines are depicted on the following map. [Map indicates Olenya, Nerpichya, Yagelnaya, Ostrovnoy, Pavlovskoye, and Rybachiy as submarine bases; Okolnaya as an SLBM loading and storage site; Revda as an SLBM storage site; Nenoksa as a test range and SLBM storage site; Severodvinsk as an SLBM loading and silo refitting or elimination site; Zlatoust as an SLBM production site; Pashino as an SLBM elimination site; Krasnoyarsk as an SLBM production site; and Bolshoy Kamen as an SLBM silo refitting or elimination site]

Heavy strategic bombers are part of the Air Force's Long-Range Aviation. This means bombers with a range of more than 8,000 km and missile-carrying aircraft equipped with long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's).

At the time of the signing of the START Treaty the Soviet Union had 147 Tu-95 and 15 Tu-160 heavy bombers, of which 84 and 15 (respectively) carried long-range cruise missiles. These accounted for 735 and 120 nuclear warheads.

All heavy bombers were deployed on the territories of three former Union republics. At Mozdok and Engels in Russia, at Priluki, Uzin, and Ukrainka in Ukraine, and at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. There are now 79 bombers on Russian territory (two Tu-160's, 25 Tu-95MS's, 45 Tu-95K22's, and seven Tu-95K's), and 43 aircraft on Ukrainian territory, including 16 Tu-160's. There are 40 Tu-95MS's in Kazakhstan.

Long-Range Aviation also includes 34 tanker aircraft. These were all based at the Engels Airfield in Saratov Oblast, but, just before the collapse of the USSR, some of them were redeployed to Ukrainian territory. They are still there today.

The breakdown of the Commonwealth's strategic forces at the time the "White Paper" was drawn up was as follows: [in the following table the column-head letters denote: A—Platforms; B—Warheads [zaryady]]

Country	ICBM's		SLBM's		Heavy bombers		Total	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Belarus	81	81	—	—	—	—	81	81
Kazakhstan	98	980	—	—	40	240	138	1,220
Russia	912	3,970	788	2,652	79	271	1,779	6,893
Ukraine	176	1,240	—	—	43	372	219	1,612
Total	1,267	6,271	788	2,652	162	883	2,217	9,806

Belarus has stated its readiness to abide by previously signed international agreements, has ratified the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, has signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, and has concluded a treaty with Russia on the status of the strategic nuclear forces on its territory. These include not only the strategic missiles and nuclear warheads due to be withdrawn to Russian territory by the end of 1997, but also servicing and maintenance [tekhnicheskoye i materialnoye obsluzhivaniye], intelligence-gathering system, space communications, ABM defense, and missile early-warning units.

Kazakhstan too has ratified the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, but has not yet acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty, although it has stated its desire to do so. It is leaning toward recognition of Russia's right to have ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads, and strategic aircraft; approaches to other complexes and systems are being worked out. (Many experts claim that the Kazakhstani leadership's decision in this area will largely depend on Ukraine's stance on strategic nuclear weapons. Kiev's example could also influence Almaty's nonnuclear status—V.L.).

Ukraine has officially stated its adherence to nonnuclear status and its readiness to abide by the international commitments stemming from the Lisbon Protocol. But the current Ukrainian parliament has not set any deadline for carrying out these commitments, the START I Treaty has been ratified with major reservations, and the state itself intends to accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty as a country possessing nuclear weapons.

Conventional Arms

On 15 May 1992 Georgia and seven CIS states—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine—signed a joint statement reaffirming their adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE]. Kazakhstan signed the agreement as a state, part of whose territory is covered by the treaty. It has no troops or armaments on this territory.

Under these accords the quotas for armaments and hardware were divided up between the Transcaucasian states and Moldova as follows. [expansion of abbreviation TV unknown]

Type of armament	Azerbaijan	Armenia	Georgia	Moldova
Tanks	220	220	220	210
Armored fighting vehicles	220	220	220	210
of which, infantry fighting vehicles and armored fighting vehicles with TV	135	135	135	130
of which, armored fighting vehicles with TV	11	11	11	—
Artillery systems	285	285	285	250
Combat aircraft	100	100	100	50
Attack helicopters	50	50	50	50

In actual fact the **Azerbaijani Armed Forces** have four motorized rifle, one tank, and two artillery brigades which organizationally make up two separate army corps, as well as a detachment of warships, one air squadron, and a separate Spetsnaz battalion.

The "White Paper" does not quote a precise figure for the number of troops in the republic or for the number of armaments. It only indicates that, following the Russian Army's departure, there are 20 Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters left behind, along with 70 Czech-made L-29 aircraft and 16 Su-24 and MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft.

"The Military Balance" ascribes 400 tanks, 470 armored vehicles, 120 aircraft, and 14 helicopters to the country. But there is probably nobody who could quote an accurate figure today. Some of this equipment has been "consumed" in the flames of war, other equipment has broken down owing to a shortage of spares and poor servicing.

What is known is that the republic's Defense Ministry was allocated 3 billion rubles in 1992 and that Azerbaijan plans to have a 50,000-strong army by the year 2000.

According to the "White Paper" the **Armenian Armed Forces** comprise 10,000 men, or 15,000 together with other military formations. The law allows the army to have up to 30-35,000 men.

The CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command report claims that Armenia does not have the amount of combat hardware which the republic is permitted to have under the CFE Treaty. The two divisions which Russia transferred to it had 180 tanks, 180 infantry fighting vehicles [IFV], 60 armored personnel carriers [APC], 130 artillery systems, and several dozen "Osa," "Strela," and "Igla" surface-to-air missile systems, as well as the "Shilka" self-propelled antiaircraft gun.

Armenia's greatest shortage is its lack of aircraft. It only has a squadron of Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters. Admittedly, the Institute for Strategic Studies gives the following figures—the republic has 250 tanks, 350 fighting vehicles, and seven helicopters.

The **Moldovan Armed Forces** consist of regular troops and a reserve. The regular troops are based on ground units, air defense forces, and army aviation. The Army comprises four groupings, each with a motorized rifle

brigade and an helicopter squadron. The total strength of the Armed Forces is 10,000 men. They have been equipped at the expense of the 14th Army units which were located on the south bank of the Dniester. Their aviation comprises 38 MiG-29's. Efforts are being made to exchange them for helicopters. Combat hardware, including T-55 tanks and 2,000 assault rifles, is also reaching the republic from Romania.

According to the "Military Balance" figures, the republic has no tanks or armored vehicles.

Belarus

Armament and combat hardware quotas for Belarus: [in the following table the letters denote: A—Regular Units; B—In Storage; C—Total; the expansion of the abbreviation 'TV' is unknown]

Type of armament	A	B	C
Tanks	1,525	275	1,800
Armored fighting vehicles	2,175	425	2,600
of which, infantry fighting vehicles and armored fighting vehicles with TV	—	—	1,590
of which, armored fighting vehicles with TV	—	—	130
Artillery systems	1,375	240	1,615
Combat aircraft	260	—	—
Attack helicopters	80	—	—

The **Belarusian Armed Forces** are based on the Belorussian Military District, which comprised 130,000 servicemen—not counting the 40,000 men in the strategic forces. There was one serviceman for virtually every 43 inhabitants of the republic. The figures for Russia, for instance, were one serviceman for every 634 members of the population, in Ukraine it was one for every 98, and in Kazakhstan one for every 118 people.

By the end of this year the Belarusian Army should comprise 87,000 men—10,000 officers and generals are to be cut. Stress is being laid on the creation of airborne assault and assault landing [desantno-shturmovoy] units and mechanized brigades. The Air Force consists of seven-eight air regiments. Some 1,600 tanks, more than 1,200 IFV's and APC's, and 130 aircraft are due to be scrapped. According to the British annual publication, there are currently 1,850 tanks, 1,390 armored vehicles, 617 aircraft, and 80 helicopters in the republic.

Russia

Armament and combat hardware quotas for Russia: [in the following table the letters denote: A—Flanks: Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts; B—Moscow, Volga, and Ural Military Districts and Kaliningrad Oblast; C—Total; the expansion of the abbreviation 'TV' is unknown]

Type of armament	A	B	C
Tanks	1,300	5,100	6,400
of which:			
in regular units	700	4,275	4,975
in storage	600	825	1,425
Armored fighting vehicles	1,380	10,100	11,480
of which:			
in regular units	580	9,945	10,525
in storage	800	155	955
of which, infantry fighting vehicles and armored fighting vehicles with TV	—	—	7,030
of which, armored fighting vehicles with TV	—	—	574
Artillery systems	1,680	4,735	6,415
of which:			
in regular units	1,280	3,825	5,105
in storage	400	910	1,310
Combat aircraft	—	—	3,450
Attack helicopters	—	—	890

Russia's Armed Forces were set up by Boris Yeltsin's edict of 7 May 1992. They are based on the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy. Apart from these, the Armed Forces include the Airborne Forces, the Military Space Forces, rear service units, and military construction and troop-billeting units.

In terms of military administrative organization Russia has eight military districts (the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus, Volga, Ural, Siberian, Transbaykal, and Far East Military Districts) as well as, currently, three groups of forces (the Western, Northwestern, and Transcaucasus Groups of Forces). At the time when its own Armed Forces were set up the Russian Army had 2.8 million men; there should be 2 million by 1995.

The "White Paper" devotes around 55 pages to the Russian Army. The space available in this newspaper does not allow us to discuss this in any kind of detail without distorting the content; we will therefore restrict ourselves to just the general observation that it is currently at the stage of abrupt transformations—including structural changes, enhancing the mobility of its units, and equipping them with modern hardware. We have already provided detailed information on all this for IZVESTIYA readers and we will be continuing to do so.

Ukraine

The **Ukrainian Armed Forces** were set up on the basis of the Kiev, Carpathian, and Odessa Military Districts, part of the Black Sea Fleet, and other military formations located in the republic. They number 700,000 men in total.

The concept developed in Ukraine for the Armed Forces' organizational development envisages the creation of two operational commands—the Western and Southern Commands—as well as airspace [vozdushnoye prostranstvo] defense troops based on the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces. Armed Forces strength is planned to be 420,000 by 1995 and 230,000 by the year 2000.

It is planned that the Armed Forces will comprise three branches of service—ground, air, and naval forces. It has also been stated that missile and space troops [raketno-kosmicheskiye voyska] will begin to be set up. It is planned that the organizational and manpower structure of combined units will include three motorized rifle regiments and tank, self-propelled artillery, surface-to-air missile, and separate antitank battalions. Logistical subunits will include a reconnaissance battalion, a communications battalion, a combat-engineer battalion, a chemical warfare defense battalion, and others.

It is planned that the Ukrainian Navy will have 100 ships and vessels by 1998, as well as around 40,000 men. We would recall that the Black Sea Fleet currently comprises 45 large surface combatants, 28 submarines, more than 300 medium-sized and smaller ships and vessels, 151 aircraft, and 85 deck-borne helicopters.

The most modern combat vehicles and aircraft are in service with the Ukrainian Army; these include the T-72 and T-64 tanks, the BMP-2, the Su-27 and MiG-29, the "Smerch" and "Uragan" multiple rocket launcher systems, "Tochka" tactical missile systems, and S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. Enterprises from nine defense-sector [oboronyy] and seven machine-building ministries work for the country's military-industrial complex. The state can independently produce strategic missiles and other kinds of military output.

Armament and combat hardware quotas for Ukraine: [in the following table the letters denote: A—Odessa Military District; B—Carpathian and Kiev Military Districts; C—Total on Ukrainian Territory; the expansion of the abbreviation 'TV' is unknown]

Type of armament	A	B	C
Tanks	680	3,400	4,080
of which:			
in regular units	280	2,850	3,130
in storage	400	550	950
Armored fighting vehicles	350	4,700	5,050
of which:			
in regular units	350	4,000	4,350
in storage	—	700	700
of which, infantry fighting vehicles and armored fighting vehicles with TV	—	—	3,095
of which, armored fighting vehicles with TV	—	—	253
Artillery systems	890	3,150	4,040
of which:			
in regular units	390	2,850	3,240
in storage	500	300	800
Combat aircraft	—	—	1,900
Attack helicopters	—	—	330

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

The **Turkmen Armed Forces** are made up of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces, and the Navy. Before 1993 they comprised 110,000 men, but have now been considerably reduced. There is a National Guard, which numbers 1,000 men. The "White Paper" does not give any other figures. Its British counterpart believes that there are 750 tanks, 1,400 armored vehicles, and 250 aircraft in the republic.

The **Uzbek Armed Forces** are made up of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces, the Spetsnaz, and the National Guard. Organizationally they include the Army corps, the Spetsnaz corps, artillery, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, communications troops, engineering and chemical units, and rear services and technical backup units. The main tactical combined unit is the brigade, the main tactical battlefield component is the battalion.

The paper makes no mention of the size of the Uzbek Army or its materiel, but, according to information from independent experts, it has 280 tanks, 780 armored vehicles, 265 aircraft, and 24 helicopters.

The "White Paper" says that the **Tajik Armed Forces** are at the initial stage of their organizational development. They are to include ground forces and an air force. Currently the role of defending the country against incursions by various Afghan groupings is being carried out by Russian troops and border guards.

The **Kazakhstani Armed Forces** include the Army (Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, and civil defense units), Border Guards, Internal Troops, and the Republican Guard. The "White Paper" does not give any specific figures on how many troops and arms there are on Kazakhstani territory, but it points out that the Army should be no larger than 150,000, and that the Ground Forces are equipped with an adequate number of T-72 tanks, BMP-1 and BMP-2's, BTR-80's, "Grad" multiple rocket launcher systems, "Gvozdika" self-propelled howitzers; the Air Force has Su-24, MiG-23, MiG-25, and MiG-29 bombers and fighter-bombers, An-26 and An-24 transports, Mi-24, Mi-26, and Mi-8 helicopters; while the Navy has a separate division of warships in the Caspian. The Republican Guard numbers 2,500 men.

"The Military Balance" also gives figures for the amounts of materiel in Kazakhstan—1,200 tanks, 1,500 armored vehicles, 370 aircraft, and 25 helicopters.

The **Kyrgyz Armed Forces** have 14,000 men. This army will be cut back. It is planned to comprise motorized rifle units, an air force, air defense forces, and a national guard brigade. The republic does not have any border guards—its borders are defended by Russian border guards. According to Institute for Strategic Studies figures, it has 30 tanks, 75 armored vehicles, and 200 aircraft.

Accord Signed on Space Communications Project

LD2311201193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1505 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Svetlana Ivanova]

[Text] St. Petersburg, 23 Nov—An agreement was signed here today between the "Prikladnaya Mekhanika NPO" [The Applied Mechanics Scientific and Research Association] joint stock company (the town of Krasnoyarsk-26), the "SovKanStar" Russian-Canadian joint stock company, and the Baltic Bank on the beginning of preparations for a major project in the sphere of space communications. This will consist of five private satellites of the "Gorizont" class, which will offer their customers a full range of services, beginning with the opportunity to hold telephone conversations via space and up to using video channels.

The first such satellite was launched from Baykonur cosmodrome on 18 November. It has been leased to an American firm; conditions of the deal are kept secret. It is planned to launch the second satellite into orbit in 1996. A number of foreign firms have already shown their interest in the project; its implementation costs 15-20 percent less than that of similar Western versions.

Russian Minister on International Oil Talks

NC2311155193 Yerevan SNARK in English 1025 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 22 (SNARK)—The Azerbaijani, Russian, Kazakhstani and Turkmenistani representatives will meet in Baku or Moscow to discuss the oil output, Yuriy Shafranik, Russian energy minister, told TURAN News Agency. The meeting will take place at the beginning of December. There will be discussed the problems of further cooperation in oil and gas output and the raw transportation to the world markets.

One of the problems is the oil-line tour from the Central Asia to Europe. Russia has a worked out project which is more profitable than the Western suggestions.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 24 Nov

LD2411073293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0715 GMT 24 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 24 TASS—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. Speaking about concepts for Russian foreign policy and security, Kozyrev pointed out in particular that the concepts provide for the priority of Russia's efforts in eliminating conflicts primarily on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

"We must accomplish peacekeeping missions in immediate neighhbour countries", the minister said.

In response to a question as to what will be the core of a peacekeeping force on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Kozyrev said: "It would be an error to ignore the role of the United Nations and the CSCE but it would be yet another extreme to fully give up this sphere of activity and turn it over to those organisations. This is the area of Russian interests..."

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA runs the text of a letter by Zurab Labakhua, president of the Phoenix-A Foundation for the Revival of Abkhazia, expressing concern over a likely resumption of the war against Georgia. He believes that, notwithstanding the most complex situation in Russia, the Russian president personally and the Russian Government should intervene to help resolve present-day Abkhazian-Georgian problems.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA summarises remarks made by Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev at a press conference on the results of his Monday talks with Kaspar Filliger, head of the Swiss federal military (defence) department, quoting him as saying that "the Russian military doctrine is of purely defensive nature" and that "all states are viewed by Russia as non-hostile."

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on social welfare problems of Russian servicemen. The newspaper today introduces a "social protection" page, which is to become, the editorial board believes, the epitomy of efforts to uphold the honour, dignity and legitimate rights of the military persons and their families". The newspaper notes that the Russian Army is finding its feet, albeit slowly. "Much in this respect is being done by the Defence Ministry and by the president of the Russian federation".

TRUD on the aggravation of the socio-economic situation in Russia. The newspaper's estimate is that up to 75 per cent of family budget on average is spent on food alone. With the rise in the cost of housing, one has to cut the already scant diet.

The newspaper quotes a recommendation, given to the government by the Russian three-sided commission for a settlement of social and labour relations, "gradually, stage-by-stage avoid a direct regulation of the prices of bread, medicines, public transport fare and utility rates...". However, it seems that the authorities seek to move on to free prices as soon as possible, TRUD observes.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on a survey of expected voter turnout on election day. According to the survey, which was carried out by the newspaper among urban and rural population in 15 regions of Russia, fifty-five per cent of voters will go to the polls on December 12 (plus-minus 4). It is pointed out that "only one out of four" young people is sure to take part in the polling.

The most active group of voters will be in the 40 to 49-year age group. Among those who decided to participate in the polling, 52 per cent to this or that extent welcome current economic reforms and 48 percent repudiate them partially or fully, the newspaper emphasises.

TRUD carries an interview with Sergey Arutyunov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences who dwells on the history of a de-facto extinction of a number of Eskimo tribes in Soviet times.

Almost a whole page in the newspaper is dealing with the subject of corruption in the top echelons of power in Kyrgyzstan. Corruption manifested itself in secret smuggling of gold out of the country to Switzerland in circumvention of customs houses.

Filatov Meets Clinton; Elections Discussed

LD2411023993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0110 GMT 24 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vitaliy Chukseyev]

[Text] Washington, 24 Nov—On 23 November U.S. President Bill Clinton received Sergey Filatov, head of the Russian president's administration here on a working visit, at the White House. The two exchanged opinions on various aspects of the situation in Russia and the United States.

As reported to the ITAR-TASS correspondent by Vladimir Polyakov, Sergey Filatov's aide on political issues, questions were discussed in particular relating to the election campaign and the discussion of the draft of the new Russian constitution. Filatov presented this document in English translation to the President. Clinton said he would be pleased to familiarize himself with it. The U.S. President expressed the conviction that the new constitution will be adopted, that the elections will take place normally, and that Russia will progress by way of the transformations proposed by Boris Yeltsin. In this connection he expressed support for the Russian president once again.

Filatov spoke about his meetings in the White House and expressed thanks for the opportunity to acquaint himself with its work. During the conversation Bill Clinton noted that the U.S. President also has his problems with Congress.

Filatov Views Washington Trip

LD2411100493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0842 GMT 24 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vitaliy Chukseyev]

[Text] Washington November 24 TASS— "There is no doubt that political relations between Russia and the United States are friendly. The U.S. leadership is eager to see our country as a great power," Sergey Filatov, head of the Russian president's administration, who is currently paying a working visit here, told Russian journalists accredited in the United States. He shared with them his impressions of the talks he had with leaders of the American administration.

"Our relations," he stated, "are developing successfully. The situation is more complicated in the economic sphere, where feelings of mistrust are still rife. Therefore, we are advancing step by step in this domain." Filatov said he was sure that the upcoming visits to Moscow by U.S. Vice-President Albert Gore (in mid-December) and President Bill Clinton (in mid-January), and their talks with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and President Boris Yeltsin could give a significant impulse to this process. He expressed the view that concrete plans for bilateral cooperation in the economic sphere were now necessary, for instance, in the petroleum-refining industry, agriculture and several other areas, that is in the most painful spheres for Russia.

The head of the presidential administration said he came to meet Russian journalists directly from the State Department, where he had talks with Warren Christopher. "We have discussed problems of cooperation between our two countries and details of the upcoming visits of American leaders to Russia. In general, I wish to stress," Filatov said in reply to an ITAR-TASS question, "that all the meetings I had were marked by a spirit of good will. This is probably the first time that I have witnessed here such a desire to support everything that is happening in our country."

Filatov said that he was most impressed during the last few days of his stay in Washington by the finely polished off procedure of the U.S. President's relations with the Congress. "I have acquainted myself with great interest with the 'situation room' in the White House and the State Department. Of course, we also have a centre for accumulating vital information, but it needs radical improvement. Very interesting also was the talk devoted to the White House's relations with the public and the mass media, which are organised in such a way as to smooth out many sharp corners," Filatov stated.

The Russian journalists, naturally enough, were interested to know about the political processes now occurring in Russia. Filatov outlined in detail his view on the election campaign and the ongoing discussion of the draft of the new Russian constitution. "This subject figured largely during all the meetings I had here," he stated. "I believe it is extremely important for our foreign colleagues to get an undistorted picture of the events in Russia. I have stressed, in particular, that we are exerting every effort to organise an honest election campaign and to create maximum conditions for all the parties, associations, and their candidates taking part in it. It was also stressed during the talks that the main thing for Russia today is to adopt a new constitution," Filatov stated.

U.S. Parties Prepare To Observe Russian Poll

PM2411091193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Aleksandr Shalnev article: "Won't the $10 Million Promised by Washington Just Disappear?"]

[Text] From the end of this week, U.S. observers will start to congregate in Russia in order to scrutinize the "course of the elections" to the Federal Assembly; I was told at the Moscow bureau of the International Republican Institute, however, that "they will under no circumstances assume the functions of inspectors or investigators." A total of 25 observers and approximately 15 assistants will disperse to 12 Russian cities, where they will spend election day wandering around the polling places.

The institution which Steven Bigan [name as transliterated] represents in Moscow is something like the international section of the U.S. Republican Party. And it is precisely the Republicans, i.e. the opposition, who will be most prominently represented at the Russian elections among all the groups and delegations coming to our country from the United States to observe the progress of the voting.

The ruling Democratic Party is not sending an official delegation at all, although its international wing has about 10 of its staffers here, who are spending approximately $200,000-300,000 on activity relating to the election from the end of October through mid-December. But the Democrats, I was told by Josh Freeman, coordinator of the Russian bureau of the National Democratic Institute for International Relations, "are not performing the function of observers at the election, they are busy with the processes that precede the voting and are trying to investigate problems with a view to learning lessons for the future."

Have they been able to investigate anyth[illegible]g? Yes, Freeman replies, citing first and foremost [illegible] speed with which the election preparation pro[illegible]s are changing, which creates problems for both candidates and voters."

Let me note once again that the U.S. Democrats do not have the status of an official delegation at the election; the U.S. Republicans have a slightly higher profile (they are observers), but this is certainly not the same thing as a visit to Russia by a government-level group or a delegation headed by a former president, Jimmy Carter, for example, who, incidentally, headed the group of U.S. observers which traveled to the elections in Nicaragua and Haiti.

According to some reports, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who visited Moscow several weeks ago, planned to discuss with our officials, including President Boris Yeltsin, the issue of dispatching a very representative U.S. delegation to the Russian elections. A government-level delegation was not ruled out either. The Americans themselves, however, did not raise this issue as a topic for detailed discussion.

The exact reasons are unclear, but we can hypothesize. Some of these reasons may have something to do with the fact that the U.S. Administration is not 100-percent sure that the 12 December elections will be held in Russia in full accordance with international standards, or that there will be no grounds for doubting their fairness and honesty. And if there are any such doubts, they should be set out in the pages of an official report, which should be prepared by an official delegation. The higher the status of the delegation, the higher the status of the report, and consequently the bigger the impact the delegation's observations and conclusions will have.

A report by a public organization is one thing, a report by a government organization—a public one headed by a former president—is quite another. The former would simply "take note," whereas the latter would be regarded by both the administration and Congress as guidance for the formulation of subsequent U.S. policy toward Russia, their policy after the elections.

There is one other fact worthy of mention: During Secretary of State Christopher's visit, he gave us to understand—and IZVESTIYA said so at the time—that the United States was prepared to allocate via its public and party organizations approximately $5-10 million to assist us in holding the elections. But judging by the information we have at our disposal, this money has not yet begun to arrive, and if it has started to arrive the sums involved are extremely insignificant. Admittedly, it cannot be ruled out that in stating these figures, the State Department was referring to money that had already been allocated much earlier, before the announcement that elections were to be held in our country. The sum of just over $200,000 which the National Democratic Institute intended to spend was, it was explained to me, "old money" released via the U.S. Agency for International Development several months ago.

It is unclear whether we will be able to get our hands on this $5-10 million during the three weeks that remain. But it must be understood that in our country there is not even a mechanism for absorbing this amount of foreign money, accounting for it, or distributing and monitoring it. It could, of course, be allocated more simply: $10 million divided equally between all the party blocs that have been allowed to contest the election. Admittedly, this violates the Statute on the Election, which bans candidates from using money obtained abroad.

But are we just going to let the $10 million disappear?...

'Special Features' of Draft U.S. Defense Budget

PM2311110193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Manki Ponomarev report: "U.S. Congress Meets All the Pentagon's Requests"]

[Text] The House of Representatives and the Senate have just ratified, with a seven-week delay, the U.S. draft military budget for fiscal 1994, which began back on 1 October. The document adopted by congressmen and signed by the President sets the overall defense expenditure ceiling at $261 billion. Of this sum, the Pentagon will receive $241 billion.

In contrast to past years, the Congress has met the administration's budget application almost in full. Only its demand for expenditure on the development of ABM defenses has perhaps been somewhat cut back.

Nevertheless, the military budget for fiscal 1994 has a number of substantial special features. And we are not just talking about the fact that that it is over $13 billion down on last year. For the first time the Pentagon budget includes the appropriation of $400 million "to assist the former republics of the Soviet Union to dismantle the

nuclear armaments on their territory." Previously appropriations for those purposes were submitted in separate bills.

Nor did previous Defense Department budgets provide for the allocation of resources for "humanitarian purposes," which principally means the financing of American troops' peacemaking operations in, for example, Somalia.

Another special feature of the new U.S. military budget is the inclusion of expenditure to convert military production and compensate civilian employees dismissed from the Defense Department as a result of the reduction of the Armed Forces. And the amount of money appropriated for those purposes is not so small.

Such are a few of the distinctive features of the U.S. military budget for fiscal 1994. They indicate that Washington does not intend to pursue at its former tempo the policy of the arms race or the use of brute force in international relations. But at the same time it is not slackening the attention it pays to maintaining the combat power of its Armed Forces and providing them with everything necessary. The executive and legislative branches of power are working hand in hand in this area. The legislators have met virtually all the Pentagon's demands for the appropriation of funds to develop various arms systems and enhance the pay of servicemen—both officers and men.

Even with the difficult economic situation which the country is experiencing, Washington does not deem it necessary to make savings on the Armed Forces but is seeking to ensure that they are properly trained and equipped and are capable of successfully carrying out any set task. But whether this task will be appropriate to the prevailing situation is another matter, and the answer to that depends on the country's political leadership.

Sanctions on Ukraine Viewed Over Nuclear Status

LD2311182793 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 1700 GMT 23 Nov 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Defense Ministry]

[Text] Intensive consultations are going on in the Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with Ukraine's virtual refusal to adopt a nonnuclear status. IZVESTIYA reports that the official position will be formulated in the next few days. It is possible that Russia will take retaliatory steps; and harsh economic measures are not ruled out.

Kiev May Scrap More Carrier-Rockets, Warheads

LD2311135293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1327 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Vladimir Suprun]

[Text] Moscow, November 23 (TASS)—"Ukraine does not rule out the possibility of scrapping additional carrier-rockets and nuclear warheads over and above the limits fixed by the START-1 Treaty, but our desire to accelerate its fulfilment still does not meet with an adequate response from our partners," Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia Vladimir Kryzhanovsky told a press conference here today. It was devoted to the Ukrainian ratification of the START-1 Treaty.

"However, we shall fulfil exactly as many of our commitments as we have assumed in conformity with this document," he added.

"The Ukrainian Parliament's decision," Kryzhanovsky noted, "should be regarded as our state's important step towards the phased liquidation of all the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. Ukraine has to cut by 30 per cent the number of carrier-rockets and by 42 per cent the strategic nuclear warheads inherited from the former USSR and now deployed on its territory. More than 80 warheads have already been disassembled and are on their way to Russia."

"Ukraine's hopes to get support from the world community, primarily from the nuclear and other influential powers, have still not materialised: It has still not received reliable guarantees of its security and the promised aid is obviously insufficient. The problem of compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons moved to the territory of Russia has not been decided too. If the reaction will be adequate to our lawful demands, we shall do everything to step up the process of Ukraine's advancement towards a nuclear-free status," the ambassador stated. "We feel the Clinton administration's great desire, though it is still insufficient, to meet us halfway. In any case this desire is greater than that of our brother—Russia," Kryzhanovsky said.

Ukraine's Stance on Nuclear Status Criticized

PM2311114993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Sergey Prokopenko report under the "Events and Commentaries" rubric: "Ukraine Has Decided To Sell Its Nuclear Status a Little Less Cheaply"]

[Text] "It is time for us to stop portraying ourselves as a nuclear power"—this is how Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk commented on the decree "On Ratifying the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic and Offensive Armaments Signed in Moscow 31 July 1991, and the Protocol Thereto Signed in Lisbon on Ukraine's Behalf 28 May 1993," which has been adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament. So it is that by means of the adopted document the Ukrainian parliamentarians have ratified the treaty they call START I.

However, in the experts' opinion, this decree, which was adopted with 13 major reservations, fundamentally alters the thrust of the previously adopted documents. In

particular, the article on the Lisbon Protocol providing for Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the capacity of a nonnuclear state has been "bypassed." It is also stipulated that the full inventory [vse imushchestvo] of strategic and tactical nuclear forces located on Ukraine's territory, including their nuclear weapons [boyezaryady], constitutes the state property of Ukraine, which will thus exercise administrative control over the strategic nuclear forces on its territory.

The terms for Ukraine's gradual transition to nonnuclear status are defined by another reservation. In particular, these terms stipulate the acquisition of reliable guarantees of Ukraine's national security. The thrust of other "amendments" boils down to the irritating question of compensation and aid: Once aid is forthcoming, disarmament will begin. So it is that Ukrainian Government Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov reckons that in order to implement the START I Treaty—and I will remind you that Ukraine intends to destroy 36 percent of its carriers and 42 percent of its weapons [boyezaryady]—the republic requires between $1.6 and $1.7 billion, and some $3.8 billion for their complete destruction.

The Ukrainian parliament's decree also states that Ukraine will undertake to exchange ratification documents only after all its terms have been met, and in the event that other states of the world join all the Union republics, the USSR's successors, and the United States in the process of cutting their nuclear arms.

It is evident that, even having stated their position in respect to their participation in the nuclear disarmament process, Ukraine's politicians have tried to extract the maximum advantage from this.

According to Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, incidentally, on these questions both Ukraine's president and its government occupy a position different from that of the Supreme Council. In his view, the Ukrainian parliament's decision creates a highly alarming impression. "In point of fact," he stressed, "everything indicates that Ukraine is declaring itself the possessor [obladatel] of the nuclear weapons located on the territory of that state, and is reserving the opportunity to avoid liquidating this weaponry in full over the course of seven years, as follows from the international obligations assumed by it. On the other hand, it is not assuming direct obligations to accede as quickly as possible to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the capacity of a nonnuclear state. This creates an extraordinarily serious situation for the entire system of international relations, above all in Europe. For the first time in many decades a legislative organ of power is gambling on the collapse of the international nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime, and we are talking about the emergence of a new nuclear state."

Conditions for START I Condemned

LD2311212193 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 1700 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Nina Volynskaya commentary from the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] I would like to say a few words about another problem in a country of the former USSR, about the Ukrainian parliament's ratification of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty, START I, and the conditions it has laid down for this.

Formally, the START I Treaty has been ratified by the Ukrainian parliament. But this action has been hedged around with so many provisos that a very serious question arises: Does this ratification lay the path to Ukraine's becoming a non-nuclear state?

Let us look at the facts. At present there are a total of about 2,000 nuclear warheads on Ukrainian territory. The nuclear arsenal which it possesses is more powerful than those of France, China, and Britain added together. The Ukrainian parliament for some reason decided that the START I Treaty applies to only slightly over one third of the carrier missiles and just over 40 percent of the nuclear warheads. Thus, Ukraine, in practice, retains a colossal nuclear potential, and for an indefinite period.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has stated that in practice Ukraine is a country possessing nuclear weapons which are located on its territory contrary to its international obligations. But before it will implement the START I Treaty, Kiev has put forward a total of 13 conditions. These include not only international guarantees of its security, and vast international financial aid to dismantle the nuclear weapons, but also compensation for the elimination of the nuclear potential.

Just imagine! It wants to receive compensation for weapons that never belonged to independent Ukraine. The weapons were the property of the former USSR, and by consent of the international community, Russia is now its legal successor.

Thus, Kiev states quite unambiguously that if there is no international aid and no compensation then the process of nuclear disarmament could be halted. In such conditions the reaction by the U.S. State Department is quite correct: The actions by Kiev are likely to delay or totally prevent the treaty from coming into force.

But there is one further circumstance which makes the world community cautious about Ukraine's policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons. Kiev has totally forgotten the pledge it gave to accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Ukraine should have acceded to the treaty as a non-nuclear state. But since it remains in practice a nuclear power it evidently does not consider it obligatory to accede to the treaty.

The near future will evidently show whether Ukraine can drop its international obligations so easily and still count

on the trust of the world community. Kiev's ambitions are hardly likely to strengthen the international prestige of the Ukrainian state.

Searches for Journalists in Abkhazia Detailed

LD2411121793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1109 GMT 24 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS observer Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Nov—An independent commission of journalists empowered by two funds, the Defense of Glasnost and Sakharov Funds, has returned to Moscow from Abkhazia, where it was endeavoring to determine the fate of the missing journalists Yuriy Gavva, Aleksandr Berulava, Iosif Gobechiya, and Aleksandr Topuriya.

We managed to establish that Yuriy Gavva, former editor in chief of the paper DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ABKHAZIYA [DEMOCRATIC ABKHAZIA], is in a remand center in Gudauta. Aleksey Simonov, chairman of the board of the Defense of Glasnost Fund, noted today in a conversation with the ITAR-TASS observer. The commission received guarantees from Vladislav Ardzinba, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, that Gavva will be released by the end of this week and handed over to the Russian side.

Simonov said that the commission's investigation had revealed that journalist Aleksandr Berulava was last seen in Sukhumi during the September fighting, while his colleague Aleksandr Topuriya was last seen in the same town a month earlier. The commission also learned that according to the Abkhaz Security Service, journalist Iosif Gobechiya managed to cross over from Abkhazia into Russia. Representatives of the United Nations and Red Cross missions did not confirm earlier information to the effect that Topuriya had been killed, nor reports that Berulava had been wounded and was kept in a remand center in Gudauta. We would be grateful to anyone who provides us with any information about the fate of our colleagues, Simonov said.

Members of the Independent Commission of Journalists noted with satisfaction the Abkhaz and Georgian sides' readiness to exchange information on those reported missing in action during [illegible] hostilities. However, Simonov stressed that mass media representatives had not been allowed into Abkhazia in the last few weeks, which leads to extremely unprofessional and biased coverage of the situation in the region.

Yeltsin Representative on Moldovan Mediation

PM2311143593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Svetlana Gamova report: "Talks on Dniester Region To Be Resumed With Russian Participation"]

[Text] Chisinau—Talks on settling the Dniester region conflict are to be resumed in the near future. Russia intends to take an active part in them, according to Nikolay Medvedev, President B. Yeltsin's representative, who has been in Moldova on an official visit.

Medvedev stated that "new conditions and opportunities for galvanizing the talks process have now appeared," and he noted both sides' positive attitude toward this.

To ensure that the political dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol becomes more positive, a new formula for the talks was proposed: three people each from Moldova and the Dniester region plus a Russian representative. Without aspiring, Medvedev stressed, to more than a mediatory role, Russia is pursuing only one aim: to facilitate the restoration of Moldova's territorial integrity and to help elaborate the special status for the Dniester region which was stipulated by last year's July agreement signed by B. Yeltsin and M. Snegur.

Incidentally, CSCE representatives working in Moldova at the request of its government are in favor of giving the Dniester region special status. In its recommendations the CSCE mission specifies the region's rights should Moldova change its political status, that is, join another state. In this case, the recommendations note, the Dniester region should have the right to self-determination guaranteed by international organizations.

The principle on which the Left Bank leadership was insisting until recently was a confederative treaty with Moldova. Chisinau has been adhering to a provision enshrined in the country's constitution on Moldova's being a unitary state. In Medvedev's opinion Russia's role as mediator is to bring these positions closer together. Citing the Russian president's desire to help Moldova resolve the conflict, his representative expressed his confidence that the Dniester region problem would be solved in the near future.

Government Changes Peacekeeping Forces in Moldova

LD2311133393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1258 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, November 23 (TASS)—Four motorized rifle batallions and other units of the 27th Division of the Russian peace-making forces have begun to implement their peace-making mission in the Dniester region.

The peace keepers arrived in the area of a recent armed conflict from the Orenburg oblast, the Tiraspol-based "OLVIA-PRESS" news agency said on Tuesday.

The servicemen, who will stay here in accordance with a contract for six months, are led by Colonels Valeriy Stasov and Valeriy Kononets.

The peace keepers, who earlier implemented their mission in Moldova's left-bank areas, are now returning to their permanent stations.

Churkin Summons Armenian Envoy Over Attack

LD2311152693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1240 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Nov—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin summoned the permanent representative of Armenia to Moscow, Feliks Mamikonyan, on Monday [22 November] and handed to him the text of the Russian Government statement regarding the incident in Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 November, Russian presidential representative and special envoy, Vladimir Kazimirov, and persons accompanying him came under attack.

The meeting was reported today at a briefing held by Grigoriy Karasin, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's information and press department.

According to Karasin, Russian Ambassador to Armenia Vladimir Stupishin has meanwhile been instructed to remain in Moscow for consultations.

Kozyrev: No Armenian Reaction on Kazimirov

LD2311181993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] In an interview with INTERFAX today, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said that Armenia has so far made no reaction whatsoever to the Russian Government statement on the gun attack on the car of Vladimir Kazimirov, the Russian president's special representative.

For this reason, Vladimir Stupishin, Russian ambassador to Armenia, remains for the time being in Moscow. His return to Yerevan is being postponed.

I remind you that the car carrying Kazimirov came under fire on 20 November from Armenian formations on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Yerevan, however, pinned the blame on the Azerbaijani side, whose authorities had arbitrarily changed the Russian diplomatic mission's route from Azerbaijan to Armenia.

According to the SNARK agency, Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan has arived in Moscow. There is no mention of the purpose of the visit, but it is probably linked with the incident and stems from the need to obtain a large ruble credit from Russia to back the dram, the new Armenian monetary unit.

Kozyrev Demands Apology

PM2411100793 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Nov 93 p 1

[Leonid Timofeyev report: "Kozyrev Demands an Apology. At Present"]

[Text] To judge from the statement which Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev made at Monday's news conference on the incident in Nagorno-Karabakh involving Vladimir Kazimirov, the Russian Federation president's special representative, Moscow might well make the transition from persuasion in its mediatory mission to "other methods."

The minister emphasized that, if such a thing had happened to a U.S. representative, the "offenders" would immediately have been able to observe a U.S. aircraft carrier off their shores. Nevertheless, he pointed out, Russia is demanding at present that Armenia, from whose territory the mediation mission was fired on 20 November, issue a "public apology" and punish the guilty persons.

According to the Russian minister, Moscow has strategic interests in that region and intends to act quite tough, mindful of the danger of other countries being drawn into the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. If the opposing sides do not draw a lesson from the incident, Russia's aid to Armenia and Azerbaijan might be reduced to "zero," Andrey Kozyrev declared.

Tajikistan Given 1 Billion Rubles in Credit

LD2311211293 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin and Tajikistan's Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullojonov, have today signed in Moscow an intergovernmental agreement on granting Tajikistan a cash credit worth 1 billion Russian rubles. The credit will be used to exchange the bank notes currently in circulation in Tajikistan—which are of the pre-1992 type—for Russian rubles of the 1993 issue.

In his interview with the INTERFAX agency, Aleksandr Shokhin described the Tajik-Russian agreement as unique. Explaining this remark, he said that an understanding had been reached with the other CIS countries, who signed a document on joining the ruble zone in September 1993, involving some other schemes for the unification of their monetary systems.

Tajikistan's prime minister said that the signing of the agreement was the first step, and indicated that the republic had indeed joined the ruble zone.

Border Guards Commander on Security Operations

PM2411093993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko: "Border Guards Commander on Border Situation"]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Nov—Russia's Border Guards have arrested more than 3,000 violators of the border since the start of the year. Border control units and subunits have let more than 32 million people and around 4 million vehicles through checkpoints in 1993 (the figures for all of 1992 were 13.8 million and 1.4 million respectively). In conjunction with customs organs, contraband worth 3.6 billion rubles has been confiscated along with around 1,000 firearms and large quantities of drugs and ammunition. These figures were quoted today in an exclusive interview with this ITAR-TASS correspondent by Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of the Russian Federation Border Guards. "Our people are doing everything possible, and sometimes even the impossible, to carry out the combat mission facing them," he stressed.

The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border continues to be alarming, in his opinion. In October alone "border posts and border guards subunits in Tajikistan have come under fire 55 times—including 27 times from the Afghan side. Border guards have joined battle 18 times, killing 16 intruders and wounding three. For our part, four servicemen have been wounded."

According to Gen. Nikolayev's information, conferences of the leaders of Islamic Revival Party armed formations were held recently in the Afghan border town of Emam Saheb and in Tajikistan's Pyandzhskiy Rayon. "They elaborated a plan for combat operations on the border and in the republic's border regions. Decisions were made to step up the transfer across the border from Afghanistan of armed groups to engage in operations on Tajik territory. They number 5,000 men in all. Their missions include acts of terrorism against officers of the Pyandzh Border Detachment, who, in the Islamic Party's opinion, have inflicted the greatest damage on their formations."

The situation remains complex in the Transcaucasus region too, the general believes. This is a result of the hostilities in Georgia. Russian border guards in maritime sectors have found themselves at the epicenter of events.

In the commander's opinion, the problems faced by border guards in the northwest of the country are linked "primarily to the fact that the territorial claims against Russia from Latvia and Estonia have still not been removed from the agenda." Border guards in these areas are being caused a lot of trouble by smugglers. "This year alone we have prevented the smuggling to the Baltic from the Russian Federation of around 1,000 tonnes of nonferrous metals and more than 300 tonnes of fuels and lubricants. More than 150 kg of narcotics, 49 firearms, and 254,000 rounds of ammunition have been seized," Gen. Nikolayev noted.

The commander expressed satisfaction at the fact that the Russian Armed Forces General Staff has almost entirely satisfied the border guards' requests for manpower to be drawn from among draftees, which will undoubtedly make it possible to qualitatively carry out the tasks facing Russia's Border Guards.

Latvian UN Stance on Human Rights Condemned

PM2311135593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Sergey Knyazkov report under the "Events and Commentaries" rubric: "'There's One Thing Wrong With the Russians...'—Latvian Diplomats Intend To 'Put a Stop' to Discussion in United Nations of Question of Human Rights in Baltic States"]

[Text] A resolution urging the interested parties to reach agreement regarding the immediate withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Estonia and Latvia, including a schedule for this withdrawal, was adopted by the UN General Assembly 15 November without a vote—by consensus. The resolution recommends that the UN secretary general offer his services in settling the troop withdrawal question, and it is also proposed that the interested states refrain from any kind of statements and actions which may be interpreted as provocative or hostile.

Addressing the General Assembly session, Yuliy Vorontsov, Russia's permanent representative to the United Nations, noted that the problem of the construction of accommodations for servicemen and members of their families constitutes a major obstacle to the speedy conclusion of the withdrawal of troops from these states. Nevertheless, it is now known that, despite this, Russia declared a readiness to withdraw its troops from Estonia and Latvia by 1 September 1994 at the scheduled rounds of talks with these states.

On 24 November the United Nations intends to examine another equally sensitive question in Russia's relations with Estonia and Latvia—the question of human rights in these Baltic States. What, then, is the reaction to this of Aivars Baumanis, Latvia's permanent representative to the United Nations? A highly original one—in an interview for the newspaper LATVIJAS VESTNIEKS the diplomat stated that Latvia's representatives will try to bring about a situation whereby everything is reduced to an announcement by the committee chairman. And the optimum program: that there be nothing at all, not even an announcement. "There's one thing wrong with the Russians," Baumanis observes, "they keep harping on the same old thing."

Let us not dwell on the arrogant tone of Mr. Baumanis's remarks, but Russia's concern for the fate of its compatriots left in the Baltic region as a result of the disintegration of a unified country is not without foundation. For instance, in November the Latvian Department of Citizenship and Immigration began to give "exit orders" to persons without a permanent residence permit and citizenship. On the basis of the law on exit and residence in Latvia by foreigners and persons without citizenship, they are instructed to leave republic territory within seven days. Moreover, they are deprived of the right to enter Latvia for five years.

Kolesnikov Holds Talks With Cuban Official

LD2311182893 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 1700 GMT 23 Nov 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, has held talks with Divisional General Julio Casas Regueiro, first vice minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba. There was discussion of military-equipment links between the two countries.

Paper on Kohl Stopover, Talks With Yeltsin

PM2411095593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Vladimir Lapskiy report: "Chancellor Kohl's Lightning Visit to Moscow Was Extremely Important"]

[Text] During his lightning visit to Moscow, FRG Chancellor Kohl reported that Russian President Yeltsin has been invited to the "European summit" scheduled for 10-11 December in Brussels. An agreement on a partnership between the European Union and Russia is expected to be signed in the Belgian capital.

I will remind you that Kohl landed in Moscow on his way home from China and Hong Kong, where, according to correspondents for Western agencies, he held fruitful talks in favor of German industrialists and signed several important treaties. In Moscow he wanted, so he had declared the day before, to obtain firsthand information on the development of the situation in Europe's largest country. Kohl's last meeting with Yeltsin had taken place on the shore of Lake Baykal last July and was brief—the German chancellor was passing through then too. Not that the brevity of these meetings means anything. As the chancellor told journalists, he is in regular communication with the Russian president and holds a telephone conversation with him at least two or three times a week.

Kohl reaffirmed his support for the reforms in our country "aimed at building a rule-of-law state, strengthening the democratic regime, and creating a market economy." The first free parliamentary elections since the breakup of the USSR and the approval of the new Constitution are to be important preconditions for this. This Constitution bears "the imprint of the president's personality" but is undoubtedly of a democratic nature.

Among the Western leaders, the German chancellor is probably the most ardent defender of Yeltsin's reforms, and the FRG gives us more material and moral help than anyone else. Since 1989 it has given our country assistance to the tune of 83 billion marks (more than $50 billion). There are virtually no problems between the FRG and the Russian Federation today which cannot be resolved in an amicable and constructive way. There is no need to say how important German support is to Russia in one of the most dramatic periods in its history.

According to the chancellor, "practically all spheres" of relations between the two countries were touched on in the two-hour meeting with Yeltsin. Two topics stood out in particular: the mass emigration from Russia of ethnic Germans, of whom there are approximately 2 million in our country (Moscow and Bonn have an identical interest in halting or at least reducing this flow), and also the withdrawal of Russian troops from the FRG. Next year, the chancellor said, "Boris Yeltsin and I will together celebrate the day when the last Russian soldier leaves Germany from the forces, which have been there for 50 years since the end of World War II."

The chancellor announced that the Russian president has been invited to pay an official visit to the FRG next May.

Kozyrev Explains Military Doctrine to Juppe

LD2311212093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2105 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Paris November 23 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has sent a message to his French counterpart Alain Juppe to explain basic provisions of the new Russian military doctrine. The message was presented to the French foreign minister today by Russian Ambassador to France Yuriy Ryzhov.

According to a report of the Russian Embassy circulated here today, this was done by the Russian side to express confidence, frankness and openness reached in international relations under new conditions and spread the Russian-French dialogue to new, previously closed and delicate items.

The dialogue, which is a stabilizing factor by itself, aims at bringing closer together the stands of the two nuclear powers in the sphere of defence and security, as well as at deepening their mutual understanding.

The fundamentals of the Russian military doctrine testify to its choice in favour of normal and civilized relations with the world and predictability of its military policy which is purely peaceful and defensive, says the message of Andrey Kozyrev.

A news conference held at the Russian Embassy in Paris today stressed Kozyrev's message testifies to confident relations between Moscow and Paris. The diplomatic step has been made to develop the agreements reached during the recent Russian visit of French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur.

Russia is interested in the legal status of location of French troops outside the country. French experience in this sphere can be very useful, stressed the news conference.

Finland To Broaden Trade Relations With Russia

LD2311164693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1233 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho stated that the problems of Russia's debt to Finland cannot be solved quickly, although it is being actively discussed in the Paris Club and in bilateral talks. Nevertheless, Finland intends to broaden trade with Russia and invest in the Russian economy, he told a press conference in St. Petersburg on Monday.

He pointed out that Finland was particularly interested in St. Petersburg, above all in finishing the construction of a diesel engine works near Vsevolozhsk (Leningrad Region) in which where Finland had already invested $400 Mn.

The talks between the Finnish prime minister and Mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoliy Sobchak dealt with projects for the development of the infrastructure, the construction of roads and the extension of the highway linking Moscow and St. Petersburg to the north over to Helsinki. The two officials also discussed the possibility of opening an institute of Finnish culture in St. Petersburg.

Aho said that the current Russian banking system allows local authorities to qualify the work of foreign and joint enterprises as a violation of the law, and added that no damage should be inflicted on Finnish-Russian cooperation. He also said that customs and border control should be more efficient, loads should not be delayed on the border and crime should be combatted.

On Tuesday, the Finnish prime minister will meet with head of the Leningrad Regional administration Aleksandr Belyakov. In the evening Esko Aho is leaving for Helsinki.

Churkin To Attend Geneva Meeting on Bosnia

LD2311181693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1746 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelyov]

[Text] Moscow November 23 TASS—There will be two meetings on Bosnian settlement in Geneva—one to attract foreign ministers from twelve states of the European Union, representatives of the three sides to the Bosnian crisis and special representatives of Russia and the United States.

The other will be held under the aegis of Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, co-chairmen of the Coordination Committee of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, special representative of the Russian president to negotiations on former Yugoslavia and Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin told ITAR-TASS here today.

Churkin commented on a proposal of the Luxembourg extraordinary session of the European Union's Council to hold the meeting in Geneva next Monday.

The co-chairmen have also sent an invitation to attend the meeting to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and President of Montenegro Momir Bulatovic.

The meeting is another effort to bring the Bosnian settlement to a logical end, said Vitaliy Churkin. The situation requires a political decision in view of a "humanitarian catastrophe"—winter frosts, the lack of food and medicines in the conflict zone.

The meeting will discuss the settlement and lifting of embargo against Yugoslavia, said the deputy foreign minister. Russia has long called for this and it is a major provision of the Russian regional policy currently shared by the European Union.

There is an impression the European Union "will not make tough figure demands on territorial settlement", said Churkin. This makes the negotiations more flexible and gives more space for manoeuvre. This is also expected to prompt the sides to achieve a mutually acceptable and lasting decision.

It was the flexibility Russian representatives have called for during their recent contacts with the European Union. Churkin and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had a telephone conversation today to stress the situation is favourable "for the ultimate decisive effort to achieve settlement and peace in Bosnia". The Russian representative called on the Serbian leader to use his influence for the achievement of this goal.

Bulgaria Fails To Reach Accord on Payments

AU2311184093 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] A Bulgarian governmental delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Valentin Karabashev visited Moscow. The basic part of the brief visit of the Bulgarian deputy prime minister has a confidential character. Our reporter Valeri Todorov reports from Moscow.

[Begin Todorov recording] The second visit of Mr. Karabashev to Russia in the last six months will apparently be more successful than the first. The merit for this

belongs to other delegations, primarily military, which visited Moscow before Mr. Karabashev.

The talks with the Russians progress with difficulties, despite the mutual willingness to mark a faster progress and the existing preconditions.

Some 15 percent of our export in the first six months of the year went to Russia, while 34.5 percent of our imports came from Russia. We export primarily cigarettes, medicines, electric cars, foodstuffs, conductors, and batteries. We mainly import oil, gas, radioactive elements and isotopes, private cars, and coal.

This is not an exchange of high technologies. The trade exchange is modest and encounters ever more difficulties, mainly because of the payments, which were the leading topic of the talks between Mr. Karabashev and Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov. They are cochairmen of the Joint Bulgarian-Russian Governmental Commission.

The attempts to overcome the transportation problems did not meet with any special success, while the risks along the road toward the Russian market and at the market itself scare the potential businessmen. The private businessmen prefer sporadic deals at the fringe of the law. The state guarantees work best in the military sphere. It is in this sphere that the two countries hope to diminish their mutual debts through mutual production and deals and military supplies.

In anything related to the major theme of who owes what to whom, how much, and in what form, the two delegations found out that they speak different languages. Apparently, we began to forget our Russian language. Well, I hope that I did not reveal any state secret. The rest you can hear from Mr. Karabashev, who will arrive within one hour in Sofia. [end recording]

UN Decision on Anti-Iraqi Sanctions Backed

LD2311211893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2035 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] At a Tuesday briefing in Moscow the official spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry Grigoriy Karasin said Russia supports the decision of the UN Security Council to prolong sanctions against Iraq.

He said Iraq has not fulfilled most of the requirements concerning the end of the Gulf war and refuses to recognize the border with Kuwait which does not permit the international community to begin large-scale control over the Iraqi mass destruction weapons program.

However, a positive element has appeared in the Iraqi approach. This was confirmed by the November report of Chairman of the UN special commission for the disarmament of Iraq Rolf Eckeus. "The significance of these changes would have been greater, if Iraq officially recognized Resolution No. 715 and conscientiously carried out the rest of its commitments to the international community," the ministry spokesman said.

Shumeyko Meets Husayn, Ends Visit to Jordan

LD2411113393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1013 GMT 24 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Dmitriy Zelenin]

[Text] Amman November 24 TASS—First Vice-Premier Vladimir Shumeyko, who headed a Russian delegation of state officials and representatives of private economic, financial, banking, and scientific organisations, has completed his visit to Jordan. The delegation took part in the first-ever Russo-Jordanian roundtable, intended to promote mutually profitable partnership.

The head of the Russian delegation was received by King Husayn Bin-Talal of Jordan. They exchanged views on various aspects of bilateral relations, on the situation in the Middle East and in the world in general. Both statesmen noted the identity of Moscow's and Amman's stand on key problems of the region. The Russian side pointed out that Jordan was playing an important stabilising role in Middle Eastern affairs and was, in particular, contributing to the peace process there.

Shumeyko had a talk with Crown Prince Hasan Bin-Talal, who patronised the roundtable from the Jordanian side. Reciprocal interest was expressed during the negotiations in the promotion of business partnership for the good of the two nations, and concrete ways were mapped out to expand and consolidate Russo-Jordanian relations.

The head of the Russian delegation and his party called at various Jordanian ministries and institutions, visited local banks and industrial enterprises, and toured the country.

The roundtable culminated in the signing of six joint protocols on arbitration, scientific and technological development, entrepreneurship, and banking. The Russian and Jordanian sides agreed that it was necessary to set up a joint inter-governmental commission to promote economic, scientific, and technological development, which would give a fresh impetus to bilateral cooperation, proceeding from the ideas and results of the roundtable.

Interviewed by ITAR-TASS, Shumeyko stressed that the Russo- Jordanian forum in Amman was marked by a businesslike atmosphere. In his opinion, most noteworthy is the fact that the sides have elaborated a concept for bilateral relations and that its practical implementation will help promote commercial and economic relations by raising them to a new qualitative level. Long-term and solid economic and commercial contacts will back up political relations.

"In the course of our meetings with Jordanian representatives," Shumeyko noted, "we were able to feel their profound interest in contacts with Russia. It is important that the roundtable has opened up broad vistas for cooperation and exchanges not only between official structures, but within the private sector, too.

Crown Prince Hasan told ITAR-TASS that the Jordanian people harboured the warmest feelings for the Russian people. "Today," he said, "a new page has been turned in relations between the two countries which were always marked by mutual understanding and identity of assessments in the political sphere, but lagged behind in the economic domain. We now feel Russia's great openness towards Jordan and the other Arab states. We hope that the roundtable documents and recommendations will create a solid foundation for the entire range of relations between our two states, will promote progress in Russia's relations with the Arab east."

The Russian delegation left Amman for Moscow today.

Jordanian Military Delegation on Official Visit

PM2311134393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Official Visit"]

[Text] A Jordanian military delegation headed by Lieutenant General Mahmud Hammad, first deputy chairman of the Jordanian Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, arrived on an official visit in Moscow 21 November.

The itinerary includes meetings and talks with the leadership of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and visits to military units and military educational establishments in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The visit will last until 28 November.

Meeting in India Planned on Space Rocket Deal

MK2311125093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 82, 23 Nov 93 (Signed to press 22 Nov) p 1

[INTERFAX report: "Russia To Settle 'Indian Deal' Problem Soon"]

[Text] It has become known from trustworthy sources that a meeting has been planned in Delhi at the end of November between representatives of Russian space rocket enterprises and leaders of India's National Space Agency. To be finalized during the meeting are concrete points in the joint cooperation program which do not contradict the nonproliferation of rocket technology rules, the memorandum of intention to join which Russia signed in Washington on 2 September 1993.

Foreign Ministry Welcomes Decisions in South Africa

LD2311172593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1411 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] The Russian Foreign Ministry, welcoming the decisions of the multi-party forum in South Africa that approved on the night of November 18 the draft temporary Constitution and a law on elections, confirms its support to democratic transformations in South Africa, The spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry Grigoriy Karasin has told a briefing in Moscow Tuesday.

The documents adopted by South Africa's multi-party forum will be a legal basis for the first general democratic elections in the country this coming spring, as well as the foundation for the country's state and political structure over the five-year transition period.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has called on all the South African political parties, associations and blocs that left the talks, to take part in implementation of the agreements on the transition period and the elections, show goodwill for settling disagreements through talks and display a maximum of wisdom and responsibility for creating a stable, prosperous and democratic South Africa.

EC Gives 100,000 ECU Aid to Electoral Commission

LD2311181493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1745 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Moscow November 23 TASS—Head of the EC Commission's Moscow office estimated the EC aid to the Russian Central Electoral Commission at no less than 100,000 ecu.

In his words, the money was used to buy Xerox copying machines, faxes, telephones, computers and other stationery for the Central Electoral Commission.

Statistics Committee on Foreign Trade Data

LD2311191193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1716 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] In the first ten months of the year the volume of Russia's foreign trade was $46.9 Bn (without the other former Soviet republics) which is 18.5% less than during the same period last year.

According to the State Committee for Statistics, industrialized countries kept their leading position in foreign trade: Their share in exports and imports was between 59 and 61%. The share of developing countries in exports was 23% and 26% in imports. Trade with former partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance continued to fall, but while last year it was accompanied by growing trade with industrialized countries, this year with developing countries, China in particular. [sentence as received]

Germany remains the biggest trade partner with $7.37 Bn. China came second with $4.01 Bn leaving behind Italy ($3.19 Bn), the U.S.A. ($2.33 Bn), France ($2 Bn) and Japan ($1.92 Bn).

Russian exports increased by 11.2% and reached $31.4 Bn compared with the same period last year. The share of oil was 22.7% (21.4% last year), and of natural gas 18.2% (19.5%).

In the first ten months of the year Russian imports amounted to $15.5 Bn, which means a 50% drop in comparable prices. Since the beginning of the year there has been an especially great decline in imports from Hong Kong and Taiwan (by over two thirds), from Thailand by 72%, from Singapore by 85% and from South Korea by 88%. The main causes for the drop were the low exchange rate of the ruble, the introduction of a 20% value added tax on imported goods as well as customs duties and the shortage of hard currency.

Besides, imports are shrinking in the context of radical cuts in government purchases: While in the first nine months of 1992 only 13% of goods were not imported by the government, this year the figure grew to 47%.

Media Issues

Yeltsin Edict on Use of Channel Eight Television

LD2311162993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1219 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian at 1440 GMT on 23 November transmits a service message killing this item]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the decree: On the use of Channel Eight Television (Moscow). The decree, the text of which was circulated by the president's press service, states:

For the purposes of improving the quality of television broadcasting and developing non-state television in Russia, I resolve:

1. To accept the proposal of the NTV Television Company agreed with the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company on starting the experimental relaying of programs of the NTV television company on Channel Eight Television from 1 January 1994.

To recommend that "Ostankino" Russian State Television and Radio Company become a participant in the NTV Television Company.

The Russian Ministry of Communications is to ensure that programs of the NTV television company are relayed on Channel Eight Television from 1 January 1994, while preserving its distribution network and conditions.

Within a month and in line with legislation, the Russian Ministry of Press and Information and Ministry of Communications are to:

Settle the matter of assigning the Eighth Television Channel (Moscow) and its distribution network to the NTV Television Company (daily from 1800 until closedown) for a total volume of broadcasting of 58 hours per week; take into account the agreement between the National Sports Foundation and the NTV Television Company on allocation of two hours of broadcasting time daily for the promotion of physical education and sports;

Assign morning and afternoon broadcasting hours (until 1800 daily) on the Eighth Television Channel (Moscow) to the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company for the broadcasting of programs of the Russian Universities television channel with the aim of showing cultural, educational, and popular science programs, as well as specialized programs on enterprise, land reform, privatization, conversion, system of taxation, banking, and insurance business.

2. To declare null and void Article 4 of the Russian president's Decree No. 421 of 2 April 1993 on guarantees of information stabilization in the operation of the Ostankino Russian State Television and Radio Company.

3. The decree comes into force from the moment of publication.

Further on Decree

LD2311164293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1411 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree Tuesday [23 November] ordering experimental NTV broadcasting on the eighth Moscow channel, beginning January 1, 1994.

The state-owned TV and radio company Ostankino is told to become a contributor to the NTV.

The Press and Information Ministry has a month to enable the NTV to use the channel daily from 18:00 until the end of programs for 58 hours a week.

Until 18:00 the channel will be used by the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company for educational and popular science programs and for programs on entrepreneurship, land reform, privatization, conversion, taxation, banking and insurance.

The decree will take effect immediately.

The NTV is headed by Igor Malashenko, former Ostankino deputy chairman. Famous journalists Yevgeniy Kiselyov, the host of the weekly analysis program Itogi, and Tatyana Mitkova are on its staff.

Yeltsin Suspends Edict

LD2311173793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1715 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 23 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—The press service of the Russian Federation president circulated the following report today: "As a result of the number of contradictory circumstances connected with the possibility of implementing Edict 1975 of 22 November 1993 'On using the eighth television channel (Moscow),' Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin has given instructions for the suspension of the said edict going into force, in order finally to coordinate the interests of the parties involved."

'Itogi' To Be Shown on TV Channel Four

LD2311132093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1220 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Nechayev]

[Text] Moscow November 23 TASS—The popular "Itogi" analytical news programme may be aired on Channel Four of the "Ostankino" state TV network beginning from the new year.

The private NTV company founded by the "Itogi" group and three major commercial banks received part of the air time of the channel from 18.00 hours till the end of

the broadcasts from January 1, 1994, according to a presidential decree made public on Tuesday [23 November].

"It is for the first time in Russia that a private tv company has received its own TV channel", anchorman Yevgeniy Kiselev told TASS.

However, this does not mean that "Itogi" will quit broadcasts on the St. Petersburg channel where it is currently aired every Sunday. Kiselev said that his programme may appear on both channels and the issue is being discussed now.

The Channel Four and the St. Petersburg tv have some 60-70 million audiences each, but the regions they cover coincide only to some 30 per cent, according to Kiselev, who added that the NTV is planning to remain on both channels in order to double its audience.

The decree recommends the "Ostankino" tv state company to join the founders of the NTV, but Kiselev said this is only a recommendation and the issue is subject to future negotiations.

Media Chiefs Complain to Yeltsin About Use of Press House

LD2311143993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1348 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Thirty-five editors in chief—leaders of mass information media whose journalists work in the Russian Press House—have sent a letter to President Boris Yeltsin in connection with the head of state's intention to locate the Federation Council in that building. "This extremely dangerous step, Mr. President, will alienate the journalists of Russia from you," the letter says. "In three years of exhausting struggle for democracy the workers of the mass information media have obtained nothing from the authorities except the Press House at 26 Pushkin Street."

The letter also contains a reminder that the Russian Press House is completely self-supporting and does not get a single ruble from the state budget.

"The Russian Press House became one of the main political centers in Moscow during the April referendum: more than 1.2 million signatures were gathered here in support of the president of Russia," the message to Boris Yeltsin notes. During the tragic events of 3 and 4 October in Moscow the putschists failed to destroy this center of democratic forces. "Now people are trying to destroy it in the name of the president," the media chiefs write. In their opinion the Russian Press House, being a center of democratic forces, is "a trump card in the political struggle which is going on among various groups and top officials."

In conclusion, the journalists' leaders again expressed their conviction that "the president's course of reforming Russia's political system can only be put into practice with the full support of the fourth estate."

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Wins Case Against Press Ministry

LD2311135493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1327 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Belskiy]

[Text] Moscow November 23 TASS—The Moscow regional court has ruled to satisfy a lawsuit brought by the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper against the Russian Ministry for the Press and Information which suspended the newspaper after tragic events in October in Moscow.

If no complaints are lodged against the court's resolution with superior organisations, the resolution will come into effect in ten days, ITAR-TASS learned from court officials.

Political Issues

Constitution Information Service Described

PM2411110193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Oksana Petrunko: "If Russians Understand Thrust of Fundamental Law, It Will Be Adopted"]

[Text] The temporary information service on the draft Russian Federation Constitution consists of two teams of lawyers in a Kremlin office who answer citizens' telephone questions every day. The evening I visited the information service one of the first callers took them aback with a philosophical question: He asked for an explanation, from the legal viewpoint, of the difference between the concepts of "human" and "citizen." But after that, the lawyers said, it was just like any other day. "What does the draft of the new Constitution envisage in the field of pensions?" they asked from Moscow. "Is free education being retained?" was a question from Yekaterinburg. "Is state defense of the fatherland proclaimed?" asked a caller from Krasnodar. "How is the religious sphere regulated?" wondered a caller from Rostov Oblast. These questions form the majority and the lawyers only have to open up the text of the draft, read the relevant place, and, if necessary, give explanations. "Most often people want to know what rights are accorded citizens under the constitution. This is obviously characteristic of our times in general," notes Anatoliy Kirin, leader of the temporary information service and chief of the State Legal Administration's department of state, administrative, and international law. He explains the special attention toward rights and powers and not at all toward duties by people's reaction to decades when the situation was different, when the citizen's rights were subordinate to his duties.

"If the Chechen Republic is a component part of Russia why is legal misrule applied to its inhabitants?" "Why does the draft not provide for the creation of a Russian republic?" "I suggest that it should be written that the Russian president can have been born only in the Russian Federation." "We must introduce into the draft a norm regarding the right to recall a deputy from the State Duma" (incidentally, that is a frequently made statement). "Why does the draft say nothing about the cossacks and their military formations?" These are completely different questions. They contain unquenched ambitions and just comments about the discrepancy between legal norms and reality. That is why such questions require, alas, not only legal explanations.

Proposals on the text of the Constitution continue to come in from citizens. The Utopian ones are simply recorded for statistical purposes, but there are also telephone calls of the following kind. For instance, one rural inhabitant telephoned with the idea of buying a small lake since land and "other resources," the draft Fundamental Law states, can be owned privately. You recall that a few years ago a citizen sued the state, demanding that the reimbursement of the cost of his automobile, which had been stolen and had not been recovered by the militia. So in the present draft Constitution the rights of the owner in such a case are defended by the constitution. How will these norms work? Will they not be dead? "I personally do not venture to assert anything," lawyer Vladimir Krutov says in such situations talking with telephone callers. "The Constitution is the Fundamental Law, not a complete code of federal laws, and of course preparing republican legal norms or bringing them into line with it is work which is no less and no more important than preparing and adopting the draft which has been prepared today."

Those who have already decided they will vote for the adoption of the draft Fundamental Law and those who have decided they will go to vote to say "no" both telephone with their questions. The latter include those who disagree with the fundamental provisions of the new Constitution or, for instance, believe that first a referendum should be held on the right of private land ownership. Others have a negative view of the actual campaign to adopt the draft. For some turning to the information service will be a decisive act and will help determine their position. According to the lawyers a considerable proportion of those who are undecided wonder whether the draft does not give the president too many powers. "The most widespread argument—that if a bad president comes to power he will be able to use his constitutional powers to do harm—is in my view unsound," Anatoliy Kirin believes. "Under Stalin, as we know, a remarkable constitution was created which presupposed a parliament with full powers, but that did not save the country from totalitarianism. Moreover, those who express dissatisfaction with what they say are excessive powers for the president obviously do not have an adequate idea of the fact that under the new draft a considerable proportion of his powers have been removed from the president, particularly the opportunity to issue edicts in the economic sphere."

There are at least 100 telephone calls a day. That would not seem a lot but after all some telephone conversations last about an hour. People do not simply ask questions, they complain about their lives, seek the truth, wonder where they can get a consultation. I learned with great surprise from the lawyers working on the telephone line that one more specially Soviet feature is still alive: Occasionally there is an open denunciation of a neighbor or enemy. These phone calls are the exception but they do happen. Mainly people want to talk about completely different subjects. One person, in connection with enshrining private ownership of land in the Constitution, praises his auxiliary farm, someone else cannot get an apartment for his daughter, another is simply expiring from poverty and seeks justice in the draft Constitution. Lawyers do not put down the telephone, do not make excuses, they listen to such "questions" to the end and sometimes give specific advice as to how to act. It is not their work, that is not why the information service was created, but what can they do if Russian citizens need such "consultations." Is this really the only place they can find someone ready to listen? At one time telephone helplines were fashionable. Now they have fallen by the way because people are too poor, but it is precisely when people are poor that they are needed. So in my opinion if they were to start to operate again, the main problems about which people would telephone day and night would not be suicide or incest, as in the sated West, but problems of the imperfect nature of laws and the search for justice at the bit or small level. There is a need for this not only in connection with and during preparation for the adoption of the new Constitution.

Filatov Speaks on Reforming Representative Organs

PM2311110993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Completing Reform of Representative Organs of Power"]

[Text] The holding of elections to the Federal Assembly and the adoption of a new Constitution at the 12 December referendum will ensure the attainment of political stability in the country, Sergey Filatov, leader of the Russian president's administration, stated yesterday. He was speaking at a Kremlin conference of administration heads of the republican, kray, oblast, autonomous, and okrug centers and large industrial cities.

If the elections and referendum pass successfully, Sergey Filatov said, in 1994 there will be an opportunity to implement economic reforms more effectively. "There is absolute certainty that next year we will be able to complete the reform of the representative organs of power and embark on the creation of local self-administration," he added.

The administration leader announced that the text of the constitution has been published in 82 components of the Federation in a total of 22 million copies. Some 3 million brochures have also been published. But that is not enough, he admitted, urging additional steps to be taken "to gain access to every apartment for the Constitution."

Sergey Filatov expressed anxiety over the attempts by certain circles "to create the impression that this Constitution is provisional, that it has been written to suit the president. He said that everything is being done to thwart the adoption of the Fundamental Law. In this connection he stressed: "It will be a great calamity if we do not adopt the Constitution" because then all plans for the country's development for 1994 will be jettisoned.

"The main thing in the draft Constitution," Sergey Filatov pointed out, "is citizens' rights and freedoms. If people understand the thrust of the Fundamental Law, it will be adopted." He noted with satisfaction that to judge by the number of telephone calls to the information service created under the president's administration, it is rights and freedoms which most interest Russians.

Speaking of the federative structure of Russia, Sergey Filatov said that the draft enshrines the equality of the components of the Federation. At the same time he drew attention to the fact that "in some republics work is surreptitiously under way to incite the population against the Constitution" and in particular they are again insisting on the word "sovereignty." This word, Sergey Filatov is convinced, "is necessary to them not as the sovereignty of the republic but as the sovereignty of power in order to give themselves a free hand."

Soskovets Says Government Ready for Winter

LD2411104393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0905 GMT 24 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Nov—"The government has taken the necessary measures to provide all Russian regions with fuel," Oleg Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers, said today in a telephone conference. Leaders of the republics in the Russian Federation and heads of administrations took part in the work of the conference on preparing the economy for winter.

Oleg Soskovets voiced concern over the state of disrepair of several power-engineering facilities in certain populated localities. He noted that the State Committee for Emergencies is now urgently carrying out repair work.

Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Shafranik said at the conference that the fuel and energy balance in the country has deteriorated recently: in November alone, overconsumption of fuel at power stations doubled. According to him, the fuel shortage to date stands at 27 million tonnes. With the early cold weather in mind, the Fuel and Energy Ministry is ready to provide an additional 14 million tonnes for the country's economy. The minister believes that exports of oil should be cut by 6 million tonnes and fuel oil by 1.5 million tonnes in favor of the domestic market in order to stabilize the situation.

Railways Minister Gennadiy Fadeyev stated that on the whole Russia's railways are ready to carry freight in winter conditions. According to him, there are over 100,000 freight cars and about a thousand locomotives in reserve today.

The minister said that the schedule for the transportation of coal and fuel oil by rail has been approved. However, he drew the attention of the conference participants to the fact that about 2,800 railway cars of coal are still in the Far East waiting to be unloaded.

Summing up the conference, Oleg Soskovets stressed that on the whole the government is in control of the preparations for winter of sectors of the economy and above all of the fuel and energy sector.

Commentary on Use of White House for Parliament

PM2311163793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Commentary by Otto Latsis: "We Will Elect a Parliament, But Where Is It To Work?"]

[Text] The total number of personnel servicing the work of the U.S. Congress is numbered in the tens of thousands. We are not so rich today that we can create such conditions of work for our parliamentarians, but nor should we be so senseless, having for the first time elected a parliament in conditions close to democratic, to make its activity more difficult by technical restrictions.

Only a few days remain in which to form at least a small nucleus of the Federal Assembly's new apparatus, but so far even what premises it is to work in has not been decided. There is simply no suitable building in Moscow. All the options under examination—the Russian-U.S. University, City Hall, the Parliamentary Center, the House of the Press—entail the unlawful confiscation of premises from existing organizations, and, in addition, all these buildings are inconvenient for reasons of size and location.

All this threatens sad consequences that are entirely obvious: The psychological basis of a new confrontation will inevitably arise—and after all, Russia paid a dear price for the previous confrontation between the branches of power.

At the same time there exists a building perfectly suitable to house parliament—the White House on Krasnopresnenskiy Embankment, where the former Supreme Soviet was housed. True, its hall of sessions is rather small for the State Duma, which will have more deputies than the former Supreme Soviet. But there is sufficient space next

door to build a new hall of sessions, and until then, if nothing else, the chamber of City Hall, which is just across the road, can be temporarily used.

Essentially only one thing is required: to review the decision on the transfer of the White House to the Russian Government. It cannot be overlooked that there was no convincing explanation for this decision. There is an understandable emotional interpretation following the outbreak of violence 3 October, but, on mature reflection, this should serve rather as an argument against the relocation of parliament.

There also exists a reference to the fact that the the White House was built for the RSFSR Council of Ministers and originally belonged to it, but after all, neither the state nor the government of the RSFSR exist any longer, and the Russian Government has at its disposal the whole range of buildings of the former CPSU Central Committee, where it now resides, and the buildings belonging to the USSR Council of Ministers. Let us note that in all Soviet governments—union and republic—in the times of the planning and distribution economy sector ministries, and also State Planning Committees and State Committees for Material and Technical Supply, constituted the most significant part of the apparatus. In a market economy all this becomes unnecessary, provided that it really is a market economy. If in such conditions the government's current premises are insufficient, you have to ask yourself the question: Is everything in order with its apparatus?

Chairman Argues for Nonpolitical Court

PM2311142593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Nikolay Vitruk, acting chairman of the Constitutional Court, by observer Yuriy Feofanov, place and date not given: "Zorkin Aspired to the Presidency"]

[Text] [Feofanov] The Russian Constitutional Court has not been abolished, nor is it functioning. In short, the Constitutional Court has no today, but the draft new Constitution does provide for a Constitutional Court consisting of 19 persons and vested with fairly wide powers, up to and including interpreting the Constitution. Thus, hopes persist that a law-based and independent "third power" will develop in Russia. Are they justified?

[Vitruk] The president's edict of 7 October "On the Constitutional Court" initially revived the idea of abolishing the Constitutional Court as an independent organ. Do you remember the idea of turning it into a sort of constitutional collegium of the Supreme Court? We discussed this question, weighed all the pros and cons, and presented information to the president and to a working group of the Constitutional Conference. Our conclusions: Rejection of the Constitutional Court as an independent judicial organ would be a backward step.

The draft new fundamental law provides for a Constitutional Court with extremely wide powers.

[Feofanov] But it had such powers before too. And the beginning of your activity was encouraging. A reverence for the judiciary unheard of in Russia arose for you; the press displayed far more interest in you than, for example, in the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, but tell me please, why and when did schisms and dissension begin among you? I have the impression that it was connected with the "CPSU affair."

[Vitruk] The visible split occurred a little later than the "CPSU affair," in December of last year, when the Constitutional Court was drawn into the role of mediator in the confrontation between the two powers—the legislative and the executive, specifically, the president and parliament. Though the judges had already revealed diametrically opposite stances over the "CPSU affair."

The fault was already laid down in the law itself, during the election of the Constitutional Court. Well, tell me, was it possible to elect judges by parliamentary political factions, and moreover from among deputies? Nevertheless, that was how the court was formed. Vedernikov represented the "Homeland" faction, which was headed by Baburin (incidentally, Vedernikov's son worked as Baburin's aide, and that also should not be discounted—an apparently trivial point, but one which sometimes plays a very substantial role); Tiunov from the same faction was a former member of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee; Oleynik, Rudkin, and Kononov were people's deputies.

You see, a politician inevitably upholds his own platform; he has been carrying it into effect in parliament, and suddenly he is elected a judge. Independent jurists simply did not make it. For example, Kazannik, the current general prosecutor. At the congress he condemned the Communist Party and demanded a Nuremberg-style trial of it, and he did not make it. The others were not so frank, but they and their views were rejected alike.

[Feofanov] Officially you constitutional judges elected Valeriy Zorkin your chairman at your closed session. Was that your free choice? Or was the candidacy agreed in advance?

[Vitruk] You will not believe it, but no one tried to foist a candidate for the chairmanship on us—neither Yeltsin, nor Khasbulatov. We, the elected judges, met and set about resolving this question. It was entirely democratic. I proposed Zorkin's candidacy for the chairmanship. Professor Zorkin had worked five years in my department in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Higher Juridical School. I will go further than that: Our families were friends. I talked with all the judges before the election; I was supported by Ametistov, Morshchakov, Luchin, and Kononov. Another group of judges proposed Oleynik. There were several rounds of voting. In the final analysis Valeriy Dmitriyevich Zorkin won by one or two votes.

[Feofanov] Then the question perforce arises: What happened with Valeriy Dmitriyevich and when? When, why, and for what reasons did he, having been elected in that way—having been elected by jurists—suddenly abandon the legal path and take up a blatantly political and, moreover, reactionary stance?

[Vitruk] A difficult question, and the answer is even more so. You have to leave behind law and politics and look to "personalities," as the saying goes. This is not very pleasant. But in our country the personal alternates with the political to such an extent, it has such influence on political events that, if you leave it out of the picture, if you are too finicky, you will be unable to understand anything. The "Zorkin phenomenon" in this sense is especially characteristic. The most curious thing is that Zorkin took up blatantly pro-Khasbulatov positions, by no means determined by political views or sympathies. Too much homage and too many blessings were showered on this man unexpectedly. When he played the part of "peacekeeper," when all society applauded him and the press breathlessly extolled him, Zorkin began to get the idea that he was a probable future candidate for the Russian presidency.

[Feofanov] Sorry, Nikolay Vasilyevich, but I do not think that this is serious. After all, he was a fairly sensible man. Surely you do not think that he had any chance?

[Vitruk] I do not think so, but Zorkin did. Believe me, these are not empty words. It was at this time that the chairman of the Constitutional Court began to hold private consultations with leaders of parties—all parties at that. Everyone visited Zorkin's office: Volskiy, Zyuganov, Konstantinov, Rumyantsev, Terekhov—even Gorbachev, although Valeriy Dmitriyevich did not receive the latter enthusiastically. They came of their own accord, or Zorkin invited them. There were also conspiratorial meetings.

Furthermore, there were meetings with business representatives. Once around 20 people gathered there—representatives of prominent firms, associations, banks, and insurance companies. I was a witness when a narrow circle of these representatives spoke directly to Zorkin about the presidency, and you should have seen Valeriy Dmitriyevich's face. I saw it: He believed it, he wanted to believe it.

And meetings with ambassadors? A whole range of tactics was elaborated. Ambassadors came, and he himself sought meetings with ambassadors; a trip to the United States pursued the same goal—to create the image that he was a realistic presidential candidate. I have no doubt about this. The fact that both teams—the president's and Khasbulatov's—each for its own purpose raised Zorkin to its own level also played a role. The events of December showed Zorkin that, apparently, he could give advice to both the president and Khasbulatov, that he could reconcile them or set them at loggerheads.

[Feofanov] It seemed to me that such reverence for the head of the "third power" was good for the prestige of the whole judicial system. Russia has never seen the head of the judiciary reach this level.

[Vitruk] I was also delighted with it. Valeriy Dmitriyevich was initially actually bashful and consulted with me about whether he should get a "limo" or not and whether to accept a state dacha or refuse it. I told him that it would probably be correct for the prestige of the Constitutional Court. Why should the president and Khasbulatov enjoy a state dacha, but the chairman of the Constitutional Court be left out? Unfortunately, this ruined Zorkin. Material goods were showered on him like manna from heaven. After all, no one has yet told the truth about that dacha. When they began evicting him, people said: He's a victim of presidential tyranny, because he failed to please the president, but why did Zorkin hang on to it so stubbornly? Because it is a dacha with a special status; all the service and the food there is free—that is the root of the matter. A small circle of people have these dachas; very few people know about this. Journalists are conducting no end of investigations now, but dachas for some reason remain "classified." Not to mention the furs, sheepskin coats, suits, television sets, refrigerators, freezers, and so forth. Zorkin has three apartments—three privatized apartments—for four people. Did you know that?

[Feofanov] It is the first time that I have heard of it. Don't you think, Nikolay Vasilyevich, that your conversation has taken on a peculiar character, close to banal slander? Surely this is not the most important thing, whether the chairman drives a "limo" or a Volga or whether or not his wife gets a fur coat?

[Vitruk] But then we will understand nothing. Graft as a method of ruling is a surefire winner in our conditions. It was practiced for a whole 75 years, along with repression. Today it has only acquired a democratic tinge. Give me a fulcrum in the shape of a pork barrel, and I will turn "democracy" any way I like. Khasbulatov knocked together a majority in parliament through direct graft: apartments, cars, foreign travel. And openly, arrogantly, before the eyes of the whole world, he decided whatever he wanted. The same thing happened with us. It reached the point of being ridiculous. Entrance drive No. 1 to the Constitutional Court was designated for the chairman personally. A "personal entrance drive" with a duty officer! Other judges could not go through it. Again, you say, a trifle? I will not agree—it is part of the system. From such trifles a web of intrigues grows. A whole system took shape of tale-telling and shadowing of judges. The chairman proved an expert at creating conflict situations in the apparatus: I give to one, I give a little to another, I give nothing at all to a third. In itself it is no big deal, if the "the lord and master was simply having his fun." But what lay behind this was all too serious: the adoption of decisions that were highly important for the country. We were discussing a very serious matter; the decision could play a negative role for the Russian Federation. One judge stated frankly: In spirit I am for a united Russia, but I will vote for the

chairman's proposal. Do you understand what stands behind this? Whoever is in charge of the pork barrel rules the roost.

[Feofanov] I have always thought the classic formula of "first among equals" disingenuous.

[Vitruk] The law itself helped to turn the chairman into the sole director, something which in principle cannot exist in a Constitutional Court. Alas, tradition is more powerful than the law.

[Feofanov] You recently stated that the Constitutional Court's final decision of 21 September was falsified by Zorkin. How did he manage this? Where were the judges?

[Vitruk] Our last session was on the night of 21-22 September. A decision consisting of four elements is put to the vote: The edict does not accord with the Constitution; it serves as grounds for suspending the president from his post; Article 121/6 or 121/10 should be applied. Article 121/6 is interpreted as grounds for suspending Yeltsin from his post without impeachment proceedings. Each point has to be voted individually. Zorkin puts it to the vote according to the Lukyanov-Khasbulatov method: "Let us vote on the motion as a whole and then on each part separately." Nine of 13 are against the direct suspension of the president. Zorkin puts the motion as a whole to the vote a second time. An unexpected result: Nine are "for," four "against." Zorkin declares: The decision is adopted as a whole. And what lies behind it? Something all too big: The court is for the direct suspension of Yeltsin at a time when "President" Rutskoy has been sworn in! And all the decisions of the Supreme Soviet and the so-called Congress are justified by reference to our ruling on the immediate suspension of Yeltsin from his post. That is what lies behind all this!

[Feofanov] Fine. That is history. But soon there are to be further elections of constitutional judges, and most importantly—the election of chairman. In IZVESTIYA I have expressed support for chairmen of the Constitutional Court to be elected not secretly but openly, at a session of parliament, with wide-ranging preliminary discussion of the candidates. A widely known, independent, unsuborned jurist who will not "dash off into politics" should head the "third power." What do you think of this idea?

[Vitruk] Yes, I believe that this question requires extremely thorough analysis. First, I suggest that if this principle is abandoned—namely that the judges themselves elect the chairman—he should be elected for a limited period. The chairman must not be allowed to feel himself irreplaceable until the end of the term of his judicial powers. Or (this is my preferred option) the chairman of the Constitutional Court should be elected individually, say, in the Federation Council, or possibly by both houses. This would provide an opportunity to openly discuss this candidacy. All events have shown that he is too important a figure in the state.

[Feofanov] That is to say, the law needs to be seriously improved?

[Vitruk] It must be improved; a new law must be created, providing for a system of guarantees to prevent a judge being drawn into political activity and excluding at least to some extent the introduction of politics into the court's activity. But this is a matter for future legislators.

Most Respondents Approve of Yeltsin's Oct Actions

MK2311112093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 21 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Oleg Savelyev under the "Social Barometer" rubric: "Russians on October Events"]

[Text] In October 1993 the All-Russian Public Opinion Studies Center conducted a survey among 1,638 residents of Russia, a sample representing proportionately the main socio-demographic strata of the Russian Federation's adult population in terms of sex, age, education, geography, and the type of residence area.

The breakdown of responses to some of the survey's questions regarding Russians' attitude to the events in Moscow in October 1993 is given in percentage points:

"Was Boris Yeltsin right in issuing the 21 September edict dissolving the Supreme Soviet and calling elections for the State Duma?"
Right—50
Wrong—23
Do not know—27

"Was the use of troops for the purpose of bringing the situation under control during mass disturbances in Moscow justified?"
Yes—51
No—30
Do not know—19

"What was the main reason for the bloody clashes in Moscow in the first days of October?" (More than one answer was allowed):

Rutskoy's and Khasbulatov's desire to retain power by any means available—46
General disarray in the country started by Gorbachev—32
Readiness of communist and fascist organizations to stage a coup d'etat—19
Yeltsin's and the government's indecisiveness in quelling mass unrest—10
Base mob instincts—6
Vacillation of the army and the internal troops—3
Other—2
Do not know—14

"What consequences do you think these events may have?"
Stabilization of the situation in the country—26
Stepped-up oppression by the authorities—22

Chaos, collapse of Russia—18
Civil war—5
Do not know—29

Oct Rebellion Leaders' Lawyers Accused of Delays

LD2311181093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1645 GMT 23 Nov 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] The Russian president's Press Secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov stated that the lawyers of the October rebellion leaders were deliberately delaying the investigation, presenting the defendants as victims, and the defenders of democracy from the communist and fascist putsch as the culprits. He also said that attempts were being made to involve President Yeltsin in the investigation.

Kostikov believes that there are plans to re-play the 1991 coup leaders' trial, delay the investigation, complicate it by involving new personalities, procedures and medical pretexts, in an effort to save the initiators of the tragedy from punishment.

Kostikov also stated that although such actions were understandable from the lawyers' point of view, they alarmed the public. The artificial barriers raised in the investigation are fraught with many dangers for society. The population is losing moral guidelines, while the concept of guilt and responsibility for serious state crimes is blurred. All this enhances legal nihilism and political impunity, and encourages the illusions of those seeking revenge.

"Without interfering in the legal prerogatives of the investigation and defence, public and democratic organizations have every right to insist that the democratic experience of the Russian lawyers should not be used as a refuge by those who have pushed the country to the verge of civil war. Democracy must defend democracy, not totalitarianism," stated Boris Yeltsin's press secretary.

Intelligence Value of Press Sources Stressed

PM2311111593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Interview with Vadim Kirpichenko, leader of group of advisers to the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, and Yuriy Kobaladze, chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service Press Service, by Ravil Mustafin under the "Special Services" rubric; place and date not given: "Intelligence Discloses Secrets"]

[Text] [Mustafin] Big changes have occurred in Russia's state structure in recent years. Have they affected the work of intelligence?

[Kirpichenko] There have been quite a few changes in intelligence recently. Intelligence has detached itself from the KGB and, consequently, from the system of law-enforcement organs. True, this has not reduced criticism of it by the Russian press. Departyization has occurred in intelligence.. Our employees are forbidden to participate in the activities of any political parties whatever. To a certain extent this has probably even saved us. There is no room for settling political scores with one another.

As regards the essence of intelligence activity itself, previously we endeavored to have a presence even in the remotest corner of the planet. Today we work only where Russia has real, not imaginary interests. Over the past two years various intelligence components have been cut back by 30-40 percent. We have closed down approximately 30 resident agent missions abroad. In addition, we have abandoned the very concept of the "enemy." Russian intelligence today does not have main or secondary enemies. Work is organized along geographic lines. A switch from confrontation to cooperation is taking place in intelligence. Lines of cooperation have become apparent in the struggle against international crime, the narcotics business, the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and the illegal arms trade.

The adoption of the Law on Intelligence, which strictly determines all our activity, was an important event. Whereas previously we and our colleagues at the Main Intelligence Directorate silently did what was ordered from above—from the Politburo, by general secretaries, and by KGB chairmen—today it is clearly defined what intelligence can do and what it is forbidden to do. For example, it cannot use special preparations which damage people's health, compromising materials, or blackmail.

Work on recruiting agents now boils down to seeking people who want to help us for money or out of a liking for Russia.

[Kobaladze] If someone had said just a few years ago that intelligence would have its own press service, that person would probably have simply been made a laughing stock. But such a service exists in our intelligence today. One of our chief tasks is liaison with the mass media. The second area is liaison with the public.

Our employees deliver lectures on the history of intelligence at Moscow State University, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, and other higher educational institutions in Moscow. The third area is work with our archives. There is plenty of speculation and gossip here. The thing is that the intelligence archives were created for operational purposes, certainly not for scientific or historical purposes. Nobody in the past thought that in the nineties our archives would be approached by journalists, scientists....

Incidentally, about the alleged trade in archives. Such a thing cannot have happened for the reason that a special commission has been set up in intelligence, which we call the screening commission. Any document leaving intelligence is first screened in the subdivision to which it belongs. Then it goes to the archive department, where

its possible disclosure is looked at from the security viewpoint. Then it comes to this commission, and with the permission of the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service this document can be made public. So the chance or deliberate sale of documents is simply ruled out.

The fact that certain intelligence documents ended up in the CPSU Central Committee and in other archives in the past is something else. From there some of them did reach the press. I can cite as an example the party money affair. You know, intelligence was involved in the transfer of that money. Some of the documents have been published. Nobody disputes the fact that that money had to be found and returned to the country. But this was done in a barbarous manner, and the press published the names of specific intelligence officers, who had to be recalled urgently from missions.

[Mustafin] It has already been stated repeatedly that Russian intelligence does not work against nearby foreign states. At the same time it is well known that one of the main threats to Russia's security stems from local, internal conflicts. Is there not a contradiction here?

[Kirpichenko] There is no contradiction, and we do not acquire sources in the former Soviet republics belonging to the CIS. This is the first point. In addition, the Russian intelligence collective is multinational. Even if we had begun such work, it would have very soon collapsed, but this does not mean that intelligence is totally indifferent to events taking place in former Soviet republics. We monitor developments in neighboring countries as well as further afield.

[Mustafin] Under conditions when the prestige of intelligence has been considerably undermined, what actually guides the people who cooperate with you?

[Kirpichenko] Many motives drive people who cooperate with us. There is the desire to earn a bit of money, dissatisfaction with their bosses and their career, and the desire to assert themselves as individuals in secret activity. There also quite a few who have a tremendous liking for our country. For example, people who came originally from Russia, who still have unclouded feelings toward their motherland and want to help it.

Previously there was mainly an ideological basis to recruitment particularly during the years before World War II and during the war, but faith in the USSR was gradually replaced by disillusionment. The material factor therefore also grew stronger simultaneously. Regarding recruitment on the basis of compromising materials, the proportion of such people was always insignificantly small.

[Mustafin] What amount of information do intelligence officers derive from the open press?

[Kirpichenko] The press is a major base for carrying out intelligence work and is always of interest to the professional intelligence officer. By no means always does the intelligence officer act only on a mission from the center. He frequently raises questions relating to press materials. I am sure that foreign intelligence services today obtain a very great deal of useful information for themselves in this way from the Russian press.

[Kobaladze] There is a book—"The Art of Intelligence"—which is recognized as a classic. In it a military specialist, by analyzing only the open press, was able to give his general staff information which was deemed top secret. He was then tried for allegedly divulging a state secret. Although there was no secret. He had obtained everything "secret" from the open press.

[Mustafin] Does intelligence make forecasts with regard to Russia's future?

[Kirpichenko] No. Russian intelligence does not make such forecasts. True, from time to time specialists in our Information Analysis Administration examine particular problems relating, let us say, to the economy or ethnic problems on the basis of intelligence information, the open and closed press, and confidential sources.

[Mustafin] How accurate did U.S. forecasts with regard to events in the former USSR prove to be?

[Kirpichenko] CIA materials of 20 years ago attest that Langley forecast the growth of dissidence, the economic slump, and the upsurge of nationalism. This was during the years when outwardly everything seemed normal. The crisis which later led to collapse was not yet apparent in the economy, and many regions of the former USSR were not in the grip of conflagrations of local conflicts.

Election Issues

'Radical' Yeltsin Opponent Quits Elections

LD2411065493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0630 GMT 24 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Grachev]

[Text] Vladivostok November 24 TASS—Svetlana Goryacheva, a radical hard-line opponent of President Boris Yeltsin, announced she is quitting her elections campaign because of health reasons and unwillingness to work in the new parliament which she believes would be a rubberstamp body.

"I cannot yet recover after the October events of armed rebellion in moscow, the heart began to fail me", she told the Vladivostok radio on Wednesday, adding that she fears she would not cope with the tensions of the election campaign.

"Secondly, I clearly realise how the newly elected bodies would work", said Goryacheva, once a deputy of Yeltsin when he was Russian parliament chairman and a staunch opponent of the president's reforms.

"The federal assembly will be an obedient instrument of the executive authority, the state duma will be an

appendage of the upper chamber", Goryacheva said and asked rhetorically: "Is there any sense of participating in rubberstamp bodies of power which will not be popular with the people and will bring nothing good to Russia?"

She announced her decision to quit running for a seat in the upper chamber of the new parliament.

Centrists, Communists Not What They Claim

PM2411094193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Dmitriy Volkogonov: "They Are Trying To Tempt Us with New Chimeras and Myths"]

[Text] Russia is making its second agonizing attempt of the 20th century to switch to a democratic, civilized footing. The first, which was started in February 1917, ended tragically and the Bolsheviks seized for seven decades the power they had lusted after. Even today they, together with their national-patriotic and other allies, are trying to prevent the second attempted switch to a normal, civilized life this century in Russia from happening.

The Drama of Democracy

There remain 13 bloc lists, on which people will vote on 12 December. But there are only two pure "democratic" ones among them. It is difficult to believe the arch observations that the democrats have deliberately diversified in order to gain more votes and cover different strata of the population.

The Russian liberals' old problem is in evidence again: As long as they are in opposition they are together, but as soon as there is a chance of taking and consolidating real power, the "division" begins. In Russia today people have been usurping liberal democratic names which reek of extreme reaction a mile off. Remember what the present leader of the constitutional democrats said at the congresss and in parliament?! If the venerable Pavel Nikolayevich Milyukov had heard him he would have turned in his grave. Not to mention other, equally well-known "liberal democrats."

"Russia's Choice" is the only bloc that has a serious economic and social program. But its base is relatively narrow following the split in the democratic forces. Even some active members of the intelligentsia are in a state of intellectual confusion and are rambling on about morality instead of trying to strengthen the bloc's positions.

Certainly the democratic leadership has made plenty of mistakes and blunders. For example, after the abolition of Makarov's commission, it apparently decided to drop the question of fighting corruption, abuses, and the mafia's growing links with the apparatus from the agenda altogether. What a pity! The opposition is bound to make all this a trump card. Not everyone realizes that the fear of authority vanished a long time ago, but the Communist Party failed to instill any other feelings in people. People are still wondering what the powers that be will say to them, what they will do, what they will require of them, how much they will "give" them to paper over the financial cracks. It is the old mentality!

Democracy is going through another drama. It must not develop into a tragedy. Every age has its Dark Ages. We have been through ours, and to return would be suicide. Everyone is strong only insofar as he can fight his own weaknesses. The democratic wing has a chance: It must transcend arrogance, unite, amd achieve a parliamentary majority. To do this it is necessary to help the government achieve at least partial success that is visible to the entire nation. Or at least the beginnings of it. The ability to wait must not be supplanted by the ability to act. I believe, although it sounds almost fantastic, that Russia will experience its own "economic miracle," unless it succumbs to the temptation of new chimeras and false myths.

It is difficult to see those whom you might call "centrists," aside, perhaps, from the "women's" bloc and the associations of Yavlinskiy and Shakhray (with reservations). They are huddled against the left wing. Even if one assumes there will be no formal associations (aside from the "Agrarian Union"), the so-called "center" is antigovernment. Whereas in 1917 the main issue on which Kerenskiy tried to fight against the Bolsheviks was that of war and peace, now the epicenter of confrontation is the reforms.

Seriously, there is no real center at the moment. Everyone is aligning or will be aligning with someone. The dress circle of genuine centralism in Russia is always virtually empty...

All the talk about a gradual approach, about "not conducting the reforms at the people's expense" (at whose expense, then—the western European Community's?) simply conceals from the centrists, particularly "Civic Union," the presence of any economic program. There is a great danger that the left, together with "Civic Union," will be capable of blocking the main government programs. The crisis would become permanent. And the culprit would be the good old Council of Ministers, of course, if the notorious last parliament is anything to go buy.

It is particularly galling to see talented politicians with a big future, such as Yavlinskiy and Shakhray, in the dubious company of the chimera of centrism. Grigoriy Alekseyevich was my economic idol for a long time, then there was that sudden, incomprehensible metamorphosis. The smell of power is intoxicating, apparently.

There was never any "center" in the shape of "Civic Union." It is just a rather good way of picking up votes. It would be more honest if the "centrists" were to shake hands publicly with the Zyuganovites.

Seduced By Lies

Lies are a universal evil. The Communists used them all the time. In order to preempt any personal criticism, I will say right away that for a long time, for a very long time I was a member of that party. But maybe it was my

only worthwhile act to publicly break with the organization that caused all Russia's chief ills in the 20th century. I announced this at the last party congress, saying that the CPSU was doomed and would die, whereupon I was banished from the platform; I announced this at a conference of Defense Ministry leading personnel; I also defended my view that the party was in decline at a session of the Main Editorial Commission, which was discussing the first volume on the last war, which had been prepared under my supervision. The upshot was that the marshals and Central Committee secretaries removed me from my job once again at the actual session. I say this just to emphasize that I never concealed my abandonment of the old beliefs. It was a supremely conscious step.

So the left flank of the electoral spectrum is Communists. If they were to mount the social democracy platform they would have an historic opportunity. Otherwise I do not believe they will ever come to power in the country again, but they could carry national-patriots, semifascists, and other similar people into office on their shoulders. That would be more terrifying still.

When I listen to the television election "get-togethers" of the Communists' current leader I am struck by the fact that they have learned nothing. Again they are trying to seduce millions of people with the Lies. The same old words: social justice, nonviolence, spirituality, prevention of a bourgeois dictatorship, rebirth of the USSR... One could carry on with this litany, which, let us be honest, many people, in whose consciousness the old Bolshevik stereotypes are well established, still believe in.

"Cessation of disarmament." By the end of 1991 there were more than 63,000 tanks on the territory of the former USSR. That is almost as many as in the whole of the rest of the world. We had achieved an abundance of just two things: missiles and the collected works of Lenin... Does this not indicate something to Communists?

"Social justice." Why will the leader of the Communists not say that the communists turned this into leveling tendencies against a background of an entire empire of Central Committee and oblast committee sanatoriums, recreation centers, guest houses, hospitals, special stores, and a multitude of other benefits from the "bright future." Was it for social justice that used up 10,000 tonnes of gold buying grain from the West over a period of 25 years? And whwre did the 80 billion petrodollars go? Don't wait for an answer. There won't be one.

"Nonviolence." Do the Communists' leaders think people have forgotten that it was they who repressed 21.5 of their compatriots in 25 years under Stalin. Later the Politburo even set up two sinister bureaus: No. 1 (on foreign terrorism) and No. 2 (on terrorism inside the Union). Banished peoples, numbers running into millions... Has all this been forgotten, has it all dropped out of the picture? The bloc's leader never mentions it...

"Spirituality." It is essentially the same old Lies and Violence. Violence and Lies. One may be busy saying nothing at this point, but what kind of "spirituality" was it when the Bolsheviks destroyed nearly 70,000 churches in Russia? Is that all forgotten?

"Prevention of a bourgeois dictatorship." It is as if the leader of the Communists did not know that a "dictatorship of the proletariat," a particularly sophisticated form of social racism, existed for decades in the USSR. Although, to be more accurate, a dictatorship of the party and a dictatorship of leaders: limited, one-dimensional, flat, like the dictatorship itself. They are now going on again about "class interests." But there is no class truth. As Berdyayev once said: There are class lies. Truth is universal.

No one says now how many victims there were of this dictatorship. There were at least 4 million people in the Gulag at all times. Then to talk about a dictatorship, but, in reality, the current relatively weak authority...

"Resurrection of the USSR," which, of course, was broken up by the "democrats." Zyuganov, being a clever man, must know that the chief destroyers of the Union were the Bolsheviks, who started to abolish the most progressive form of state organization—guberniyas—back in 1920 and replace them with ethnic entities. On more than one occasion Lenin personally added on dozens of RSFSR districts to this or that newly created republic... It was a time bomb of awesome power.

One could continue ad infinitum. The left-wing forces are acting as if they are not party to a single crime by the Communists. Glib displays of repentance are just degrading.

People are being seduced by the lies. If these people were to come to power, the traditional division, repartition, confiscation would start, and then, of course, the constant ally of lies—violence—would come along.

One very much hopes that people will remember all this before taking up their voting papers. In the end our destiny is in our own hands. If we succumb to the lies no one will have cause for complaint. It is we who are deciding our own destiny today.

'Former Socialist Sector' Farm Backs Russia's Choice

PM2311130593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Oleg Dmitriyev: "Who Stands Behind 'Russia's Choice?' Many People. Including State Farm Named for Lenin"]

[Text] Despite the fact that the account of the "Russia's Choice" election bloc was opened only 18 November, a whole series of organizations have already stated their readiness to put money into it. They include "Uralmash," the pride of Russian machine building, and... the state farm named for V.I. Lenin in one of the southern oblasts of the European part of Russia. Aleksey Golovkov, executive director of "Russia's Choice,"

promised more detailed information for ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI after he had received the payment documents.

There really is something phantasmagorical here. The "apologists of monetarism" are supported by those who would seem to be their most inveterate opponents. Obviously alongside very tough statements by representatives of the former socialist sector of the economy there are the real interests of specific commodity producers which predetermine their political sympathies.

Program Features Russian Unity, Accord Party

LD2311233993

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1800 GMT on 23 November carries the 60-minute election program "We Listen, Ponder, and Elect" [slushayem, dumayem, vybirayem]. Radio commentator Vladimir Kurnikov opens the program by saying: "Our radio offers its air waves to electoral associations and parties that have been permitted to participate in the State Duma elections on 12 December. In accordance with the presidential decrees on the elections and the guarantees given to those taking part in them regarding information, and also with the points regulating the use of the media by electoral associations, Radio Rossii, broadcasting as it does to all of Russia, is committed to offering its services to each electoral association free of charge for at least one hour. These broadcasts are scheduled to air on working days, are repeated the following morning, and will reach all regions of Russia via its communications system. The order of presentations on the air by all 13 registered parties and associations was determined by the drawing of lots on 16 November by the Central Electoral Commission. Today Radio Rossii's studio is at the disposal of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord. This broadcast was prepared and recorded independently by its representatives. We offer it for your attention."

An unidentified female presenter encourages listeners not to miss getting acquainted with the leaders and members of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, which is only slightly more than a month old. She then describes the background of the party. She says that at its constituent congress it proclaimed the idea of creating genuine federalism and local self-government in Russia as the foundation of statehood. It intends to represent the interests of the regions and to switch from shock methods to constructive creation. The party has established its popularity by receiving the support of voters in 71 regions of Russia. Because Russia has already shown by example the inconsistency resulting from the country being run by amateurs, the party decided to be the political party of professionals. The majority of the party's candidates to the Federal Assembly is made up of lawyers, economists, politicians, and business executives who have experience in state administration. There are few women in the party, but this is explained by the fact that the men who make up the party's backbone are conservatives. They believe that it is the men who should work and earn a wage, and it is a woman's right to decide whether to do the housework, look after the children, be a machine-tool operator, go into politics, or not do anything. But women themselves, even those who are not party members, have a very positive attitude toward the party.

After a three-minute song the presenter gives a biography of the party's leader Sergey Shakhray. She says that Shakhray is a supporter of a strong presidential republic, with the government being entirely accountable to the president, and that he describes his party as conservative.

Shakhray then elaborates on what conservatism involves. He points out that, in line with the party's charter, its deputies will be forced to vote in accordance with the platform presented in the elections. He says: "We will not enter into any blocs in the election campaign. We want to get into parliament as a party because we believe that this is a necessary element of responsibility and predictability." He says that one of the party's main tasks is to defend the rights of the regions: "The variety of the regions and the multi-ethnic composition of Russia is its potential. It must be used competently." He says: "The only way to ensure the unity of the Russian state is through accord." He says: "We must get rid of the habit of thinking that the state by itself will resolve all problems. Therefore, we must ensure maximum freedom, including freedom of action, to the able-bodied population. Through the tax system, via the mechanism of social protection, the state must channel these funds only to the indigent: to women, pensioners, and children. I am ready to halve my salary as long as my parents and all elderly people are provided for. We in Russia must be a social state. Those who can work should be given maximum freedom and defend it. Those who cannot work should be given state assistance. That is why the Party of Russian Unity and Accord regards both the struggle against inflation and liberalization not as program aims. Our program is somewhat different: We [the state] must live according to our means. We must assume that we will not receive any help from abroad."

The presenter says that the party intends to be guided by common sense, which is in short supply now, when making decisions. Aleksandr Shokhin, one of the party's leaders, explains the concept of "economic federalism" which is contained in the party's program. It involves a three-tiered budget system which presupposes that the greater part of the questions will be resolved not at the level state power of the subjects of the federation, but at the level of towns and villages and of the bodies of self-government of these towns and villages. It also signifies a single economic space, something which does not exist now. Regions should be directly involved in the process of decision taking at the federal level.

The party also introduces the concept of "social partnership." Gennadiy Melikyan, Russian minister of labour, explains what it involves. He admits that, for instance, closure of some mines in some northern regions is inevitable, but this must be done in civilized way on the basis of programs which are being drawn up. These must

offer protection to the people who are now employed in this industry. He believes that in 1994 hidden unemployment will very quickly and on a massive scale be transformed into open unemployment, with a social explosion being a real possibility. He says this must not be permitted. A normal system of registration of unemployed should be established, and they should receive assistance in finding jobs.

Next, Dmitriy Olshanskiy, a profesor in political science and the party's candidate for the State Duma for the 204th southwestern constituency of Moscow, is interviewed. He is an example of the new "member of parliament," both energetic and experienced, skillful and competent, called upon to pull society out of the net of contradictions. Unlike Russia's Choice, the party believes that Russia's instant entry into the market is impossible. Evolutionary reforms should be sought. This means searching for social peace and accord and establishing social partnership. Reform is for the people and not the other way round.

Next is a six-minute interview with Aleksandr Kotenkov, member of the Federal Council of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, who is not running in the election. He sets out the party's stance in legislative and military matters.

A 12-minute interview with Vladimir Aleksandrovich Tumanov, professor, doctor of sciences, and expert in the sphere of international, constitutional right, chief scientific staff member of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Federation follows. He is running as a deputy to the State Duma for the Party of Russian Unity and Accord. He worked on the draft for the new constitution in which much attention has been given to human rights. Tumanov explains how his party intends to defend the liberties of Russian citizens at the state level.

The program concludes with presenter Vladimir Kurnikov repeating the opening announcement.

24 Nov Campaign Broadcast Schedule Reported

PM2411095993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 24 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed, untitled report under the "At the Center of Attention" rubric]

[Text] Today election broadcasts will be made by the following: On the Russian TV channel from 1845 hours through 1915 hours, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia; from 1915 hours through 1945 hours, the Democratic Party of Russia; on the "Ostankino" TV channel from 1945 hours through 2015 hours, the Democratic Party of Russia; from 2015 hours through 2045 hours, the "Dignity and Charity" association; on "Radio 1" from 1900 hours through 1930 hours, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms; on "Mayak" from 2030 hours through 2100 hours, the "Women of Russia" political movement; and on Russian radio from 2100 hours to 2200 hours, "Russia's Choice."

Journalist-Candidate's Report on Signature Lists Confirmed

MK2311141093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 82, 23 Nov 93 (signed to press 22 Nov) p 2

[Report by Gleb Cherkasov report the "Scandal" rubric: "Candidates Who Submitted Falsified Documents Allowed To Run for State Duma. Voters Will Have To Think for Themselves"]

[Text] Rumors about possible violations of the Statute on Elections and the likelihood of mass falsifications of signatures appear to have started taking tangible form. District commission No. 78 on the elections for the Council of the Federation and commission No. 202 on the elections for the State Duma have registered candidates who submitted documents that were formally inaccurate and effectively falsified. This incident has already been revealed in the press: On 20 November, Aleksandr Minkin, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS journalist and candidate in the 202d electoral district, wrote an article highlighting the violations and announced the withdrawal of his candidacy. The district commission, however, has not received any official application from him.

Commenting on Mr. Minkin's article, Boris Nazarov, chairman of the district electoral commission, told about numerous "inaccuracies and distortions" that tend to "misrepresent the genuine picture of the events and produce a wrong impression about the commission's work." At the same time, the commission chairman admitted that inaccurate and falsified signature lists were in fact submitted by some candidates. For instance, three-quarters of signatures collected in support for Oleg Tolkachev, candidate for the Council of the Federation, were dismissed for being inconsistent with the established standard. There has also been a certain number of falsified signature lists among those submitted by Messrs. Krasnov and Kubarev, who are running for the State Duma. In addition, according to Mr. Nazarov, "inadvertent violations" were present in the documents of virtually all candidates—that is, they were universal in nature. Mr. Nazarov is inclined to attribute the formal irregularities to the collectors' lack of experience and the short period of the election campaign.

The district commission chairman believes that the submission of falsified documents must not be a cause for denying registration. Mr. Nazarov is of the opinion that in this situation the commission should limit its role to collecting information on violations and reporting them to the credentials commission, which will start functioning after the elections. Moreover, Boris Nazarov suggested that all materials on violations and falsifications be made public before the elections so that the voters could have clearer views. Any transfer of this information to the prosecutor's office is out of the question, Mr. Nazarov said.

Boris Nazarov confirmed Mr. Minkin's report about an attempt by a representative of the "Future of Russia-New

Names" electoral association to have his candidacy registered after the deadline, an attempt backed by the Central Electoral Commission. The city commission would not break its rules and denied registration to the candidate, although the city electoral commission chairman personally argued for allowing the "New Names"' representative to run in the 202d electoral district.

According to Mr. Nazarov, no pressure has been exerted on commission members and all the above decisions have been made in pursuance of the Statute on Elections.

Roundup on Election Candidates' Registration

LD2311205993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] Results of the registration of candidates to the Federal Assembly have been summed up. At the Central Electoral Commission's news conference today Aleksandr Ivanchenko, deputy chairman of the Electoral Commission, reported that 490 candidates will compete for 178 seats in the Federal Assembly and 1,567 candidates will compete for 225 seats in the State Duma. Elections will not be held in Chechnya, where no electoral commissions have been formed, or in Tatarst and Chelyabinsk oblast, where only one candidate was proposed, in violation of the provisions on elections. However, two seats in the Federal Assembly and one seat in the State Duma were reserved for Chechnya. So, the necessary preparatory work can be still carried out in a short period of time.

Here is a broad description of the candidates' corps: 40 percent of candidates for the Federal Assembly and 20 percent of candidates for the State Duma are heads of the executive bodies of power. The average age of the candidates is 42-43 years. There are very few lawyers among the candidates—just over 2 percent. Fifteen and a half percent of candidates for the Federal Assembly and 20 percent of candidates for the State Duma are entrepreneurs. Between 1 and 3 percent of candidates are farmers and workers. [passage omitted]

Public Council Appointed To Oversee Election Campaign

MK2311130093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 82, 23 Nov 93 (Signed to press 22 Nov) p 2

[Unattributed report: "Central Electoral Commission Approves Public Observers Council Composition"]

[Text] A 22 November session of the Central Electoral Commission approved the composition of a public council of observers proposed by Anatoliy Sobchak, coordinator of the Public Chamber of the Constitutional Conference. The council has 19 members. According to the statute confirmed by the Central Electoral Commission, its members have the right to travel to make spot checks of complaints in the course of the electoral campaign. They are also entitled to peruse the documents of electoral commissions and of electoral associations, to attend the sessions of electoral commissions and meetings of candidates with deputies [as published].

Presidential Council Member on 'Tense' Competition

LD2311191493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1854 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Melnikova]

[Text] Moscow November 23 TASS—In the opinion of Presidential Council Member Georgiy Satarov many electoral districts which have registered six or seven candidates for deputies of the Federal Assembly will witness tense competition.

The split of democratic forces may become their considerable drawback under these conditions, Satarov told ITAR-TASS. This means more consolidated forces will gain parliament mandates, for instance, the Communist Party. "There is only one way out from the situation - unification of centrists and democrats on the basis of agreements or withdrawal of some candidates in favour of one to have more chances to win," he said.

"The future parliament structure depends on whether they manage to agree before the elections".

Analyzing the information about candidates to run for deputies of the Federal Assembly in majoritarian electoral districts and results of public opinion polls, the Presidential Council member said "Anyway, neither bloc—neither the right- or the left-wing nor the centrist—will gain the majority in either parliament chamber. Thus, decisions will be made by the center".

Still, according to estimations of Georgiy Satarov, the social composition of candidates for deputies of the future parliament "is more or less OK". Firstly, "the middle class, including businessmen, is entering the scene," secondly, "there is a tendency of professionalism in the future parliament".

Speaking of political struggle in the future parliament, Satarov noted "the constitution will be the major issue, since the question of the constitution is the question of power".

Bearing in mind "each politician fights for more power," there is a danger of an attack at the constitution in case of consolidation of the center and the left-wing forces.

Court Warns of Election Statute Breaches

PM2311124593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 2

["Recommendation" from Information Arbitration Court: "Arbitration Court Warns"]

[Text] On 22 November debates between political blocs and parties began in the mass media. The procedure for

organizing the debates is strictly regulated by the Statute on information guarantees for election campaigning approved by the Russian Federation president's edict. It was printed in ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI No. 214 for 4 November. The same edict formed the Information Appeal Court, which is to monitor the granting of equal opportunities for election campaigning for all parties and blocs.

Even before that, however, many mass media and the election marathon participants themselves committed a mass of violations not only of this statute but also of elementary ethical norms. In this connection the Information Arbitration Court has adopted the following document:

Recommendation No. 1 of the Information Arbitration Court dated 18 November 1993 [subhead]

On the elimination of violations of legislation on election campaigning in the mass media.

The Information Arbitration Court, guided by point 1 of article 30 and article 31 of the statute on information guarantees for election campaigning approved by the Russian Federation president's 29 October 1993 edict no. 1792 notes that the electronic mass media are failing to observe the requirements of legislation regarding the coverage of the election campaign.

The covert political advertizing of individual candidate deputies and election associations is being disseminated despite the fact that the procedure for political advertizing is strictly regulated. Thus, during a speech (interview) by A.N. Shokhin on radio 14 November 1993 on questions of his activity as a member of parliament he was asked questions by the program presenter on the attitude of the "Party of Russian Unity and Accord" electoral association, from which A.N. Shokhin has been nominated as a candidate deputy, toward the "Russia's Choice" electoral association. A.N. SHokhin was thus given an opportunity for political advertizing for his electoral association and for critical remarks against his rivals, which A.N. Shokhin did not fail to use. The ethical and legal complaints in this case are primarily against the program presenter.

Covert political advertizing by the electronic mass media also includes cases of the frequent appearance on television of pictures of the same people who are candidate deputies without even any connection with the subject matter of the program in question and also the granting to such people of an opportunity to speak on various issues of sociopolitical and cultural life and the election campaign. In particular such instances occurred on "Ostankino's" first channel with regard to Vice Premier Ye.T. Gaydar and the "Russia's Choice" electoral association.

Counter to the requirements of legislation, the practice of journalists' support for particular candidates and electoral associations and election platforms in their programs and statements or, conversely, their attempts to cover them critically and to repudiate them has become widespread. And this is done in various, sometimes highly unethical, forms.

Thus, in his radio coverage of an election trip by N.I. Travkin, a journalist, instead of simply reporting information, launched into a discussion of what percentage f the population of the region where the candidate deputy had gone supported the electoral association of which N.I. Travkin is leader and how many oppose it and gave figures which blatantly discriminated against the candidate deputy and conversely were aimed at supporting the "Russia's Choice" electoral association.

On 16 November 1993 in the "Vesti" program (at 2300 hours) after briefly covering the report by A.I. Volskiy, leader of the "Civic Union for Stability, Justice and Progress" association, who is a candidate deputy, the floor was given to the commentator who tried in a very ironic manner to repudiate A.I. Volskiy's report and in fact the electoral association's program and made a number of humiliating remarks about the speaker.

The Information Arbitration Court believes that these and similar instances are violations of articles 7, 20, and 22 of the state on information guarantees for election campaigning and do not ensure equal opportunities for access to and use of the mass media by all registered electoral associations.

The Information Arbitration Court warns that if further cases of the violation of the state on information guarantees for election campaigning are discovered (covert political advertizing, journalists' support or preference for particular candidates, electoral associations, and election blocs, and the nonfulfillment of the requirements of article 23 on the halting by journalists who are candidate deputies or candidates' agents of their participation in the preparation of television and radio programs, and other violations) it will immediately take the steps envisaged by Article 24 of the state on election [as published] guarantees for election campaigning.

[Signed] A.B. Vengerov, chairman of the Information Arbitration Court,
V.V. Sukhomlinov, court secretary, 17 November 1993

Survey Predicts 55 Percent Election Turnout

PM2411103193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Professor Vladimir Komarovskiy and Professor Vladimir Sokolov: "Only One Young Russian Voter in Four Will Approach the Ballot Box. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's Prognosis Is More Optimistic in Other Respects"]

[Text] Will you approach the ballot box 12 December? This is, of course, an interesting question—even for those who have already decided firmly to "vote with their feet" and ignore the elections which have been announced.

The results of an investigation which we conducted among the urban and rural population in 15 regions of Russia provide grounds for asserting that **55 percent (plus or minus 4 percent) of voters will go to the polling places 12 December.**

To judge from intentions, women do not intend to lag behind the stronger sex—**there will be approximately equal numbers of men and women at the ballot boxes.** So success for the "Women of Russia" bloc in the preliminary heat appears not at all accidental.

But young people take a very skeptical attitude, as was frequently said in the past, to their civic duty. Among young people **between the ages of 18 and 20 only one in four will go to the ballot boxes for certain.** It should be pointed out that young people are not very active in elections in other European and American countries either. On the other hand, pensioners do not intend to sit things out. **The most active group of voters is aged between 40 and 49**—which, incidentally, fully accords with world standards. As everywhere, the Russian voter with higher education is appreciably more active than the less educated citizen.

One more observation. The results of elections held in recent years and of the April referendum attest that there is a widening gulf between the sentiments of residents of capitals and oblast centers and countryfolk. This time, however, people out in the sticks are even somewhat more actively inclined than residents of oblast centers. This betokens the campaign's special intensity. In any case the present claims for an unconditional election victory by a pro-government bloc—particularly "Russia's Choice"—seem somewhat premature.

It is true that the pro-government blocs are favored by the fact that **the poorest sections of the population do not express any great wish to participate in the voting**, at any rate compared with relatively well-off people, not to mention very well-off people (the latter, incidentally, make up just 2-3 percent of voters). Among Russia's paramount problems voters named, in order of preference: the struggle against corruption and crime, the curbing of inflation, the ensuring of civil peace and national concord, the prevention of Russia's disintegration, ecology, assistance for the needy, the adoption of the Russian Federation's new Constitution, the development of market relations, and the struggle against unemployment.

There are questions on which the opinions both of those who are prepared to go to the polling places and of those who intend to ignore the elections coincided. Thus, **more than half of both (to be more precise, 60 and 51 percent respectively) regard the events of 3-4 October as a national disgrace**, for which all the branches of power were to blame. Only 6 and 4 percent of those polled agreed with the assertion that "the reds and browns deserve nothing different." In general, among those who have decided to participate in the voting, **more than half are disillusioned both with the former representative power and with the present executive power** and will evidently seek new leaders and new political trends. Or they will cast their votes for the old opposition.

A final point: Among the voters who have decided to participate in the voting **52 percent welcome to one degree or another the economic transformations that are being implemented, while 48 percent partially or totally reject them.** So it is almost a 50-50 split—which means that the struggle will be very acute.

Economic Issues

Fedorov on Nonpayment of Debts; Foreign Banks

LD2311192693 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Finance Minister Boris Fedorov by correspondent A. Peshchayev; place and date not given; from the "Vesti" newscast—Fedorov remarks recorded]

[Text] A report on the Moscow ZIL [motor vehicle] factory switching to a four-day work week was a major news story yesterday. It became known today that a transport and hoisting equipment works at Komsomolsk-na-Amure has switched to a reduced working week, too. The Khabarovsk chemical and pharmaceutical factory has had to suspend operation in most of its shops. All these events have been caused by customers' nonpayments. At Vesti's request, Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov comments on the situation that has arisen.

[Pishchayev] This problem is being artificially blown out of all proportion, Finance Minister Boris Fedorov told us in an exclusive interview. Enterprises' outstanding debts are not that large, after all, and they grow slower than inflation. According to Fedorov, one should not delude oneself. Giving credits to enterprises, the Central Bank, unfortunately, has not learned to recover them. Therefore, the method of promissory notes proposed by the authorities, that is, the compulsory recovery of debts, is quite a realistic and promising thing because... [incomplete sentence as heard, fading to Fedorov remarks]

[Fedorov] I am absolutely certain that many of the enterprises that are regarded as nonpayers today are quite capable of paying up.

[Pishchayev] We asked for the finance minister's view on yet another problem today. It is known that Russia has been vigorously inviting foreign banks to begin operating here and then this sudden snag occurred, that is, Yeltsin's edict limiting their activity.

[Fedorov] First of all, foreign banks do not play any substantial role in our economy today. The decision that has been adopted does not deprive anyone of anything because it says that those who were engaged in certain operations on a certain date—15 November—can continue to do so. In other words, if someone was not engaged in something he cannot start for the time being.

I have been in touch with many foreign banks and have not come across any indignation or strong protests on their part.

Bank Chief Accused of Engineering Inflation

PM2311124993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Nov 93 First Edition p 5

[Article by Andrey Illarionov, leader of the Russian Council of Ministers Chairman's Analysis and Planning Group: "Can Inflation Be Beaten If Viktor Gerashchenko Does Not Want To Beat It?"]

[Text] This is the third year in a row now that the government has stated its intention to crush inflation. For the past two years it has failed.

Inflation has been running with an enviable consistency within the range of 20-25 percent a month. What are the reasons of the failure to defeat it?

Recently another large-scale propaganda campaign was launched on the special character of the Russian economy, the inapplicability of standard economic policy methods to Russia, and the special, non-monetary character of Russian inflation. The mass media have been citing Viktor Gerashchenko's words: "It turns out that the Bolsheviks were right. The causes of our inflation are not purely financial or monetary but monopolistic. We have fulfilled all the conditions set by the government and the IMF, we have pursued a tough policy, but it has not worked."

Even children's comic books will tell you that the only causes of inflation are money and the growth of the money supply in an economy. The link here is absolutely clear—like the question about filling a bath with water. If you turn on the tap and increase the money supply, within three to four months you create a wave of inflation and the level of prices goes up. If you turn off the tap and restrict the money supply, within a few months the rate of price rises begins to fall.

At the empirical level that fact was known to the czars centuries ago, and in the 20th century so many books have been written about the subject that you could not list them all. That is why to state today that inflation is not financial and not monetary in character is tantamount to claiming that there are floods without water, hurricanes without wind, inflammations without infection.

Let us return to the so-called tough money-credit policy "devised according to the recipe of the government and the IMF" but which has failed to produce the desired results. V. Gerashchenko called it an "experiment, one of the ways which we had to test out." Just how "tough" was the Central Bank's policy? In the first five months of 1992 (when the Bank of Russia was under the direction of G. Matyukhin) the money supply grew at an average monthly rate of 11.4 percent. In the next five months (in July V. Gerashchenko arrived at the bank) it reached 28.4 percent (!), but from the end of 1992 through the present day the money supply has been increasing at an average of 17.3 percent a month. Is it this 17 percent a month increase that V. Gerashchenko calls a "tough" policy?

Its results have indeed been as expected. The first period (with a four-month lag) was characterized by price increases averaging 12.6 percent a month, the next period produced increases of 25.8 percent, and the final period saw 21.9 percent. What is surprising about that? The policy was inflationary—it produced inflationary results.

But the point is that it is this inflationary policy which they are trying to conceal with the help of massive disinformation about a supposedly tough money-credit policy that has been pursued in Russia in the past two years. There has been nothing of the kind. There were three periods—a period of moderately restrictive policy, then an openly pro-inflation policy, then a moderately inflationary policy, but there was simply no tough policy as such. In Gerashchenko's words, the "experiment" with a tough policy has not started yet, and society is still paying in the form of continuing price increases for another experiment—the experiment with the soft, inflationary monetary-credit policy being pursued by the Central Bank's present leadership.

The main criterion for a tough policy is a low rate of growth in money supply, and if the "major practitioners" here have neither confidence in nor respect for foreign text books, they can at least turn to world experience.

In the past five years (1988-1992) the average annual growth in the money supply in the United States was 5.4 percent, with the result that the average annual rate of inflation there was 4.3 percent. In France the money supply growth rate has been less rapid—2.2 percent a year—and prices have not risen as rapidly either—3.0 percent. In Germany there has been a higher money supply growth rate of 10.6 percent, but it has not triggered a corresponding increase in prices—the figure is 2.9 percent—simply because there was very fast economic growth in those years. The same thing has happened in Japan, with figures of 5.6 percent and 2.2 percent respectively. That is real, unfalsified toughness.

A lack of confidence in world experience is something that can also be applied to our own. Viktor Vladimirovich's position here is especially favorable. Few of our fellow countrymen possess such a unique, almost 12-year experience of work in banking institutions abroad. He has worked in Britain, Lebanon, Germany, and Singapore, where he was able to see for himself how a tough money-credit policy is carried out. The rate of growth of the money supply everywhere as a rule does not exceed 10 percent a year—ranging from 2.7 percent (Britain in the sixties) to 9.6 percent (Germany during the energy crisis of the mid-seventies), and correspondingly the average annual rate of inflation is not more than 6 percent anywhere. It is only thanks to an incredible economic boom (an 8- to 10-percent growth in GDP a

year) that Singapore has been able to allow itself an increase in money supply of 12 percent a year with inflation rates of only 5-6 percent. As we can see, this is very telling experience. Why has it not been used for the good of our country?

Of course it may be objected that America, Japan, Germany, and Singapore are not mandatory role models for us. After all, ours is an economy in transition, with objective rules of its own. Let us look at what is happening in other countries that are undergoing market reforms.

In Czechoslovakia in 1992 the money supply increased by 26 percent while prices rose by 11 percent; in Hungary the figures were 48 percent and 25 percent respectively; in Poland they were 60 percent and 43 percent; in Bulgaria 41 percent and 80 percent; in Slovenia 101 percent and 101 percent; and in Romania 96 percent and 202 percent. Despite the national differences that exist there is a common objective characteristic here: the more money there is in the economy, the higher the rate of inflation.

But even if the example of East Europe does not convince the Central Bank's leadership, who might argue that the structure of the economy is different, the consumer market more balanced, and so forth, let us look at our immediate "brothers," those who in all respects are little different from us—namely, the countries of the former USSR. On the one hand you have Estonia and Latvia, which are adhering to a very tough money-credit policy (in Estonia the money supply grew just 20 percent in a year), have naturally almost squeezed inflation out and for almost a year have been living with prices rising at a rate of 1-3 percent a month. On the other hand Ukraine, which has gone much further than Russia to ease money policy (in the first half of 1993 alone the money supply grew by an average of 24 percent a month), "achieved" an average inflation rate of 41 percent a month and in September set a new "record" with 65 percent.

The differences in levels of inflation among all our countries are found not in the level of monopolization of the economy, its structure, the level of supply to the consumer market, or some other far-fetched "nonmonetary" factors (prior to 1992 we were all very similar to one another in this respect); the differences lie in the monetary policy that is actually being pursued.

Perhaps these clear objective laws governing the interaction between money supply and inflation are news to V. Gerashchenko? Even if such an improbable assumption made any sense 18 months ago, since he has been in his high office the chairman of the Central Bank must have heard these explanations addressed to him especially, dozens of times, from various sources. Why were they not heeded or, if they were, why were they not put into actual practice?

In fact it seems that this advice was heeded and put into practice brilliantly, only it was done in oirder to achieve the opposite effect. Let us recall that V. Gerashchenko occupied the post of chairman of the Central Bank in July 1992 when the monthly rate of inflation fell to just 9-10 percent, when the exchange rate hovered at around 130 rubles to the dollar, and when the sound of incipient financial stabilization was becoming increasingly audible. The prospect of reducing inflation to 3-5 percent a month by December 1992 was absolutely real.

The Central Bank began by making exceptionally intelligent use of the reform climbdown in the summer and provided credit for the vast budget deficit permitted by the government, but the first R800 billion were not enough to wreck the stabilization process. It was necessary to find something new, nonstandard, and large-scale, and that was not long in coming. At the start of August V. Gerashchenko issued a telegram allowing the reciprocal settlement of debts by enterprises to begin, thus causing a massive flood of credits into the economy.

Seeing financial catastrophe coming ever closer the government tried to rescue the situation by switching at the end of August to a major toughening of budget policy. For the next three months the federal budget deficit was virtually prevented as, consequently, was the growth in the money supply from that source, but if one source of increasing the money supply was being closed, the Central Bank compensated for that by opening others wider. In the fall of 1992 a particularly energetic issue of credit to commercial banks began. Within five months centralized credits to the commercial banks amounted to R1.8 trillion.

After that the most effective means of maintaining the rate of increasing the money supply was used—the issue of credit to states in the ruble zone. Instead of the R215 billion limit on technical credit to the republics of the former USSR planned for the second half of 1992, the Central Bank issued R1.2 trillion in technical credits (excluding cash) alone.

Thanks to V. Gerashchenko's tireless efforts the burgeoning money supply began to affect the consumer market. After a three-month pause prices began moving at the end of September and, accelerating constantly, reaching the 25-30 percent level by October and staying there virtually throughout the fall and winter of 1992-1993.

Since the beginning of 1993 the government has been keeping the budget deficit more or less firmly under control. At the same time it is being considerably more effective in restricting the issue of centralized credits to the commercial banks. These sources of increasing the money supply are gradually declining. The rate of inflation is falling somewhat—to 20 percent a month. So the Central Bank has stepped up the issue of technical (noncash) credit to the states of the ruble zone and in less than four months has transferred almost R900 billion to them. Things are developing at a scandalous rate and the government and parliament are consistently adopting decisions to terminate technical credits.

The Central Bank was succumbing but at the same time was increasing the supply of cash rubles to the CIS states. In less than seven months it managed to transfer around R1.5 trillion in cash. The government sent another warning letter to the president. A new scandal was brewing. At the same time the constant invention of new ways of boosting the money supply was becoming increasingly difficult. The Central Bank leadership needed a stable and constant way of maintaining inflation. Given that the government has fairly reliable control over the domestic means of increasing the money supply—credits to cover the budget deficit and credits to the commercial banks—the only major reserve is the neighboring foreign countries. What was needed was to create a system in which the transfer of cash to republics which are bleeding the Russian economy white operates as though on a conveyor belt.

The solution was to invent the so-called new type of ruble zone. That was when the Central Bank went in for a "close combat" operation—the bank note exchange deal. The minimum aim was achieved—around a further R1.5 trillion returned from the neighboring foreign countries to Russia, increasing its money supply by approximately 20 percent and causing 26 percent inflation in August. But the maximum aim—the new ruble zone—is far more grandiose. The point of that is to bring the republics to their knees and force them to accept conditions as dictated on Neglinnaya Street [Central Bank headquarters] and, having restored the USSR as a money-credit entity headed by the Central Bank, begin a regular and stable "ruble bloodletting of a new type." The "stick" alone does not work, and in the heat of the money reform a "carrot" of R50 billion in new Russian bank notes was offered to Uzbekistan.

Thanks to the incredible efforts of the Central Bank chairman, the ruble zone was being created at a fantastically fast pace. The framework agreement was signed on 7 September and bilateral accords were reached during the following month. However, the government stepped up its resistance to the Central Bank's latest innovation and took an increasingly tough stance. Just when it seemed that the finishing line was within reach, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which could not stand the escalation of Russia's demands, rejected the latest ultimatum. The much-vaunted new ruble zone met an inglorious end.

The impression is being created that all the money supply taps have now been shut tight and we can sit back and wait for inflation to disappear forever, but even in this situation a new means of increasing the money supply has been found. Back in June the Central Bank changed the rules of currency sales, with the result that the market was flooded with convertible currency. Seemingly guided by the apparently noble intention of supporting the exchange rate, the Central Bank began to buy up dollars on a massive scale, paying for them with freshly issued rubles. As a result an "excessive" rise in the ruble rate was prevented, exporters were supported, the Central Bank's currency reserves increased by several billion dollars, several trillion rubles were injected into the economy, and the money supply, along with inflation, continues to grow as before.

There is no doubt that the range of means of boosting the money supply in V. Gerashchenko's hands is still far from exhausted.

The logical question is: Why does Viktor Gerashchenko need inflation? He is the best man to answer that question himself but he is hardly likely to do so. However, some ideas are immediately obvious.

Without harboring any great sympathies, to put it mildly, for the politicians who came to power in August 1991 (which, incidentally, was clearly and eloquently demonstrated in the support for the rebels during both putsches and in the episode involving the executive in Chelyabinsk), Viktor Gerashchenko has dedicated his activity in the post of the Central Bank chairman to the economic overthrow of the new authorities and the restoration of the disbanded USSR. Using the colossal resources and power left in his hands, he has done and is doing everything possible to stoke and fuel inflation—the most powerful means of destabilizing the economy and the political situation in the country.

Apart from his ideological considerations he is not without purely mundane interests.

Financial stabilization will immediately deprive the Central Bank of the kind of large-scale revenue that it gets for free in conditions of inflation. If you recall that out of R535 billion profit that the Central Bank made in 1992, R371 billion went into the "economic incentive fund" for Central Bank staff, as far as its leader is concerned combating inflation is like killing the goose that lays the golden egg.

Returning to the subject of where things went wrong in the fight against inflation, it should be stressed once more that the ailment was correctly diagnosed and the right treatment prescribed but that, if the doctor does not want to treat him, the patient is doomed. So, in answer to the question posed in the headline of this article, there can be no doubt that, if Viktor Vladimirovich is unwilling to stop it, inflation in Russia unfortunately cannot be stopped, no matter how many correct decisions and firm statements the government may make. The key to inflation is in the hands of the man in charge of the nation's money.

Travkin Addresses Entrepreneurs, Calls Opponents 'Devils'

MK2311131093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 82, 23 Nov 93 (signed to press 22 Nov) p 2

[SEGODNYA report: "Nikolay Travkin Regards His Rivals as 'Devils'"]

[Text] A second planned meeting between entrepreneurs and the leaders of parties that advocate market reforms

and that have been cleared for running for the Federal Assembly took place in the Chamber for Trade and Industry on 22 November. Representing the parties during the first meeting was the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms. This time it was the Democratic Party of Russia. Its leader Nikolay Travkin declared that he considers as one of the main shortcomings of the Russian Government's foreign and domestic policy the top-priority privatization of raw-material complex enterprises and the lack of interest for medium and small producers. Stating this, he described his own experience in conducting a thorough-going privatization in Shakhovskiy rayon over eight months.

The Democratic Party of Russia chairman described members of the Russia's Choice bloc as "devils" and as his chief rivals in the election campaign.

Military & Space Issues

Kokoshin on Military Doctrine Issues

LD2311185993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1523 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Interview with First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin by observer Kim Gerasimov; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Gerasimov] Russia's new military doctrine was adopted in early November this year. It was finally adopted after long discussions at the Russian Security Council and following extensive amendments. This is a truly great event. The importance of the military doctrine as a state document is especially stressed in the new draft constitution of Russia by the fact that the doctrine must be endorsed by the Russian president as head of our state.

[Kokoshin] Both the Soviet Union and Russia have always emphatically taught about military doctrine, its theoretical foundation, while a military doctrine as such, as a separate document, did not exist. A document consisting of three main blocs has been drawn up. The political part of the military doctrine was earlier examined and approved by the president. Then there is a military part proper or a military-strategic, I would say, or an operational-strategic part. And then there is a military-economic and military-technical part, the third bloc, I would say, of the doctrine.

A specific feature of the doctrine is that in the past the first two blocs, in general, used to be examined in the theory of our military doctrine, while the third bloc remained in shadow, invisible. In reality, however, the issues of backup for the army and the building up of the armed forces are, of course, very closely linked to industry and technology. Properly speaking, this factor, the importance of equipping the army with the latest means—and I am speaking not only about hardware but about training the soldier and ensuring that his intellectual level corresponds to present conditions—all these factors, in various forms, are included in the doctrine today.

[Gerasimov] According to the document, Russia's nuclear weapons are a means to prevent nuclear war. The fact that we have them should deter everybody [word indistinct] from aggression against Russia and its allies. The doctrine as a whole is distinguished by realism and moderation. Outwardly, official circles in the West have met it almost benevolently. Reactions from the western press, however, were considerably less welcoming. These responses, at least some of them, betray a certain concern, first of all, perhaps, about the circumstance that our new military doctrine contains something which is regarded abroad as Russia's decision to reserve the right to make a nuclear first strike. The attitude of leaders of our Defense Ministry to this is interesting, especially taking into account the fact that earlier, in the Soviet Union, we renounced the right to make a nuclear first strike.

I would not say that here there is any departure from the principles really linked with the role of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, in the doctrine it is stressed that nuclear weapons are primarily a political means of deterrence, but not a means of waging war. In fact, the principles that are laid down regarding the role of nuclear weapons are approximately the same ones as are currently in existence with the United States, Great Britain, and France, which have never unequivocally stated that they would never be first to use nuclear weapons.

[Gerasimov] Ukraine is today an object of special interest for military observers of both West and East. Having become, as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the possessor of some of the Soviet nuclear weapons, it has announced its intention to become a nuclear-free state. But it has not yet signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In the West there is a desire to regard the new Russian military doctrine and the provision on non-use of Russian nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state which has signed this treaty as a warning addressed precisely to Ukraine. Is this so?

[Kokoshin] I think this is, I would say, a conjecture simply on the part of journalists or some kind of analysts. I consider that with Ukraine overall, our relations are developing in a good-neighborly way although there exist, of course, a whole number of well-known problems, but in no event should these problems come to such a level connected with the use of military force. I think that with Ukraine we should resolve all problems as two fraternal states, like two close neighbors. So there is no connection with that.

[Gerasimov] Is that really possible? It really is being hyped up!

[Kokoshin] It is unfortunately being hyped up but I would just like to draw your attention to the fact that one should have a more responsible attitude to all these kinds of conjectures. It often happens that we really publish some document, or provisions of the document are proclaimed, and then there appear some kinds of interpretations which, I think, are harmful. So the hints from

across the ocean are perhaps caused by some desire to somehow play on the contradictions which today exist and raise them to a higher level, although on the whole, as far as I know, the official position of the U.S. leadership—and the press organs there are fairly independent of the state—is precisely that all questions which exist in our relations with Ukraine should be resolved by normal, peaceful, and civilized methods.

[Gerasimov] The Ukrainian parliament has finally ratified START I, a Soviet-U.S. treaty. This has become a necessary step along Ukraine's path toward nuclear-free status. Unfortunately, while ratifying the treaty, the parliament made certain reservations which threaten to make this path endless.

[Viktor Lyubovtsev, Prague correspondent] Our new military doctrine was received in Prague with some apprehension. All the more so since it appeared soon after the NATO countries had refused to grant NATO membership to the Czech Republic and other post-communist states of East Europe. In the opinion of the Czech leadership this refusal was caused, first and foremost, by a letter sent by President Yeltsin to leaders of the North Atlantic alliance containing reasons why it should not be expanded. In other words, the NATO stance stems from its desire not to spoil relations with Russia.

Czech newspapers write: So, what is happening? RESPEKT weekly says: We are knocking in vain on the closed doors of NATO, while Moscow is working out a doctrine allowing the use of military force outside Russia, although none of the foreign states is considered to be Russia's enemy. If President Yeltsin only wants to avoid interethnic conflicts and preserve the integrity of the Russian Federation, that is one thing. But if Moscow is once again trying to revive its imperial ambitions, that is another matter which poses a potential threat to former satellites of the former USSR.

In the Czech Republic they have not yet forgotten August 1968 and the invasion by Soviet troops.

In this connection, it is interesting to know that Prague is now critizing Washington and the West as a whole much more than it is criticizing Moscow. Some people are talking about unreasonable concessions made to Russia, and even about a new Yalta and the division of the world into spheres of influence. In the Czech Republic they most certainly do not want to be, so to speak, within our sphere. At the same time people here understand that there is no real outside threat to the country, it just does not exist. I think that the reason behind the Czech Republic's insistent attempts to become part of NATO is not so much its desire to get under the security umbrella, but its wish to finally become separated from the unstable and unpredictable East and to become a member of the respectable Western club.

[Gerasimov] Yes, many people are fond of suspecting Russia of secret imperial ambitions, but are there grounds for this, in the opinion of Andrey Kokoshin?

[Kokoshin] I also think that of course one can understand what is called historical memory, the memory of the past and take account of these feelings. But I also think they are unjustified and it is not at all a question of the restoration of some kind of principles of action, which incidentally used not to be declared. They were accepted tacitly and then were also tacitly put into practice, without question, without special approval on the part of, say, recognized international bodies.

Now we are openly proclaiming in keeping with the standards of international law and by the laws of the Russian Federation that the use of armed forces outside Russia is really possible, and the United States and many other members of NATO are guided by the same standards as are many other states. So are not deviating in any way from the standards of international law and we are not violating the principles of activity of other developed states acting on the basis of the UN Charter, on the basis of the charter of various regional security organizations.

We now have our own collective security treaty. Under this treaty the possibilities of use of Russian troops outside Russia are very clearly defined. Not only that, I would say moreover that principles for, say, the stay of Russian military contingents now outside Russia stems more from the most insistent requirements—even requests, I would say—from the leaders of various states, former republics of the Soviet Union, than from our own wishes.

The use of armed forces outside Russia is a big headache every time. A big headache for the state leadership, for the president, for the government, and directly for us here at the Ministry of Defense.

[Gerasimov] Tajikistan: The Russian troops deployed here are part of the coalition peacemaking forces of the CIS. Without their presence, this long-suffering country would most likely have disintegrated into warring oblasts and gangs. Moreover, the stability of the Central Asian region as a whole would have been under threat along with the huge border of the Russian Federation, obviously undefended here by anyone. It is just as obvious that in a democratic society the stationing of one's troops abroad, especially where killing is being done, will always provoke disputes and criticism, as also, by the way, will the use of the army for helping the Ministry of Internal Affairs in stopping internal conflicts on the territory of Russia itself. That incidentally is also envisaged by the new Russian military doctrine. Of course, it would be very interesting to know which of the tasks of Russia's new military doctrine is the most difficult to carry out.

[Kokoshin] The most difficult task today is the budgetary and financial and materiel and equipment back-up and the implementation of the things listed in the doctrine. This task is a headache for the leadership of the Defense Ministry practically every day. Here one sometimes has to operate in very tough, extremely tough conditions in order to ensure the troops' fighting ability and in order to provide for their combat training and solve social problems. There is a chronic and catastrophic lack of funds.

[Gerasimov] In general, what do you think? Are there sufficient forces in Russia in the present conditions, are they at the right level for the aims which have been proclaimed in the doctrine? Will we have enough stamina or not?

[Kokoshin] You know, they must be enough, otherwise we lose one of the most important elements of statehood, those elements which are present in all democratic states, developed states. If we want to be a worthy member of the community of developed, civilized states, we must have an army appropriate to this, albeit considerably smaller but well equipped and supplied. The armed forces really are a very important part of the state, a very important part of society. So is the arms industry, the elements of our industry which fulfill state defense orders. If there is insufficiency, we make fairly modest requests.

We have really had a very sharp cut in arms expenditure, especially in purchase of armaments and military equipment in 1992, a cut of nearly 70 percent. No state in the world has known such a cut in the postwar period, in a short interval of time. Most of the expenditure which the state and society now spend on defense consists of social expenses. We have calculated that about two- thirds of expenditure effectively consists of spending on maintaining kindergartens, hospitals, and schools which the arms enterprises have. They are also the social expenses of the army.

We are withdrawing a colossal number of troops. About a quarter of all the expenses allocated to the maintenance of the army are spent on the withdrawal of troops. Such a scale of withdrawal of troops which is now being carried out by Russia is also unprecedented in modern history in the last few decades. The British, say, withdraw one battalion from West Berlin in the course of several years, with colossal complexities. We are withdrawing entire armies.

Yes, it is a big load, but we have managed overall to preserve the basis of the armed forces and effectively create the basis of new armed forces, although all this of course with huge toil and effort, and we realize that the government has other concerns and we welcome the campaign against inflation, we welcome the campaign for stabilization of the budget and finance. We are not asking more than is necessary for the normal maintenance of the troops and the enterprises; incidentally, there has been a sharp reduction in the number of enterprises which fulfill state defense orders.

Yerin Says MVD Recruited 6,000 Former Armed Forces Officers

PM2411100193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Gromak: "Viktor Yerin Visits Kaliningrad, Remains Happy"]

[Text] Kaliningrad—Army General Viktor Yerin, Russian Federation minister of internal affairs, has paid a scheduled visit to Russia's westernmost oblast. He met with leaders of the oblast's internal affairs administration and visited militia collectives.

Answering a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent's question about the program for retraining officers who have been discharged from the Army owing to cutbacks and have expressed a desire to continue service with the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Viktor Yerin noted that 6,000 officers have moved over to the militia in the past year alone.

Scientists Design Near-Equator Launch Site for Proton

LD2311205893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2014 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Russian space system designers and the Australian company Space Transportation Systems (STS) Ltd. last week signed a contract to draw up two draft projects to build launch sites for the heavy-duty Russian Proton rocket on the islands of Manus and Emirau in Papua New Guinea. The projects will be tied to specific ground conditions on the islands, where Russian experts have already carried out preliminary reconnaissance. A representative of the Russian Committee for Defense Industries, who took part in a 10-day tour of possible building sites, told Interfax that Australia will as early as this December make available one-quarter of the roughly $2 Mn it has earmarked for the first part of work to draw up design and technical documentation.

The overall cost of building the launch site, which should be completed by 1998, was estimated at roughly $1 Bn in an agreement signed in Moscow between Russia and STS in mid- September.

The Moscow-based General Machine-Building design bureau, which created most of the launch pads at the Baykonur and Plesetsk launch sites (in Kazakhstan and Russia respectively), will carry out most design work for the project, added the committee representative. The Khrunichev state scientific and industrial center, the Proton's Moscow-based manufacturer, said that payloads could be significantly boosted by moving the launch vehicle's launch site closer to the equator. Payloads put into geostationary orbit (at an altitude of about 36,000 km above the Earth's surface) could be doubled to 9 tons, far more than any existing rocket system can provide.

Burning Space Transport Ship Shown on TV

LD2311221293

[Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1800 GMT on 23 November carries a report presented by Aleksandr Galkin on work aboard the Mir station, along with video of the transport ship progress burning in Earth's atmosphere. Galkin says: "Earth from orbit looks quiet and tranquil, even when greatly magnified, and the reverberations of the political storms on Mir station are hardly audible. So Vasiliy Tsibliyev and Aleksandr Serebrov continue working

according to a schedule. The other day they completed an experiment, at the request of American scientists, on growing biological crystals."

An unidentified cosmonaut says: "The biocrystals are grown in space in order to determine with absolute precision the properties of medicines. They cannot be grown on Earth because they are so multi—you know, like a branched tree and when they grow on Earth all that thermal convection breaks these little branches."

Galkin then says: "The packages of the crystals, samples of materials which have been on the outside of the station for nearly two years, and tiny pieces of screen vacuum insulation were placed in the ballistic capsule.

"Early last Sunday morning the capsule was sent to Earth together with the transport ship Progress.

"Now listen: You are seeing for the first time Progress burn up in the dense layers of the atmosphere. And the capsule, separating from it, made a successful landing hundreds of kilometers from the town of Orsk. The parcel from space has been delivered to its destination."

Video shows Mir complex over Earth partially covered in snow, interior of Mir with two cosmonauts unwrapping samples covered in silver paper and placing them in a sack. Progress is seen burning up as it approaches Earth.

Regional Affairs

Tver Nuclear Plant Overheats, Shuts Down

AU2411115693 Paris AFP in English 1141 GMT 24 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, Nov 24 (AFP)—A nuclear power plant at Tver, 200 kilometres (125 miles) north of Moscow, was shut down by its automatic security system when overheating occurred, officials said Wednesday [24 November].

Three of the four main pumps stopped working when a valve in the heat exchange unit closed accidentally on Tuesday night. Officials said there was no radioactive leak.

"It was not an accident. It was just a little breakdown which will be quickly repaired," the chairman of the government's Standing Emergency Committee, Anatoliy Streltsov, told AFP.

Shokhin in Krasnoyarsk, Speaks on Constitution

LD2411095793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0700 GMT 24 Nov 93

[Text] The key issue in Russia's politics is not so much the forthcoming election but rather the referendum on the Constitution by which the people of Russia will have to live. This opinion was voiced today by Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin, who was speaking in Krasnoyarsk at a regional conference on constitutional reform and elections. He went on to say that the new constitution must be adopted in order to end the situation that has been with us since the October events—the situation characterized not by autocracy but by the existence of just one branch of authority in the country.

Gaydar Completes Working Visit in Ulyanovsk

LD2311130893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1140 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Gennadiy Yezhov and Nikolay Milov]

[Text] Ulyanovsk, 23 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—First Deputy Premier Yegor Gaydar has completed a working visit to Ulyanovsk. He departed by air for Moscow today.

During his trip Yegor Gaydar familiarized himself with the work of Aviastar, a major joint-stock aviation enterprise which is assembling supergiant An-124-100 and Tu-204-100 airships. At a news conference Yegor Gaydar expressed the opinion that Aviastar, Russia's biggest supplier of modern airships, has a great future and "without a doubt, the government will assist the Ulyanovsk aircraft builders, who have a unique factory, to get established on the international market."

Addresses News Conference

LD2311134693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1232 GMT 23 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Gennadiy Yezhov and Nikolay Milov]

[Text] Ulyanovsk, November 23 (TASS)—"There is no doubt that the government will help the Ulyanovsk aircraft builders, who have a unique production facility, to gain a firm footing on the international market," First Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar said at a press conference here today before leaving for Moscow at the end of his working trip to this industrial centre on the middle Volga.

During his stay in Ulyanovsk, the birthplace of Vladimir Lenin (Ulyanov), after who the city was renamed from Simbirsk under Soviet power, Gaydar visited the largest aircraft building joint stock enterprise Aviastar which assembles jumbo jets Antonov-124-100 and Tupolev-204-100.

Gaydar confirmed that his trip was an illustration of the Russian Government's great attention to promising conversion enterprises. "The government ... entrusted me with identifying priority guidelines for the development of the Domestic aircraft building industry," Gaydar said.

"Under the new conditions of winning markets the main thing for the industry is to reach maximum profitability and ensure higher competitiveness of aircraft of all modifications manufactures under Russian trade marks".

The Ulyanovsk aircraft builders were the first to be granted the right to corporatise an aircraft-building complex in January 1992.

International Affairs

More Peacekeepers To Be Sent to Yugoslavia

LD2311160293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1345 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Armed Forces battalion in the UN peacekeeping forces will be strengthened from 400 to 1,220 men, said Volodymyr Yelchenko, deputy head of the international organizations directorate at Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaking to a UNIAN correspondent at a Foreign Ministry briefing today. They will become part of three motor rifle battalions to protect security zones in the Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde areas on Bosnian territory. Ukrainian servicemen will also perform duties in the Sarajevo Airport area. For the first time Ukrainian representatives will take part in military observer groups and the UN civil police. From now on, Ukraine will be in the top 20 of 74 world nations by the strength of their peacekeeping contingents.

Political Uncertainty Deters Debt Payments to Russia

MK2311140093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 82, 23 Nov 93 (Signed to press 22 Nov) p 1

[Mikhail Leontyev report: "Ukrainian Property Is No Good Even as Payment for Debt"]

[Text] Up to now Ukraine's main role with respect to Russia was to provide a living example showing what the "centrist" approach to economic policy leads to. From this point of view, Ukraine is a real boon for the reformers in the ongoing election struggles.

Up to now Ukraine has not fallen into the abyss of an economic catastrophe thanks to the colossal Russian price subsidies for raw material deliveries and practically nonreturnable credits. The credit flow has now run dry and the price subsidies are gradually waning. Ukraine is left with only one option—not to pay.

At the end of last week Ukraine's acting premier Mr. Zvyagilski arrived in Moscow to discuss the nonpayment problem, among others. Ukraine owes the Russian Gazprom over 800 billion rubles and, according to the latest rumors, is promising to pay. The promises to repay the debts are apparently linked with hopes for a miraculous effect of an economic regime that the Ukrainian leadership is preparing to introduce. The essence of the measures can be described by using some of the most banal elements of communist state regulation, like, for instance, a fixed rate for the exchange of foreign currencies and rationing the distribution system.

The Ukrainian bosses are not drawing any useful lessons for themselves: The memorable cancellation of the free market exchange rate for the karbovanets finally deprived it of any makings of a unit of currency.

Owing to the unwillingness to draw conclusions from the economic situation, Ukrainian policy is becoming increasingly marginal in all respects, both domestic and external. Stubborn resistance to the implementation of the strategic arms reduction treaty and attempts to squeeze its way into the nuclear club have no serious military content. The only aim the Ukrainian leaders are consistently working to achieve is to convert economic problems into political ones. This goal is just as real as it is risky not only for the Ukrainian population but also for its neighbors.

The awareness of the marginal and unpredictable nature of Ukrainian policy has become an obstacle to settling part of Ukraine's debts by selling Ukrainian property that is of interest to Russian enterprises. Gazprom, for instance, is greatly interested in the transit gas pipeline via which practically the entire Russian gas export goes to Europe. But even the extreme importance of this structure for ensuring our positions on European gas markets cannot force Gazprom to acquire Ukrainian property.

The Ukrainian authorities' ability to conclude agreements and therefore provide guarantees for such property is close to zero. Consequently, the sole collateral for Ukraine's debt can only be its share of the Black Sea Fleet. And although from the economic point of view such a decision means an extra liability to Russia, from the political point of view the confiscation of a certain part of explosive devices from the hands of unpredictable politicians does have a certain meaning.

German Military Delegation Visits Kiev

LD2311194593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] A delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany's Bundeswehr General Staff, led by Brigadier General Manfred Dittrich [name as heard], is on a visit to Kiev. The visit will end on 25 November. German General Staff officers met their Ukrainian counterparts to discuss issues of combat command, key officers personnel in-service training and retraining, educational work among personnel, and a number of other points.

The German military delegation is visiting Ukraine in accordance with the agreement on military cooperation, concluded by the two countries' military departments.

Foreign Attaches Visit Carpathian Military District

PM2311135393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Vladimir Bogdanovskiy report: "Military Attaches in Lvov"]

[Text] Lvov—This was the first visit to the Carpathian Military District by such a high-powered delegation, including military attaches from Austria, Britain, Hungary, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Peru, Poland,

Romania, Slovakia, the United States, Finland, France, the Czech Republic, and Japan.

The visitors met with District Commander Colonel General V. Sobkov and received replies to questions about the course of reforms in the Army. The military attaches also visited a unit of the Lvov garrison and familiarized itself with the life and daily activities of officers, sergeants, and men.

Commentary Views Tank Sales to Pakistan

AU2311213293 Kiev UKRAYINSKI OBRIYI in Ukrainian No. 18 (27), Nov 93 p 3

[Andriy Starostin commentary: "Ukrainian Tanks and the Jihad"]

[Text] At the beginning of October, the government headed by Kravchuk and Zvyahilskyy was confronted with the following dilemma: To sell or not to sell its most advanced tanks to Pakistan. The sale of tanks to a nation that is, in fact, the other party to the civil war in Tajikistan, cannot be referred to as an ordinary contract. First, the contract for selling tanks may become Ukraine's "ink test" in the world market of weapons independently of Russia. Second, the contract with Pakistan may become a financial foundation for manufacturing the first 100 percent Ukrainian T-84 tank. Finally, third, if the contract is regarded from the viewpoint of confrontation between Pakistan and India, it clearly places Ukraine on one side of the barricade.

However, while Kharkiv military specialists report to the government on the excellent results of testing the T-84 tank under conditions in Pakistan, few politicians and statesmen have any idea of Ukrainian interests in that region.

Particularly widespread are ideas that Ukraine must not have anything to do with either the war in Tajikistan or Russia's attempts to keep in power the openly communist regime in Tajikistan, or other problems of the region. Less common is the point of view in accordance with which Ukraine, in order to obtain Arab oil, must take all measures, including military and technological support for leading Muslim countries. If we disregard pro-Moscow and "imported" deputies, the least numerous is the group of those politicians and statesmen who believe that, in the given situation, our state has simply no choice: Either sales and manufacture of tanks jointly with Pakistan or, sooner or later, Ukraine will find itself drawn into the Tajik conflict on the Russian side.

Notwithstanding the fate of the contract on tank sales and the entire program of Ukrainian tank building, one thing must be viewed as essential: A pragmatic search for the material and political advantages for our state. On an example of the reconstruction by Ukrainian specialists of the Esfahan tank repairs plant in Iran that dates back to the times of [former Prime Ministers] Masyk and Fokin, one can see how unprofitable it may be to take into account somebody else's interests. When Mr. Masyk was developing the program for establishing close contacts between Ukraine and Iran, a program that was unprecedented for the first year of Ukrainian statehood, he did not pursue the interests of independent Ukraine, but those of Ukraine as a member of the CIS. Hence the present negative results. First, the extent of Ukraine's influence on Iran will never surpass that of Russia's. Moscow builds an atomic electric power plant in Iran, sells its most advanced submarines there, and has an accord on free movement of troops across the territory of Iran to Armenia with it. Therefore, Ukrainians must try to catch the train. Second, Moscow skillfully uses the fact of a too close cooperation between Ukraine and Iran to undermine Ukraine's relations with Turkey. As a result, Ukraine did not and does not have the promised Iranian oil that was the motto in the "Masyk adventure," because when he signed the agreements, Mr. Masyk forgot that Ukraine does not have a tanker terminal. At the same time, the political results are quite obvious. One cannot help feeling even greater bitterness at the sight of that same person [Masyk] in a high ambassadorial post in the Scandinavian countries.

Therefore, we already have an example of an incompetent external policy in the Central Asian Region. There remains only one thing to do: In the present difficult situation regarding the tank sales contract with Pakistan, we must not allow the involvement of those politicians who stand for anybody's interests except Ukraine.

National Affairs

Article Views Aspects of Military Doctrine

AU2311132993 Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA in Ukrainian No. 19 (38), 18 Nov-1 Dec 93 p 8

[Article by Mykola Bilovil, UKRAYINSKA HAZETA military columnist: "A Quite Intricate Lock With a Single Ukrainian Key. Reflections on Ukraine's Military Doctrine"]

[Text] At last, the event that gave rise to so much talk for such a long time, has taken place—our independent state has its own military [viyskova—derivative of "viysko"—army] doctrine. I am writing "viyskova," despite the fact that, contrary to all grammatical rules, the Supreme Council called it officially and illiterately "voyenna" [derivative of "viyna"—war]. Unfortunately, there is an impression that our legislators were not really keen on consulting the "holy book"—a dictionary or, at least, occasionally open, for example, UKRAYINSKA HAZETA, where Oleksandr Ponomariv, professor of Taras Shevchenko Kiev University explained that the Ukrainian word "voyennyy" means "related to war." Our doctrine is meant for building our own army and establishing its role in society. Therefore, the proper definition for the doctrine is "viyskova" [military], as is used in combination with the words "districts," "statutes," "educational institutions," and so on.

However, let this remain the deputies' responsibility. We will refer to the doctrine as "viyskova."

In our reflections about it and about its influence upon the establishment of Ukraine as an influential state capable of fulfilling an important role in ensuring political, ecological, and military stability in Europe, let us first touch upon the structure of this important and crucial document. It is necessary, first and foremost, to point out its exceptional conciseness and the absence of declarations. It only contains three sections with several subsections in each.

The first section deals with military-political aspects, the second—with military-technological aspects, and the third—with military-economic aspects.

For those who did not have an opportunity to read the text of the doctrine, let us also quote the titles of the subsections, in order to be able to refer to them in the present analysis.

1.1. Ukraine's military-political goals and international priorities in the sphere of ensuring the national security;
1.2. Factors of military danger. Ukraine's attitude toward war;
1.3. Ukraine's attitude toward nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction;
2.1. Main trends of guaranteeing military security;
2.1. Tasks of the Armed Forces and principles of their building;
2.3. Preparation of the Armed Forces for defense against aggression;
3.1. The goal and principles of the military-economic policy.
3.2. Preparation of the state and population for defense.

As we can see, the structure is simple and crystal clear. This is good. The text itself takes into account almost all important aspects of this extraordinary matter. At the same time, all acute problems of our time have been masterly passed over.

I remember reading an article entitled "Ukraine's Military Concept: The National Interests Are Above All" published by Professor Vasyl Tarasenko in a western Ukrainian newspaper. The author is a former leader of the Ukrainian delegation to the Atomic Commission and the Commission for Conventional Weapons at the UN Security Council.

The article states directly that the military doctrine must point out clearly that a constant threat to Ukraine's state independence will issue from Russia, that Ukraine must have nothing in common with the military plans of the CIS or Russia, and that Ukraine must possess nuclear missile weapons as long as other nuclear countries of the world remain owners of such weapons.

Sharply? Frankly? No doubt about that. Time will show to what extent the author is right. For the time being, we have, as our president likes to say, precisely what we have. More specifically, an energy blockade, lengthy negotiations on selling the Black Sea Fleet to Russia, the pressure to totally give up strategic missiles, and so on. These are today's realities. Of course, if we proceed from them, it might seem that the legislators, in elaborating the military doctrine, might at least outline our position with regard to our northern neighbor. However, the military doctrine is not a specific plan for actions to prevent an aggression, but is a program of general aspects of national security, a program meant for a long perspective. It is impossible to state in it that these are our enemies and these—our friends. Nobody would understand this. That is why the doctrine aptly stresses that Ukraine builds its relations with other states on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs.

We read the following in the first section: We are opposed to the deployment of foreign troops on our territory, rule out unilateral disarmament, and reject the use of our armed forces for resolving political issues on our territory. The latter aspect became particularly topical after the October events in Moscow, where, for the first time in world history, the Russian president fired upon his parliament through the agency of the military. This suggests that if one side is capable of using the army in such a manner, the other side may also do the same, given a different situation. As they say, this was a precedent.

Regarding the deployment of foreign troops on our territory, today, we have them both de jure and de facto: in the Black Sea and in strategic missile garrisons. Regarding the latter, former Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov issued a timely order on their subordination to Ukraine within the 43d Army. However, here, there are objective difficulties: It is, so far, impossible to do without servicing missile complexes jointly with Russia. It is, therefore, necessary to be cautious. That is why it is correctly stated in the doctrine: Ukraine "is opposed to the deployment of foreign troops," instead of demanding their immediate withdrawal. The Baltic states can easily demand the latter—they do not possess nuclear forces.

However, notwithstanding all of this, the doctrine states that economic, political, territorial, national-ethnic, religious, and other differences may become major causes for wars and military conflicts. That this is precisely so, we have already had an opportunity to see, at least, on an example of the disorders caused by the "White Brotherhood" in Kiev. The majority of its members arrived from Russia. It is difficult, at the moment, to say who and what is behind it, but these fanatics have created more than enough difficulties, and there could also be numerous victims.

In accordance with the doctrine, Ukraine condemns war as an instrument of national policy and will regard as a potential adversary that state whose consecutive policy involves a military danger for Ukraine (here, the word "voyenna" is used correctly, because it implies the threat of war—editorial note) and leads to interference into its

internal affairs and to encroachments upon its territorial integrity and national interests.

Some people explicitly assume that the reference is to Russia. However, it is up to Russia to refute this postulate.

The doctrine also envisages the use of our armed forces in cases of adherence to obligations stipulated by international agreements on protecting victims of armed conflicts. Here, there is enough food for thought. On the example of Yugoslavia, we have seen for ourselves that such actions only cost us much sacrifice and huge losses. What do we need all of this for? Are there not enough strong states that could easily do without us in such situations? The doctrine has confirmed our principles of nonalignment. That is why, in my opinion, it might be a good idea for us, until we firmly establish ourselves, to temporarily remain outside peace-keeping activities. We have yet to learn to defend ourselves.

The first section is concluded with a subsection on our attitude toward nuclear weapons. At the dawn of Ukrainian independence, the Supreme Council and President Leonid Kravchuk proclaimed it nuclear-free. It appears that the president has now realized that it was done prematurely and inconsiderately. That is why the doctrine reads that "Ukraine intends to become, in the future, a nuclear-free state." I think that such a formulation is not suitable for the doctrine, which needs to be more specific and clear. However, circumstances require this particular formulation.

Recently, new U.S. Ambassador William Miller arrived in Kiev. He replaced Roman Popadyuk at this post. As is known, the latter threatened us with negative consequences unless the parliament ratified START I. I wrote about this in UKRAYINSKA HAZETA.

In a conversation with our parliament speaker [Ivan Plyushch], William Miller also touched upon the problem of elimination of strategic missiles situated on the territory of Ukraine. Ivan Plyushch frankly stated that it could be resolved very quickly provided that a tripartite mechanism involving Ukraine, Russia, and the United States is created. This would primarily resolve the technical problems (how and when to destroy the missiles and the sum of compensation) and would elaborate principles of collective security in accordance with which aggression on the part of one of the participants in the treaty against another would also be perceived by a third side as aggression against itself.

This would create a specific reliable lock with a single key. The statement by the head of our parliament indicates that Ukraine can make a good use of the nuclear legacy, instead of giving it up. Unfortunately, this is only one side's desire. Its implementation requires much time and effort. It is good that our rightful striving is reflected in the statement formulated in the doctrine.

That is why we will remain a nuclear power until the Ukrainian lock starts operating despite the concerted pressure exerted by Clinton and Yeltsin upon Kravchuk to secure Ukraine's fastest nuclear disarmament.

Statements made by Ukraine's new Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy on the availability of high-precision weapons that are also mentioned in the doctrine are noteworthy. The minister proudly declared about a "key" to other weapons "based upon new physical principles." A question arises: If both types of weapons are equivalent to nuclear, then why bother and draw the state into new large outlays, if we already have everything? It is desirable to have Mr. Radetskyy tell about this more clearly and more specifically in UKRAYINSKA HAZETA, so that his words would not remain empty talk.

The Ukrainian people must know that they will not suffer in the process of nuclear disarmament and that the armed forces will be able to conduct combat actions on land, in the sea, in the air, and in near space, as is stated in the doctrine.

The proposal by Chairman of the Supreme Council Subcomission for Issues of the Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion Vasyl Kryuchkov on the need to immediately approve the bill on preservation and further development of Ukraine's space missile potential on the pretext that this potential will, otherwise, collapse, is quite worrying. It is an alarming signal and symptom. From such a point of view, the military doctrine seems to be somewhat idealized and detached from our technical and economic possibilities. The only reassuring thing is that this document is meant for a long perspective. However, one cannot help feeling apprehensive knowing that, today, military units do not get new machineguns, tanks, aircraft, munitions, or fuel and that the army subsists on starvation rations.

In the doctrine, this is "reflected" in the following way: "To ensure maximum efficiency of military production in conditions of limited financial and material resources." How can this be ensured to a maximum extent today, when Ukraine, on its own, is capable of creating 3 percent of "MiG" aircraft, 5 percent of antiaircraft missile complexes, 20 percent of tanks, and 0 percent of artillery and fire arms....

As we can see, there is still a long way to implementing the ideas of the doctrine. However, we must not despair. The main thing is that the doctrine already exists, more specifically, the foundation of Ukraine's military building that is based upon an analysis of the geopolitical situation in the world and long-term scientific predictions of its development is a constituent part of the concept of the national security of our state, its people, and the individual.

No matter what, in the third year of its sovereign existence, the Ukrainian state has its military credo and its own independent position with which all countries of the world—both friends and adversaries—must reckon.

However, at the same time....

Ukraine's Minister of Defense Colonel General Vitaliy Radetskyy issued an order in accordance with which the Ministry of Defense Administration for Sociopsychological Service has been transformed into the Main Administration for Educational and Sociopsychological Work. Major General Anatoliy Kobzar has been appointed as its head. In the past, under the leadership of Mr. Radetskyy, he used to head the sociopsychological service of the Odessa Military District.

Major General Volodymyr Mulyava, who had until then headed the Ministry's Administration for Sociopsychological Service was transferred to the post of deputy minister of defense for issues of ties with the public, parties, and movements.

Some people get thrown into the high seas, while others are put into quiet waters. What else is there in store?

Deputies Demand Economic State of Emergency

LD2311151593 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1345 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev—In the morning of 23 November deputies gathered at the plenary session. Because of Ivan Plyushch's absence, who at the moment is in the Czech Republic, the session was initially chaired by his first deputy, Vasyl Durdynets. He said that because of the absence of a quorum and a decision by the Ukrainian Supreme Council presidium, which was made yesterday, the plenary session would be postponed. The indignant deputies demanded to continue the plenary session, but the lights and microphones in the chamber were turned off. Deputies decided to hold a deputies' assembly and Ihor Yukhnovskyy was elected chairman. Volodymyr Yahoferov was the first to take the floor. He read aloud a statement from the Lugansk deputation. The statement questioned whether President Leonid Kravchuk and the government that he heads is capable of fulfilling their duties. The speech by Andriy Pecherov, chairman of a parliamentary commission, stressed the necessity of introducing a state of emergency in the economy. People's deputies demanded that the continued holding of the deputies' assembly be conducted under the chairmanship of Vasyl Durdynets.

Deputy Stepan Khmara proposed that the commissions examine the amendments to the constitution and the law on the presidency regarding restricting the president's functions and rights. He also proposed elaborating a mechanism for impeachment.

In his speech, People's Deputy Ihor Yukhnovskyy noted that the introduction of a state of economic emergency in Ukraine is necessary first of all to resolve several most important issues: tje organization of trade, taxation, and customs legislation. In his view, if the state has the right to import goods worth $9 billion, it must also claim the right to export an appropriate amount. Academician Yukhnovskyy warned that land privatization cannot go ahead until a land tax is imposed. He suggested using Poland's experience, and quoted calculations that reveal that Ukraine could receive 12 million conventional tonnes of grain in taxes off each 16 million ha of land occupied by grain crops. In his opinion, trade can be invigorated only by restraining the growing dollar rate and by increasing wages. World experience, he said, shows that such invigoration occurs as soon as the [monthly] wage reaches 80 dollars. Academician Yukhnovskyy expressed the belief that the Interbank Currency Exchange artificially raised the dollar rate against the karbovanets. If one should follow the Currency Exchange rate, then the gross national product of the entire country amounts to a mere 0.5 billion dollars.

Deputy Leopold Taburyanskyy offered an explanation for the causes of the current economic crisis in Ukraine: The state is led by incompetent people. In his words, either the president himself or his entourage must be competent. "It has transpired that Leonid Kravchuk is incapable of forming a government able to act. One cannot declare social security when production is coming to a standstill. It is only by restoring production that we will have payments made toward the state budget and that we will be able to improve the well-being of the people," said Leopold Taburyanskyy.

Deputies did not reach a unanimous conclusion on the resignation of the government, no confidence in the president, or the introduction of an economic state of emergency. After the discussion, work will continue in deputies' commissions. A UNIAN correspondent has learned that a joint session of the Supreme Council Presidium and the Cabinet of Ministers Presidium, with the participation of the Ukrainian president, will discuss in the afternoon of 24 November versions of the introduction of an economic state of emergency in Ukraine. It is expected that a relevant document will be adopted by parliament at the plenary sessions to resume on 25 November.

Debate Postponed

LD2311182493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] The Supreme Council of Ukraine is planning to support a government decision on introducing an economic state of emergency in the country. It was envisaged that this issue would be examined at today's plenary sitting. However, Vasyl Durdynets, first deputy chairman of parliament, referring to the fact that the relevant documents are not yet ready, proposed that deputies elaborate them further in commissions and discuss the issue of introducing an economic state of emergency and also social protection of the populace on 25-26 November, with the participation of the president of Ukraine. This caused a wave of indignation in the hall.

The parliamentarians endeavored to demonstrate that this problem can in no way be postponed and decided to hold a deputies assembly without the leadership of the Supreme Council. Certain speakers proposed that a new election for parliament chairman and his presidium be held as they cannot cope with their duties. A statement

from the Lugansk deputies called for the president's resignation. Neither proposal was supported.

After a lengthy debate the deputies asked Vasyl Durdynets to take the place of the speaker and conduct the assembly. The parliamentarians at the assembly outlined a (?range) of problems, which will be discussed as a package of issues on introducing an economic state of emergency in Ukraine.

RUKH Leader Boycotts Supreme Council Over Election Law

PM2411100593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[UNIAN report "specially for IZVESTIYA:" "'Rukh' Leader Vyacheslav Chornovil Refuses To Participate in Ukrainian Supreme Council Sessions"]

[Text] Kiev—"RUKH" [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] leader Vyacheslav Chornovil has released a statement in connection with the Ukrainian Supreme Council's adoption of the Law "On the Election of People's Deputies."

It says that the law, for which most of the Ukrainian parliament voted, "has no peer in European postcommunist states in its reactionaryism and effectively preserves the old Soviet election system, providing a guaranteed route to the future parliament and government for the nomenklatura 'party of power.'"

Chornovil is not relinquishing his duties to his electors as a people's deputy, but he is refusing to participate in Supreme Council plenary sessions and urging deputies who are democrats to follow his example or to implement the long-standing idea of holding parallel People's Council sessions.

RUKH Leader Views Domestic Political Situation

AU2311193693 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 23 Nov 93 p 9

[Interview with Vyacheslav Chornovil, founder of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka, by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—first paragraph is PESTI HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] We hardly have to introduce Chornovil to those who have been following the events in Ukraine in recent times. Chornovil, founder of the RUKH [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] national movement, has spent 15 of his 56 years in prisons and labor camps. He is a journalist by profession, and people who later founded Ukraine's Helsinki group had congregated around the UKRAINISKIY VESTNIK that ran under his name. Chornovil is a recognized leader of the Ukrainian Parliament's democratic wing, and was one of the presidential candidates in the 1991 elections. Ukraine became independent as a result of the August 1991 coup attempt. What were the effects of the October 1993 events on Ukrainian political life?

[Chornovil] It is very true that Ukraine's independence can partly be attributed to the August coup because the communist nomenklatura became frightened of the coup organizers. At a high cost, the October events—Russia's dramatic historical lesson—showed where conflict between the legislative and executive bodies leads. In my view, it is because of this that parliamentary and presidential elections will be held in Ukraine in the spring.

[PESTI HIRLAP] Do you think that the new parliament will be better than the current one?

[Chornovil] It will have to be because it will be set up as a professional parliament and it will not have any people sitting in more than one seat at the same time. It was only a second job for kolkhoz chairmen and factory directors and, since they are very conservative, we could not have expected them to support the reforms.

[PESTI HIRLAP] How many mandates do you expect to gain in the new parliament?

[Chornovil] It all depends to what extent we manage to get rid of the old, Soviet system of selecting the candidates. At the moment, our suggestions are meeting with a strong resistance, but even the current deputies gave a noisy welcome to President Kravchuk's announcement that all communists will have to be removed from the next parliament. We hope that the RUKH will acquire 30 percent of the mandates.

[PESTI HIRLAP] And will Canaan immediately come to Ukraine?

[Chornovil] I understand the irony in the question but we did not promise mountains of gold at the previous elections, either. All we can promise now is that we will continue the reforms and put an end to empty talking.

[PESTI HIRLAP] What will be future president Chornovil's first decree?

[Chornovil] If not the first one, then the second or the third will be on the land because this is our currency. A normal country cannot allow itself not to apply good management on half of Europe's best arable land in order to maintain the sovkhoz-kolkhoz system. For example now, a significant part of the produce—sugar beet and corn—is covered by snow. When we have fuel, it is very expensive. The subsidies worth billions [currency not specified] can create a new wave of inflation. On the other hand, at Poltava, where strong farms have been set up, the cost of producing one tonne of wheat is one and a half times less than in the kolkhozes. Therefore, these farms have to be supported.

[PESTI HIRLAP] If the RUKH comes to power, will Ukraine's relations with Russia improve?

[Chornovil] I would like to call attention to the fact that the RUKH has never had an anti-Russian attitude. We

have never had territorial demands against Russia. On the other hand, the Russian leaders—the previous and the current ones—have used pressure a number of times. In August 1991, Rutskoy visited Ukraine and demanded the withdrawal of the Ukrainian declaration of independence. Or let us think of Khazbulatov who made chauvinistic statements on the Crimea in the Russian Parliament. The fact that President Yeltsin keeps threatening with closing off the taps does not increase his popularity in Ukraine. Ukraine paid too much for its independence to tolerate these imperial efforts without resistance.

Ukrainian People's Council of Transcarpathia Formed

LD2311213393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] An election coalition has been set up in Uzhgorod—the Ukrainian People's Council of Transcarpathia [Ukrayinska Narodna Rada Zakarpattya]—an association of democratic forces. The local political formations of Rukh, Memorial, Enlightenment [Prosvita], the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Union of Ukrainian Women and others are part of the bloc. A coordinative council and headquarters have been set up. It was decided to support a single candidate for people's deputy of Ukraine in each electoral district of Transcarpathia, not to nominate independent candidates and to continuously coordinate actions during the election marathon.

Council of Industrialists, Entrepreneurs Abolished

LD2411120693 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0755 GMT 24 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev—The Council of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs under the government has been abolished by decree of the Ukrainian president dated 23 November in accordance with the recent decree on "Leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine." This was done with the aim of strengthening leadership over all structures of state executive power in the center and in the localities, efficiently resolving the tasks of economic reforms, and consolidating market relations etc.

Belarus

Deputies Adopt Draft on Overcoming Crisis

WS2311153193 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Report by Mikhail Rudkovskiy]

[Text] During discussion of current issues at today's session of the Supreme Soviet in Minsk, People's Deputy Vasil Chepik informed the lawmakers that a new deputies' association has been formed under the name Popular Movement of Belarus, comprising a large group of parties and public organizations.

After the announcement by Deputy Chepik, the floor was given to Nikolay Kuznetsov, first deputy Supreme Soviet chairman who spoke on behalf of the committee for drafting a resolution on the addresses by Chairman Shushkevich and Prime Minister Kebich to the Supreme Soviet. He submitted the draft for deputies' consideration, but lawmakers refused to adopt the document in its entirety. A heated debate followed. People's Deputy Viktar Hanchar insisted that the adoption of the resolution would amount to legislative control over the government's activity, which is a normal function of parliaments throughout the civilized world. In the opinion of Deputy Gets, the Belarusian Supreme Soviet must find a way to overcome the crisis and, as long as a committee has failed to draft an appropriate program, a new committee must be formed. Deputy Lukashenko insisted on adopting a resolution and voting on his own draft.

Adding to the discussion, Deputy Pankevich said that the government should not be blamed for the critical situation because the Supreme Soviet itself is to blame. Thus, the only resolution is to introduce amendments to the Electoral Law and call early elections, because the existing Supreme Soviet is unable to adopt radical, necessary decisions.

After such heated debates, the draft was finally approved by the deputies.

A delegation of Romanian lawmakers led by Oliviu Gherman attended the session. Mr. Gherman told deputies about the progress of economic reform in his country. Stanislav Shushkevich thanked Mr. Gherman for his speech, after which a recess was called.

KGB Department Chief on Methods, Staff

WS2311133093 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 2

[Interview with Petr Aksyuchits, head of the analysis department of the Belarusian KGB, by Vasiliy Matveyev; place and date not given—first paragraph is NARODNAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] **Among the most important institutions of a sovereign state, as is known, are its special services. The content and orientation of their activities, as well as the character of information disseminated by them to the highest bodies of power and administration, can significantly influence state policy. We have quite a complex situation in the domestic policy and economy of our Republic; our foreign policy also faces a series of acute problems. In such a situation, our society is not indifferent to questions of what and to whom the Committee for State Security of Belarus reports. We have requested that these and other questions be answered by Petr Grigoryevich Aksyuchits, head of the analysis department of the Belarusian KGB.**

[Matveyev] **Thus, Petr Grigoryevich, what does the KGB report to the authorities and administration of the Republic?**

[Aksyuchits] The legal foundation determining the content of KGB activities for informing leading state structures was laid down by the Temporary Statute of the Committee for State Security of the Republic of Belarus, which was approved by a Supreme Soviet decree on 15 January 1992. Among other statements, the mentioned document determines the following directions of our activity (excuse me for reminding everyone of them, but, apparently, they are not known to all your readers): "...obtaining intelligence on foreign policy, economy, defense, science and technology, and ecological issues to inform the authorities and administrative bodies of the Republic of Belarus"; "... multifarious studies of the strategic situation, preparation of information on separate topics and prospective estimations for the highest authorities on issues of national security."

Hence, operating from the theoretical and legal point of view that national security can be regarded as the protection of vitally important interests of a society and state against external and internal threats (both real and potential), we direct our analytical activity in the sphere of information, that is, we aim to provide the governing bodies of the Republic with full and reliable information about those events, occurrences and processes, which may threaten national interests. It should be pointed out that those interests, including very difficult problems, are to be found in practically all the vital spheres of our state—political, military, economic, scientific, technical, ecological, and human... Such an approach in the activity of the KGB is, in my opinion, a matter of principle for bodies of state security, as well as for the Republic as a whole. Particularly, in the forging of our sovereign state.

Considering the direction of our work as a priority, the KGB governing body pays continuous attention to its development and improvement. Judge for yourself. Our department alone, despite its relatively "young age," prepared and dispatched to various addresses about 500 reports last year, and over 300 this year. Those documents contained diverse information, from external policy and economic relations of Belarus with foreign countries to ecological issues. We also conducted analytical studies on privatization issues, conversion, the fight

against crime, state border protection, the situation in transportation, and others issues.

[Matveyev] **In this regard, would you like to give more details about the consumers of your information?**

[Aksyuchits] The recipients of our information are the Supreme Soviet, chairmen of the Council of Ministers, Supreme Soviet committees, and various ministries and departments. The local KGB branches carry out analogous work on the oblast and rayon level, and provide necessary information to central bodies of the committee, as well as to local authorities.

Relying on the Constitution and laws, while preparing and sending appropriate documents to the appropriate institutions, we are, first of all, guided by the interests of the nation and the country, where the majority of us were born and grew up. I am sure that the present KGB workers, my comrades and colleagues, will not be ashamed of the contents of those documents today or in the future.

[Matveyev] **Petr Grigoryevich, what can you say about the realization of your information, about its effectiveness?**

[Aksyuchits] The realization can be accounted in short: It means for us the timely reporting of urgent material to the people and bodies which need it. In doing so, we are never directed by the desire to overemphasize our importance or to defend "the honor of the regiment." As for any decisions made on the basis of our reports, they are the prerogative of the governing bodies. As for effectiveness, it should be noted that not everything can be assessed in terms of quantity. For example, how can you evaluate information which might ward off a menace to our citizens, avoid a state of emergency in vitally important establishments of the national economy, or prevent political or economic losses for the state? Possibly, we would like our work to be evaluated in some numbers...but that is far from being our primary or most important goal. The primary goal is to preserve the social stability and secure, normal life of the Belarusian people. In connection with this, I am impressed by Aeschylos' words: "Wise is not he who knows much, but he whose knowledge is useful."

[Matveyev] **Judging by what you have said, I assume that your department has a large staff?**

[Aksyuchits] Unfortunately, no. In the number of employees, we cannot even match the support staff of some medium-sized educational institutions, not to mention certain scientific research institutes. Our workday is not regulated. The department employs well-educated officers, who have work experience in various KGB departments. There are also candidates of sciences among them. Working under such workloads and conditions, with such depth of analysis in various problems, many other employees could defend their theses, as well. Do not think me immodest in saying that, after attending scientific conferences and consultations, analyzing the work of many authors and institutes, I have come to the conclusion that our work is no worse than anyone else's. By the way, while working out the final versions of our analytical reports, we consult many scientists and specialists to get their expert opinions. Taking this opportunity, I express my great gratitude to them, and hope for more close cooperation in future—we all work for the same common cause.

[Matveyev] **One last question, if it is not a secret. From where do you get your information?**

[Aksyuchits] No, it is no secret. The main channels, through which the initial information is obtained, are open-source media (foreign and domestic papers and magazines, scientific research papers, etc.), which are analyzed through the prism of national security interests; also the operational possibilities of the KGB and the research of its employees. For example, materials prepared on the basis of our thorough analysis of press reports on the situation at nuclear power plants in neighboring countries, proved to be extremely accurate. This is also the method of operation adopted by well-known special services in foreign countries.

Firms Assist in Destroying Old Ammunition

PM2311144393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Valeriy Kovalev; from the "From Our News Bureau" column: "Shells in Belarus Cut Up By... Water"]

[Text] Minsk—Practical work to recycle outdated ammunition, more than 80,000 tonnes of which has been stockpiled in army arsenals, began in Belarus last week.

A Belarusian-American-British joint venture called Belkonvers has been set up at a military unit base near the city of Dobrush, Gomel Oblast, for this purpose. Purpose-built equipment is being used to dismantle the shells in safety. They are cut up by a jet of water pumped under a pressure of 4,000 atmospheres. The shell cases are then crushed.

Reasons for Economic Ties With Russia Viewed

WS2411083093 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 11 Nov 93 p 1, 3

[Interview with Alyaksandr Kulichkow, head of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Industry and Public Services, by Alyaksandr Shchadranok; place and date not given: "The Economic Union Is Not a Relief—It Is the Main Prerequisite for Overcoming the Economic Crisis"—first two paragraphs are ZVYAZDA introduction]

[Text] **While the highest governing officials in Belarus are discussing what is more convenient—to introduce a national currency or hide under the wing of Russian ruble—the interim Belarusian currency, the "zaychik" ["little hare"—nickname adopted because of the animal's image on one of the banknotes], was hit by the same**

syndrome as the Ukrainian karbovanets. According to specialists, at the end of 1993, one Russian ruble will be equivalent to 8-10 "zaychiks," which bears witness to the financial breakdown of our economy. Meanwhile, many people see the only possible solution in economic union and unification of the Belarusian and Russian currency systems, while forgetting many examples of when "the older brother" completely neglected Belarusian interests in spite of various international agreements.

According to the opinion of our interlocutor—Alyaksandr Kulichkow, head of the Supreme Soviet Commission for Industry and Public Services—it is not going to be repeated anymore, and the economic union will help Belarus rise to a qualitatively new level of development.

[Shchadranok] **Alyaksandr Mikalayevich, the Supreme Soviet session should ratify the agreements between Belarus and Russia on the creation of a common economic area and united ruble zone. It is known that there are diverse opinions regarding the expediency of the "CIS Common Market" in the Supreme Soviet, as well as in society as a whole, therefore you, as an active supporter of these agreements, will likely have to defend them. What arguments have you prepared for the discussion with your opponents?**

[Kulichkow] Today, many industrialists, economists and politicians are convinced that economic union within the CIS framework is necessary for Belarus.

Belarus should not push itself away from Russia, because 70 percent of our exports go to Russia. Only a short-sighted person withdraws from acquired markets. Though, I agree with you that there are people's deputies who will speak against the union during the session. Therefore, I will stress at the beginning that the common economic area and ruble zone are external prerequisites for Belarusian economic development. Without them, we will not be able to resolve our domestic problems.

As to other arguments, just look at the situation we are in, beginning with the immensely enigmatic system of settlements between enterprises, and ending with everyday relations between people. Today, nobody can guarantee to a sender that his parcel or money order to some other CIS country will ever reach its destination. Therefore, according to the opinion of many producers, it is necessary to create a united economic area with "common rules of the game." It means that we need to break the obstacles to free the transfer of goods, services, and capital; to abolish customs duties; to implement coordinated budget, credit, pricing, and monetary policies; and, after all, to draw together national legislations.

[Shchadranok] **However, what specific profits will the Belarusian economy draw from these agreements? We will be buying energy resources from Russia at the prices we paid before?**

[Kulichkow] The primary profit will be in the common market. We should get oil and metal at the same prices as Russian consumers. We should not ask for any relief or dictate our will to each other. Our goal is full freedom for entrepreneurs and equal taxation terms. Belarus will have an advantage in the established common market, because the country is a producer of finished products. Our economic potential is higher than that of the enterprises that prepare raw materials. We have a more qualified labor force and, after all, we have labor discipline in the manifold sense of the word.

Having united our possibilities with Russia, Belarus will be able to rise to a qualitatively new level of development. For instance, today, Russia need not create new capacities for production of tires, because our Bobruysk Tire Combine is only using half its production capacity. Russia could use these means to increase oil extraction, for instance, in Tumen, where 35 percent of the oil wells are not exploited, and supply Belarus with part of that oil.

[Shchadranok] **Belavezha agreements have approved documents on the strengthening of economic ties within the CIS framework. Unfortunately, these documents remain on paper, while in practice the opposite steps are taken: customs points, customs duties, licenses, etc. Bearing this precedent in mind, you begin to question: Do we need the new "paper economic union?"**

I want to stress once more, that all these measure are proposed within the CIS framework. Those Belavezha documents were only called "agreements." Actually, they were principles, declarations, which require the implementation of new documents of executive force, including also the ones on economic union. After several meetings, in Moscow on 24 September the leaders of the CIS countries at last signed economic agreements and approved the schedule for governments to work out appropriate documents. This schedule puts off the adoption of resolutions to the first quarter of 1994. Such political moves testify to the fact that the questions of economic union within the CIS framework are resolved very slowly. One even has an impression that the CIS may be transformed in the committee, which covers the liquidation of the former USSR in all spheres, including the economic one. Therefore, being an industrialist, I set all my hopes on bilateral economic agreements between the CIS countries and, in particular, between Belarus and Russia. The question should be resolved as quickly as possible.

We have already signed an agreement to unify our monetary system with Russia's, which practically takes into account all the principles of economic union. It remains only to ratify this agreement in the Supreme Soviet of Belarus. On the Russian side, this power was given to the government and the National Bank, and it means that they do not need any additional procedures on their side.

[Shchadranok] **Thus, it seems to me, after the ratification of this agreement by the Supreme Soviet, one may positively affirm that Belarus has lost its sovereignty, because everyone knows perfectly well who is going to play first fiddle in the Belarusian-Russian duet...**

[Kulichkow] The economic union does not contradict the principles of national sovereignty. Not at all.

As for sovereignty, let us return to history. In Rome, on 25 March 1957, the agreement creating the EEC was signed to closely develop economic activity, continually and evenly stabilize the situation, and work toward faster increases in living standards, as well as to strengthen ties between the united countries. To achieve these goals, the EEC countries provided for the abolition of customs duties and quantitative limitations on imports and exports of goods; introduction of common customs tariffs and a common trade policy toward third countries; removal of barriers to free movement of people, services, and capital; implementation of a common transportation policy; implementation of procedures allowing member states to coordinate their economic policies and remove discrepancies in balance of payments; and the drawing together of legislation. Since 1957, they have been moving toward a common market, and at last they have succeeded. We have an excellent example before our eyes, but we are still lingering—to do it or not to do it. By the way, none of the EEC countries has lost its sovereignty.

[Shchadranok] **Alyaksandr Mikalayevich, what is your opinion about the view that a state is sovereign only when it has its own army and currency?**

[Kulichkow] We have resolved the question of our own army long ago. As for the national currency, the Belarusian economy needs a reliable, stable monetary unit. Whether it should be a Russian ruble, a Belarusian "zaychik," or a Belarusian ruble is quite another question. To introduce our own currency is not a complex task, however, before doing so, we must answer the following questions: Do we have gold reserves or a reserve fund in convertible currency to protect our national currency?; Do we have products that can be sufficiently competitive on the world market? The answer to both these questions is, no. Besides, now is not the right time to introduce a national currency. Production is decreasing while inflation in increasing. Thus, we have to stabilize the economic situation. Otherwise, the furious inflation will compel us to print new banknotes. By the way, each banknote cost us 25 cents to produce. What means will we need, and for what? Thus, in my opinion, Belarus will be sovereign, while using Russian rubles as a means of payment, and as a variation—Russian ruble and the "zaychik."

[Shchadranok] **You are speaking of economic instability and inflation as the primary reasons for obstructing the introduction of a Belarusian currency. However, we have the examples of the Baltic states, which were in a similar situation but still managed to introduce their own currencies. For instance, in Latvia, the lat is standing on its own feet pretty well. With the help of Western aid, they have found a way to create a stabilization fund there. As for us, we see only one creditor for ourselves—Russia, with its big printing machine. However, this situation will not last long, because Moscow has more and more ministers of the Fedorov type, who oppose any help to the former fraternal republics.**

[Kulichkow] As for the Baltic countries, they, in my opinion, have found ways of resolving those questions I posed earlier.

We both have different understandings of the idea of economic accord. Within the CIS framework, we need rules of the "Common Market" to be implemented and for mutually disadvantageous relations between the CIS countries to be eliminated. Regarding Fedorov's statement, I can say that he is a competent specialist, who understands his job well and can count money. However, there are other people in the Russian Government who think differently.

[Shchadranok] **Today, we are discussing the joining of the ruble zone by Belarus, but let us recall how Belarus was "chucked out" of that zone, and, in particular, the Russian approach to the exchange of banknotes, which took place in August. By the way, they were not able even to come to a full understanding of who ordered and initiated that action. Who will protect Belarus against such "tricks" by the Russian National Bank in the future?**

[Kulichkow] In my opinion, the united "ruble" zone ceased to exist on 1 July 1992, when noncash monetary transactions were differentiated in connection with the transition to inter- republican settlements through the balancing of bank accounts. The "zaychik" exchange rate with the Russian ruble has begun to form, though until recently it was not given official status. The exclusion of the banknotes issued prior to 1993 from circulation in the Russian Federation has definitely strengthened the delineation of the currency systems, and at the same time sharpened the question of mutual monetary and credit relations between Belarus and Russia. If someone thinks it was accidental, he is greatly mistaken. It was a deliberate act by Russia against the CIS republics, according to the words of V. Gerashchenko.

I think a situation like that is not going to happen in the new type of ruble zone. It will be guaranteed by the institutions that will be established to implement the accepted policy. Perhaps, we will encounter some troubles at the start, but we can borrow from the working experience of the EEC. Of course, we have our ways, but we also have very competent economists, who are able to establish contacts in case nobody disturbs them.

[Shchadranok] **Yet the events of last week, when Russia slammed the door to the ruble zone on Kazakhstan, cast doubt on the idea of economic union within the CIS framework in general. Do we need to "jump at one another's throats" and prove our points of view, bearing in mind the Kazakhstan's case, whose legislative body, by the way, ratified all the agreements, as in vain?**

[Kulichkow] In my opinion, Russia and Kazakhstan should consequently follow that policy that was adopted between them in the concluded bilateral agreements and documents regarding cooperation within the CIS framework. I am not acquainted with the detailed reasons for

not admitting Kazakhstan into the ruble zone, but I am sure that in this case, a different policy meddled in economic questions.

Regarding the reasons for discussing the question of integration with Russia during the Supreme Soviet session, I want to note that the ratification of agreements gives hope for implementation of economic and political resolutions, which are intended to better the life of our citizens.

[Shchadranok] **By the way, one purely practical question: Will the wages of our citizens be on the same level as in Russia? If we say that our labor force is more qualified, then it follows that they should be paid more.**

[Kulichkow] I think that will be the case. Payment levels are determined by the personal contribution of the employee and the results of the enterprise.

[Shchadranok] **Alyaksandr Mikalayevich, today we are talking about a common economic area and see it as a solution to all our economic maladies. However, let us look at the situation of being isolated for three or four years, when we had one national economic complex and no problems with customs duties, mutual settlements, etc. Even then we could observe the industrial recession that testified to the economic inefficiency of the former Union...**

[Kulichkow] I think that the economic union is not a solution, but the main prerequisite for overcoming the economic crisis. Later on, we will have everyday's hard work before us to restructure our economy, among other things. By the way, there is an item on the session agenda, regarding changes in tax legislation; those changes are intended to stimulate producers, not middlemen. Having created normal conditions for producers, we can increase the Republic's budget by 20 percent.

[Shchadranok] **One last question: In your opinion, is the economic union a first step toward political union?**

[Kulichkow] The old state cannot be reinstated. The European experience shows that states are looking to one another for support; therefore, any economic union has political implications. By now, we are working to strengthen the CIS, and questions of any political union should not be raised, because they obstruct the creation of the common economic area.

Today, many politicians declare their support for the idea of economic union, deriving political capital from such declarations. However, they do nothing concrete to help further the cause. I think that we have completely fulfilled the plan for destruction; now it is time for construction. The center of our state construction has been transferred to the economic sphere. Everyone who does not work to strengthen the economy, is an enemy of the Republic's sovereignty and our statehood.

MY I VREMYA Publishes Suspended Russian Papers

Publishes PRAVDA 25 Oct

WS2411073093

[Editorial Report] The Belarusian pro-communist newspaper Minsk MY I VREMYA in Russian on 25 October carries the following announcement on the front page:

"When the publication of PRAVDA was suspended during the 'emergency' days, many of our colleagues from that newspaper sent their materials to the MY I VREMYA editorial office.

"A true journalist cannot help writing, as a human being cannot help breathing.

"We decided to gather and publish all of these materials in a special supplement under the familiar PRAVDA masthead on our own initiative.

"We hope that our colleagues will forgive us this freedom."

MY I VREMYA is supplemented by a special issue with a masthead reading: "PRAVDA. Newspaper established on 5 May 1912 on Lenin's initiative. Monday, 25 October, 1993. Special MY I VREMYA issue."

The following is a review of articles published in the two-page PRAVDA supplement.

The front page carries two interviews and one report.

The interview with PRAVDA's chief editor Gennadiy Seleznev by A. Mikhailov under the headline "PRAVDA Cannot Be Choked..." deals with the authorities' decision to suspend the newspaper. The editor begins by recalling the recent story of PRAVDA's suspension. He confirms the adherence of the newspaper to socialist ideals. G. Seleznev continues by rejecting the rumor about a dyarchy in PRAVDA. Commenting on President Yeltsin's actions, the chief editor says: "President B. Yeltsin's team has acted consequently. After August 1991, it managed to suspend and abolish the CPSU. Now the soviets are in its way. This team is trying to wipe out from our history everything that would recall the USSR as a superpower." In conclusion, G. Seleznev expresses the idea that the president's post should be abolished in Russia.

The second interview with Yuriy Sedykh-Bondarenko, deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, by Y. Makhrin is entitled "The Last Hour of the Moscow Soviet." The deputy chairman recounts the last hours of the functioning of the Moscow City Soviet and its closure. He assesses B. Yeltsin's decision as unconstitutional.

The report by Ivan Boltovskiy under the headline "The Shot Russia" is an eyewitness account of the tragic events on the night of 29 September.

The back page carries a commentary and several letters.

The commentary by Vasiliy Fartyshev, PRAVDA editor for cultural issues, entitled "The Furious Ones Demanded Blood," deals with a document signed by 42 writers and published by the newspaper IZVESTIYA, demanding resolute action from the government. V. Fartyshev accuses these writers of demanding revenge and the suspension of certain publications.

In an open letter to President Yeltsin under the headline "An Open Letter to the Unloved Man," Nataliya Morozova explains which actions by the president evoked her dislike for him.

Another two letters deal with the legal aspect of President Yeltsin's decisions after the shooting in Moscow. The first letter by V. Belotserkovskiy congratulates Constitutional Court Chairman V. Zorkin on his resignation. The second letter by PRAVDA's chief editor G. Seleznev is addressed to Russian Prosecutor General A. Kazannik, in which the author requests the prosecutor general to provide a legal assessment of official statements and actions concerning the suspension of his newspaper.

Publishes DEN 1 Nov

WS24111000

[Editorial Report] The Belarusian pro-communist newspaper Minsk MY I VREMYA in Russian publishes a "special edition" on 1 November which includes contributions from the banned opposition Russian newspaper DEN. The masthead from DEN does not appear anywhere in the paper.

The masthead of MY I VREMYA on 1 November includes the notation "special edition" and the statement "Aleksandr Prokhanov and other Moscow authors participated in preparing this issue." Next to the masthead is a box containing a picture of the charred building of the Russian legislature with the inscription "Russia steeped in blood."

Three articles appear on pp 1-2: "With a Nail on the Grimed Wall..." by Aleksandr Prokhanov; "'Our Dead Remain With Us in the Ranks'" by Shamil Sultanov; and "The Shooting for Show" by Nikolay Anisin.

Aleksandr Prokhanov begins his article with a description of the fear and confusion that Yeltsin supporters have managed to impose throughout Russia, which is the main precondition for keeping people under subjugation. He warns that the whole country will soon be turned into a "factory of fear" and the country's "social life" should resist fear even if "it has to go underground." The author goes on to say that the parliament and its congress proved to be "the only democratic institutions that garnered popular resentment and protest" of unfair economic transformations carried out by tiny interest groups to further their own interests. This is why Yeltsin could suppress public outrage and discontent only by smashing the legislature and installing "dictatorship," "in its nastiest and harshest form." Aleksandr Prokhanov goes on to criticize the Orthodox Church and its Patriarch, who proved scared by the events and failed to lead a crusade against the Army, which itself was carved up by "separatist regimes." He also contends that the country is now ruled by a junta propped up by the rich, radical democrats, and "America, whose interests lie in Russian 'reforms.'" He warns of swelled budgets for the military and meager funds for the hinterland, which will put a brake on military conversion programs and throw Russia back to the highly centralized way of governing. Fortunately, the authors concludes, Russian patriots managed to come up with some creative ideas—known as the "Russian Idea"—which will remain in peoples' minds and survive the present catastrophe. These ideas will help to resurrect Russia once again.

"'Our Dead Remain With Us in the Ranks'" by Shamil Sultanov is an extensive attempt to analyze the reasons behind the recent abortive coup, the manner in which it was carried out, and its implications for the country.

S. Sultanov stresses that the coup was prompted by a fiasco of reforms conducted by the Yeltsin team characterized by dwindling production and dropping standards of living. More and more people were actively involved in politics. This was happening amid distractions within the ruling establishment that came to a head in September with the appearance of small, mutually hostile groups. The crisis manifested itself in the failure of the Constitutional Assembly and an attempt to replace the Supreme Soviet with the Council of the Federation. The author then goes on to describe Yeltsin's edict dissolving the legislature and Khasbulatov's counter reaction. In the opinion of S. Sultanov, the president's plan was orchestrated by a small group including Filatov, Shumeyko, Barsukov, Lobov, Yerin, Baturin, Sliva, Makarov, Ilyushenko, and Grachev. He blames them for instigating pro-Khasbulatov demonstrators to act violently, which allowed the military to roll on the streets and ruthlessly overwhelm the protesters. After that, S. Sultanov gives an account of the assault on the Ostankino television center and street fights. The author says that those events undoubtedly proved to favor Russian Defense Minister Grachev, who "by playing several games at a time, consolidated the Army from within," and helped it "overcome the August syndrome and reemerge as a major political factor." In this context, the author points to the hastiness with which Yeltsin set out to devise a new military doctrine. This proves that he now has to repay his debts to the Army that took his side in the conflict. Summarizing the implications of the Moscow unrest, the author concludes that the president-parliament type of diarchy was replaced by the president-army one, which poses the threat of a presidential conflict with Grachev in the future. The author predicts a failure of economic reforms which will anger the people who, in turn, will start to arm themselves.

In his article "The Shooting for Show," Nikolay Anisin provides a first-hand account of the Moscow events as seen by a man on the street. Shortly before and subsequent to the blockade of the Russian legislature building,

the author was touring the city, attending public gatherings, viewing the Supreme Soviet emergency session and the barricades erected by defenders of the Russian parliament. In his opinion, the regime deliberately shelled the parliament so cruelly because it wanted to intimidate and silence all those angered by Yeltsin's policies.

In addition to the above articles, page 1 includes an appeal entitled "While Dying, We Will Continue To Live..." attributed to defenders of the parliament, calling on their fellow countrymen to uphold their faith and save Russia. Next to the appeal appears a verse by Yevgeniy Nefedov, carrying anti-governmental overtones.

At the bottom of page 1, there is a highlighted and framed announcement that says: "According to defense attorneys that visited Lefortovo [Prison], Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, Achalov, Barannikov, Dunayev, Makashov, Anpilov, Konstantinov, and Terekhov are conducting themselves with DIGNITY [last word capitalized]."

Page 3 includes eight articles (about 700-800 words each) attributed to ordinary people—an unemployed woman, a pensioner, a conservatory graduate, etc.—who give accounts of what they saw on the streets during the unrest. Their stories highlight their efforts to avoid getting shot on the street and the ruthlessness of the government troops.

Pages 4 and 5 feature pictures of street battles under the title "The Uprising."

Page 6 includes articles "Blessed Days" by Aleksandr Sintsov, "The Portrait on the Backdrop of Victims" by Aleksandr Lyskov, and "In the Overcoat and Without It..." by Georgiy Semenov. The article by A. Sintsov consists of several chapters written in the form of little novels describing violence and shootings on the Moscow streets.

Aleksandr Lyskov's article is a roundup of letters sent to the Moscow chief prosecutor by ordinary people, in which they complain that special-assignment detachments severly beat them and inflicted bodily harm.

In his article, Georgiy Semenov praises militia members that defended the Russian parliament, using the examples of two officers.

Page 7 carries an article "Wrath Does Not Create God's Truth" by priest Dmitriy Dudko, who says he was asked to write it on the request of journalists from DEN. He calls the recent clashes in Moscow a "Satanic deed," and warns that the Day of Reckoning is near. This view is echoed in the article: "The Satan Sits in the Winners" by Vyacheslav Klykov placed on the same page. The author says that the Orthodox Church Patriarch did almost everything possible to prevent the bloodshed. However, if he had appealed to all the people, not just those in power, there would have been no violent and bloody clashes in Moscow. V. Klykov argues that only Orthodox monarchy is the best system for Russia, and that "one cannot sow alien seeds of presidential or parliamentary forms of governing on our soil." He concludes by contending that the October revolution and recent events prove that only monarchy will revive Russia.

Also published on page 7 is the article "'Beytar' Visiting 'DEN'" by Aleksandr Prokhanov, editor in chief of DEN. He highly praises his newspaper for its efficient coverage of the Moscow events and thanks readers for their support. In the end, A. Prokhanov expresses confidence that the newspaper, banned by the authorities, will continue to be published. This article, and the previous one by priest Dmitriy Dudko, are the only articles in the entire special MY I VREMYA issue that are directly attributed to DEN.

Page 8 includes two verses "Russian Miseries" and "If Only Not Stray Vikings" by Viktor Kochetkov and Ilya Konstantinov, respectively, as well as an article by Vladimir Bondarenko "Hardship of Freedom or Complacency of Slavery." V. Bondarenko devotes his article to the role of intellectuals—Solzhenitsyn among them—in public life of Russia, and the role that they should have, but failed to play during the coup. He criticizes them for their inactivity and succumbing to what he calls a "new dictatorship."

Page 8 also contains the box carrying the MY I VREMYA masthead and the following information: "Independent left newspaper. Published from 1990. Founder—newspaper's staff. Editor in chief—V. Nikolskiy (Chikin). Newspaper's address: 220030 Minsk, 19 Lenin St. Views of authors from the "Free Tribune" rubric do not necessarily concurs with that of the paper. Circulation 6,000 copies."

Moldova

Snegur, Envoy Discuss Reform, Cooperation

AU2311204693 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1825 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova, this afternoon received the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Romania to Chisinau, Marian Enache, at the latter's request.

During the ensuing discussion, President Mircea Snegur referred to the economic reform process initiated by the Government of the Republic of Moldova and especially, to the coming introduction of the national currency, a measure that will contribute to the protection of the domestic market.

In turn, Romania's ambassador discussed a number of issues linked, on the one hand, to tangible actions undertaken so far with a view to strengthening bilateral relations and, on the other, to seeking new ways and means to giving concrete shape to the intentions of the two states, namely to intensifying economic integration and consolidating their common cultural and spiritual region.

As our correspondent to Chisinau, Mircea Dascaliuc, informed us, some questions regarding the election campaign, the spectrum of political parties, and the aid granted by Romania at multiple levels to the Republic of Moldova completed the dialogue, which the presidency press communique termed conclusive.

President's Military Adviser Resigns

AU2311182893 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2015 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRES, 22/11/1993—I have forwarded my resignation from military adviser of the president because I was elected for chairman of the Republican Council of the Moldovan Liberal Convention, stated to BASA Nicolae Chirtoaca. "I believe that current state structures have already reached a limit in promoting the reforms," he added. Efforts are needed today in politics to change the state's essence itself, which should be a reformist force. "This can only be done if some parties and blocks come to power," stated Chirtoaca. Nicolae Chirtoaca was born in 1953 in the Glodeni district. He graduated the Faculty of Architecture of the Chisinau Polytechnic. Since 1990 he was director general of the State Department for Military Problems, on whose basis the Ministry of Defense was created. In February 1992 he was appointed for state counselor for military problems. Nicolae Chirtoaca is married and has two children.

Russian Troops Leave for Tiraspol, Dubossary

PM2311134993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Colonel Andrey Bondarenko of the Volga Military District Press Center: "Blue Berets Leave for Moldova"]

[Text] Trains carrying four motorized infantry battalions and other subunits of the 27th Guards Motorized Infantry Division of Russia's peacemaking forces have left Totskoye Railroad Station, Orenburg Oblast, for Tiraspol and Dubossary.

The men serving under Colonels Valeriy Stasov and Valeriy Kononets will, according to a contract that has been concluded, perform tasks for a period of six months as part of composite peacemaking forces in this region of recent conflict.

Dniester Seeks To Establish Confederation

AU2311180493 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2015 GMT 22 Nov 93

[Text] Tiraspol, BASAPRESS, 22/11/1993—Grigoriy Marakutsa, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic, declared at a meeting with workers of Internal Offices that the authorities of Dniester would insist on the plan of setting up a confederation in Moldova. In case this plan is not accepted, the declaration of the independence of Dniester and its exit from the composition of Moldova will be possible, Marakutsa stressed. He mentioned that there were cases when some countries were not recognized by the world community for years. During the meeting the results of the meeting between leaders of Tiraspol and Nicolae Medvedev, representative of the Russian president, were discussed.

Dniester Fails To Commission CEC Representatives

AU2311180693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2015 GMT 22 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS, 22/11/1993—At present, the Central Electoral Committee (CEC) approves the componence of technical groups, stated to BASA Simion Ropot, the CEC speaker. The quoted source added that, for the time being, all the republic's zones, except Comrat, Camenca, Grigoriopol, Rabnita and Slobozia, had commissioned their representatives for the CEC technical groups. Dniester is represented only by the district of Dubasari. So far, the list of candidates has been presented only by the CDPF [Christian Democratic Popular Front of Moldova] alliance. Independent candidates collect supporters' signatures, which, according to the law, must be at least 1,000 to allow the candidates to be registered.

Battalion To Come Under Interior Ministry

AU2311180093 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2015 GMT 22 Nov 93

[Text] Comrat, BASAPRESS, 22/11/1993—Dumitru Uzun, head of the Gagauz Direction of Interior, stated to BASA that the "Bugeac" battalion of guardians would pass to the subordination of the Moldovan Ministry of Interior according to the terms established during the meeting of the Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and Comrat leaders. At present, specialists of the Moldovan Ministry of Interior test the battalion guardians in Chisinau in order to determine their physical condition. The test does not include the political knowledge and knowledge of Romanian language. Gagauzians, Russians, Bulgarians and Moldovans are members of this battalion, stated Guzun. He added that the unit would improve its abilities. This would allow a more efficient activity to keep order and fight crime in Comrat and in the adjacent districts.

PSD, TU Leaders Discuss Political Platform

AU2311174193 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2015 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 23/11/1993—On November 22nd, members of the Presidium of the Council of the Moldovan Federation of Independent Trade Unions met with leaders of Social Democratic Party [PSD] at the request of the latter. The Social

Democrats spoke about the main issues of their program and the platform of the party. They proposed several solutions for the crisis Moldova faces. The Social Democratic Party leaders stated that because of the two first governments the privatization program was delayed: and Andrei Sangheli's team compromises the economic reform. They emphasized their option for a professional Parliament. The social- democrat representatives said that they would like to be supported in the electoral campaign by the trade unions. Oazu Nantoi, chairman of the party, stated that nowadays there exists a single problem: When the Social Democrats come to the power rather than if they come to the power.

Agrarians To View Lucinschi Candidacy

AU2311173993 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2015 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 23/11/1993—The Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova (PDAM) investigates the possibility for the parliament speaker Petru Lucinschi to be a candidate in the PDAM lists, stated to BASA Aurel Talmaci, vice-president of the party. Talmaci said that, for the time being, this is only a supposition, as the PDAM lists for the future poll are not yet adopted. "We investigate thoroughly every suggest. Immediately after the lists are approved, we shall publish them," Talmaci added.

Kazakhstan

President Seen Behind Soviets' Self-Dissolution

MK2311142093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 3

[Sergey Kozlov report under the "Kazakhstan" rubric: "Soviets Dissolve Themselves Voluntarily. But Virtually No One Believes This"]

[Text] As many as three district soviets of people's deputies of Kazakhstan's capital at one time have announced the termination of their powers. Deputies of one of them—the Alatau soviet—have sent an open letter to their colleagues throughout the republic calling soviets "a synonym of the former regime and the old ideology." The letter calls the pattern of "the soviets' full powers" flawed and inconsistent with current realities. The deputies suggested that soviets at all levels follow their suit and back the idea of calling early parliamentary and local elections in Kazakhstan.

The deputies of the self-dissolved soviets have been assuring their voters in numerous interviews that everything they have done has been absolutely voluntarily because it has become clear that the deputy corps has become an impediment for the president and chiefs of administration.

Reports are already coming from other regions of the republic about "embracing the capital's initiative." But they also talk about "informal work" conducted by "presidential people" with some of the deputies after which the people's deputies have displayed this unexpected zeal.

The parliament has been swift and unusually harsh in responding to the goings-on. The Supreme Soviet Presidium's meeting passed a statement vehemently denouncing the dissolutions and describing them as "destabilizing the situation and breaking civil accord in the state." The Presidium also called on the deputies at all levels not to give in to such appeals for self-dissolution.

Meanwhile, the "presidential people" have received the backing from independent trade unions and the "Elim-Ay" international environmental foundation, which issued a joint statement on the subject calling on Nazarbayev to take entire responsibility for the steps and decisions being made by the government and suggesting that the Supreme Soviet pass a new elections law by the first third of January and subject itself to early elections, leaving the executive branch the right to manage the economy on a day-to-day basis by decree.

This has immediately sparked talk in Almaty about a new stage in "reforming," of sorts, the top echelons of power. It has already been inferred that it has been decided to "get rid of" the soviets by capitalizing on the virtually complete political apathy of the population and political parties at a time when people, shocked by the unexpected money reform, do not care about any reorganization of power structures. A year has scarcely passed since the adoption of the new Constitution, but many of its articles are already at this stage being drastically reviewed or ignored altogether. It has also been remarked that the compliant Kazakhstani parliament, which only affects independence, but then again at times has never been an obstacle for the president. So, the head of Kazakhstan has no need to destroy the parliament.

What has prompted the self-dissolution campaign then? A member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and a prominent lawyer who asked not to be identified drew the following conclusion: The head of state has once again succumbed to pressure from strongmen in his entourage and is encouraging processes that can only harm him. What is being erected is a shaky pyramid of power that could be resubordinated within an instant as soon as one single element—the top—is switched to another direction.

Jurisdiction Dispute Threatens Test-Monitoring Unit

PM2311125793 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 20 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Correspondent A. Kondrashov] [video shows exterior of installation in snow-covered landscape] [Kondrashov] It is a characteristic fact about Kazakhstan that it has on its territory some unique military-technical facilities which until recently were all-Union facilities.

In addition to the Baykonur cosmodrome and Semipalatinsk test range, these facilities include this secret special monitoring unit which registers nuclear tests worldwide. Located on the granite rocks of northern Kazakhstan, this is the only facility that monitors all the tremors from explosions in the United States; all information is passed to Moscow within two minutes.

After the sovereignty spree, the military unit was legally subordinated to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan. However, Russia has been funding it since August last year. Moreover, the Russian defense minister is in charge of it. However, the unit's status remains unclear and the officers, who are left to fend for themselves, as it were, are sending out SOS signals to both the Moscow leadership and to the Kazakhstani Embassy in Russia.

[Unit commander O. Babkin] If the matter of the unit's status is not resolved within the next two-three months, the unit will simply lose its combat readiness due to the discharge of most of the officers and their departure for Russia.

[Kondrashov] The officers themselves want to see their unit here as a Russian military base, which is unacceptable to Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, the situation is a typical

one—the Kazakhstani side, while asserting its right to control the unit, cannot ensure either funding or the safekeeping of large material assets. [video shows exterior of installation, interior of control room, interview]

Tajikistan

Russian Border Troops Attacked 55 Times in Oct

LD2411114193 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 0425 GMT 24 Nov 93

[From the "Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border remains complicated, said Colonel General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of Russian border troops. According to him, outposts and deployment areas of the border troops in Tajikistan were attacked 55 times in October alone. Recently, leaders of the Islamic Rebirth Party's armed formations held a meeting in Afghanistan to coordinate the actions of opposition forces. One of their main aims is to carry out terrorist acts against the officers of the Russian border unit in Pyanj.

Guards Come Under Fire Along Afghan Border

LD2411092193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0802 GMT 24 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe November 24 TASS—Separate parts of the Afghan-Tajik border came under repeated fire by Islamic opposition combatants entrenched both on Afghan and Tajik territory, ITAR-TASS learned from headquarters of the Russian border troops in Tajikistan.

According to latest information, militants on Tajik territory on Tuesday three times fired small arms and missiles at the Navranga post on the border stretch guarded by the 12th unit of the Moscow border detachment. They also attempted an offensive against the border troops positions but were rebuffed and retreated after losing some of their people.

Also on Tuesday, a border patrol from the 12th border post of the Pyanj border troop detachment was fired on from behind by Tajik opposition combatants while it was out to capture some transgressors who were trying to cross the river Pyanj from the Afghan bank to Tajik territory.

Three transgressors were prevented from crossing the border by border guards of the 9th border post of the Moscow border troop detachment.

20 Guerrillas Killed in Attack on Border Post

LD2411105993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 24 Nov 93

[Excerpt] According to preliminary information, around 20 attackers were killed when an attack by guerrillas from the Islamic Revival Party on post no. 12 of the Moscow Border Detachment on the Tajik-Afghan border was rebuffed. INTERFAX was told this by competent sources in Dushanbe.

Fire was opened from a mountain plateau on Tuesday afternoon on the border guards' positions and also on subunits of the 201st Russian Motor Rifle Division which are deployed here. The attack was repelled. There are no casualties among the Russian servicemen. [passage omitted]

Joint Peace Force Performs Night Exercise

PM2411093393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Anatoliy Ladin report: "Outcome of 'Fighting' Decided by Maneuver: In the Collective Peacemaking Forces in Tajikistan They Do Not Just Fight, They Train"]

[Text] As already reported by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the Joint Command of the Collective Peacemaking Forces in Tajikistan held its first planned exercise involving the use of live rounds at the Khalkayar training center for Russian Federation border troops, located close to the Tajik-Afghan border, 17-21 November.

In line with the exercise plan, a group of around 200 armed "border violators" infiltrated the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan and sought to penetrate deep inside the country's border region. The "enemy," according to the plan, employed two groups, operating in different sectors in mountainous terrain.

The intentions of the "uninvited guests" were to be thwarted by a battalion of the 92d Motorized Infantry Regiment of the Russian 201st Motorized Infantry Division under the command of Major Konstantin Poplavskiy. It operated in the northern sector during the tactical exercise. A reinforced motorized infantry company of the 149th Motorized Infantry Regiment which was commanded by Senior Lieutenant Pavel Safronov moved up from the other side (the eastern side) to meet the "armed group" which had penetrated from the neighboring state.

Subunits taking part in the exercise accomplished a march of many kilometers and carried out a large number of engineering operations in mountainous country. The motorized infantrymen, together with attached and support assets, then carried out a surprise night attack upon the "enemy." The delivery of artillery fire was accurate and the reconnaissance scouts, sappers, and communications personnel successfully carried out their set tasks. Deciding to crush the "opposing forces," the commander of the motorized infantry battalion,

Major Pop'avskiy, ordered company commander Senior Lieutenant Gulyam Khodzhayev to execute a maneuver and attack the "enemy" from the flank and the rear. At the critical moment the motorized infantrymen were supported by a flight of Su-25 ground-attack aircraft. The artillerymen laid down marker flares and the pilots illuminated the "enemy's" positions.

Commenting on the results of the exercise at the request of your correspondent, the commander of the Collective Peacemaking Forces, Colonel General Boris Pyankov, noted the effective collaboration of all the subunits which participated in the exercise and the good results of the delivery of fire on targets under nighttime conditions. In the commander's words, Senior Lieutenant Gulyam Khodzhayev showed initiative and tactical skill in his command of the subunit which acted as the outflanking detachment. Military pilots Majors Vasiliy Mamayev, Andrey Trubkin, Vladimir Myshlyankin, and Valeriy Romanishin demonstrated a high level of air combat efficiency.

Uzbekistan

Karimov Meets UK Foreign Secretary Hurd in London

LD2411095093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0721 GMT 24 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Solomin]

[Text] London November 24 TASS—President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, currently paying an official visit here, met British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd on Tuesday evening.

ITAR-TASS has learned from an official representative of the British Foreign Office that the sides had discussed several international problems, including the situation on the southern border of the former Soviet Union, as well as the development of bilateral relations. The representative said that the meeting was confidential.

The British foreign minister expressed the hope that Karimov's negotiations with British Foreign Minister John Major [title and name as received], expected to take place today, would be successful and would contribute to the strengthening of mutually advantageous cooperation between the two states.

President's Staff Applies Pressure to Journalists

PM2311111393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

["Own Information" report: "Journalists Taught What To Write and How To Write It by Uzbek President's Apparatus"]

[Text] The Republic of Uzbekistan president's apparatus has held two sessions of a kind of secret course for local journalists in the light of the political and economic events that have taken place in the republic in recent days.

At first, according to unofficial information sources, leaders of newspapers, magazines, television, and radio stations that either publish or broadcast in Uzbek were invited to the presidential palace. They were more or less given the following advice: Stop stirring up the situation over demands that the state language be compulsorily studied by the Russian-speaking population. Stop making barbed remarks about Russia implying that it has forced us out of the new-style ruble zone; everything might change, they say, we should wait for the 12 December election and referendum results in Russia. They were also told not to alarm Uzbekistan's Russians, it would be better to campaign to stop them from leaving...

And then the leaders of all local mass media, including newspapers and magazines published in Russian, were invited to the president's press service. They were all insistently instructed to demonstrate clearly and substantively the advantages of the sum coupons introduced by the republic a week ago and enhance the image of the transitional national currency; under a government decree one sum coupon is equivalent to one 1993-issue Russian ruble (meanwhile on Tashkent's "black market" the rate is one to three in favor of the Russian ruble, while in the oblasts and rayons it is even more; but prices at local bazaars have leaped 400-900 percent).

At these confidential discussions local journalists were requested to go easy on the drink with diplomats when invited to receptions at foreign embassies in Tashkent! Hints were dropped about the furor over the secret flight to the United States by the former Uzbek ambassador in Washington—this is what close contacts with foreigners can lead to.

Needless to say, Russian press representatives were not invited to these meetings.... Such is the way of things in Tashkent these days....

Armenia

Kazimirov Hopes 'Incident' Will Not Affect Peace Moves

NC2311143093 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1245 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Yerevan, 23 Nov (ARMENPRES)—Vladimir Kazimirov, the Russian president's ambassador for special missions, stated during a telephone conversation with Davit Shakhnazaryan, the Armenian president's ambassador for special missions, that he did not want the 20 November incident to affect the peace efforts and promised to visit Armenia and Karabakh in the future.

In a news conference, Davit Shakhnazaryan called this incident an open provocation by Azerbaijan aimed at obstructing Russia's mediatory efforts for the peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict. The incident took place on Azerbaijani territory where Azerbaijan had to ensure the security of the delegation.

Shakhnazaryan expressed the view that the new leadership of Azerbaijan is also pursuing a policy of trying to solve the Karabakh problem by force. It is no coincidence that Azerbaijan has been rejecting all the mediation efforts for peace for the last one and half months.

Shakhnazaryan described as "hasty" the Russian foreign minister's statement that blamed the Armenian side for the incident.

Yerevan Accuses Baku of Provocation

MK2311115593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Armen Khanbabyan report in the "Armenia" column: "Yerevan Is Convinced That the Incident of the Russian Federation Ambassador Was Provoked by Azerbaijan. The Aim Is To Thwart Russia's Peacemaking Mission and Mediation Efforts by the International Community]

[Text] A motorcade moving on Azerbaijani territory from the Azerbaijani center of Kazakh toward the Armenian district center of Noemberyan came under fire. In one of the cars was Vladimir Kazimirov, the Russian president's personal envoy and Russian Federation ambassador. He was traveling from Baku to Yerevan to continue talks on Russia's latest peace initiatives on Nagorno- Karabakh. No one was hurt in the attack. The Russian diplomat returned to Moscow, cutting short his tour.

On 21 November David Shakhnazaryan, Armenian ambassador at large, gave a briefing. He said in particular that a few days before Kazimirov had visited Baku where he held another round of talks with Azerbaijan's participation. On 18 November he got in touch with Yerevan by phone to discuss the itinerary and procedures for his arrival in Armenia to continue his mission. Agreement was reached that Kazimirov would go via Kazakh or Inzhevan. It is at this stretch that regular Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts take place both on the interstate and the local level. Therefore there is a reliable mechanism to ensure security while crossing the border. Yet already the following day Azerbaijani representatives told Armenian officials who were waiting for Kazimirov in Inzhevan that they intended to change the itinerary and take the Russian envoy to Noemberyan. The Armenian capital expressed a categoric protest: The locality around Noemberyan is mined and therefore there are no security guarantees. Shakhnazaryan said that he personally had tried on several occasions to get in touch with the Russian diplomat himself and with his apparatus in Moscow. He succeeded in the latter. Nonetheless everything proved to be in vain. The Azerbaijanis stubbornly refused to provide a telephone line between Shakhnazaryan and Kazimirov. As a result, Kazimirov went along the Kazakh-Noemberyan road. The incident occurred not far from the border with Armenia on Azerbaijani territory.

According to Shakhnazaryan, Yerevan officialdom is convinced that the incident was deliberately provoked by Azerbaijan and has far-reaching propaganda, military, and political aims. It is becoming increasingly clear that Baku intends to use the old force-based approaches with respect to Karabakh. And all talk about its intention to seek peaceful political solutions to the conflict was "Aliyev's pre-election bluff."

Today, when the time has come to respond to a revised schedule for a long-term cease-fire proposed by the CSCE Minsk group and to Moscow's peace initiatives, Azerbaijan has decided to thwart the peace process. In so doing, it put at risk the life of President Yeltsin's personal envoy and the Azerbaijani citizens who were accompanying him on that trip. According to David Shakhnazaryan, the incident suggests that Geydar Aliyev not only rejects the idea of any peace settlement and any peace mediation, but in his plans with respect to Karabakh assigns a noticeable role to Turkey and also to the continuation of a tough transport and energy blockade of Armenia (in the hope that the Turkish threat and the winter privations will break the Karabakh Armenians' will for self-determination).

The Armenian diplomat also described as "hasty and contradictory" the statement by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in connection with this incident. On one hand, Shakhnazaryan stressed, the head of the Russian foreign policy department gave a sharp assessment of the incident, but on the other he said that it calls for a detailed study. Meanwhile Yerevan insists on the creation of a relevant Russian commission to provide an impartial investigation of what really happened and make corresponding conclusions.

On the same day an official statement by the Armenian Foreign Ministry was promulgated, laying the entire responsibility for the incident on Azerbaijan and stressing the need for a political appraisal of the provocative actions. At the same time, a reliable confidential source said that Armenian Foreign Minister Vagan Papazyan has sent a telegram to Andrey Kozyrev

expressing concern over the sharp tone of his statement and also the fact that it was made before all the circumstances were cleared up. Papazyan's telegram says that the incident was provoked by Baku with the aim, first, of evading giving a positive response to the CSCE Minsk group's schedule and, second, of creating obstacles in the way of the Russian peace initiative in which, the telegram stresses, Armenia is very interested. Papazyan believes that a personal statement from Vladimir Kazimirov would be very important, shedding light on the main question, namely: Did he himself know about the intentions by the Azerbaijani side to change the itinerary, or did he become victim of a preplanned provocation. Papazyan also said that without Mr. Kazimirov's clearly stating his position, Armenia might find itself in a very difficult situation.

Update on Karabakh, Border Region Situations

NC2311184793 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, we now report on the latest situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] and on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The incident in which Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, Russia's special envoy to the region, was involved reconfirmed that Azerbaijan's leaders support the effort to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem merely with words. They use every opportunity to obstruct that effort. The neighboring republic is convinced that prolonging the war is the only way to settle the conflict. But, explaining in depth the serious outcome of the war is unnecessary. [passage omitted]

Azerbaijan's leaders have moved to take broad measures to prolong the war. That republic's deployment of large units and armored vehicles in areas near the NKR border confirms that. In parallel, Azerbaijan's military forces have embarked on operations to gather intelligence. They have fired on NKR defense positions with various types of arms almost daily. But the NKR military units have not retaliated against the enemy's provocative activities. Obviously, the enemy units have become more daring because they have not been punished. That is why they have intensified their firing on the Armenian positions.

The tension on the NKR's frontline escalated during the past two days. Azerbaijan's military units pounded the Armenian defense positions in (Matavis) in Mardakertskiy Rayon with artillery on the morning of 23 November. The shelling was from the areas Azerbaijan occupied in the rayon. The NKR defense units were forced to retaliate to silence the enemy fire emplacements. The Armenian defense positions in Shakhbulag were also fired on with the help of infantry combat vehicles in Agdamskiy Rayon on the same day. The Armenian forces were compelled to retaliate. No Armenian was hurt in either incident.

The Armenian positions in the two areas were pounded again yesterday. The Armenian defense positions in Fizulinskiy Rayon were also fired on with long-range artillery and Grad rocket launchers. First reports said no one was wounded.

Azerbaijan has used every opportunity to worsen things on the frontline. Naturally, the NKR command headquarters has taken the appropriate measures to penalize the enemy for its criminal activities.

No serious incident has occurred on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But Azerbaijan's mass media have published unfounded reports claiming that Kazakhskiy and Tauzskiy Rayons have been fired on from Armenia's territory.

Our people wish to live peacefully with neighboring Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, instead of agreeing to hold talks to end the problems, that republic maintains its policy of using force to end the conflict.

Karabakh Reply to CSCE Plan Expected Soon

NC2311154193 Yerevan SNARK in English 1027 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Stepanakert, November 22, (SNARK)—Third day the Karabakh Parliament Presidium is discussing "the schedule of emergency measures" on the conflict's settlement, developed by CSCE Minsk Group. SNARK was informed of the fact by the Karabakh Foreign Ministry. It is supposed that the respond to the new variant of CSCE's plan will be given by Stepanakert today or, at least, tomorrow.

Meanwhile, as SNARK learned from well-informed sources, the official Baku rejected the CSCE's schedule next time. In the opinion of the observers in Karabakh and in Armenia, such step of Baku might mean only that Azerbaijan still considers to solve the Karabakh problem by force. The accumulation of war forces along the front line and anti-Armenian hysteria, inflated during the last period of time by the Azerbaijani propagandizing mass media, demonstrate the aggressive intentions of Azerbaijani authorities.

Embassy Denies Iran Training Azerbaijani Army

NC2311140293 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1111 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Yerevan, 23 Nov (ARMENPRES)—The Iranian Embassy in Armenia released a press statement today in which it described as "untrue and a fabrication" reports to the effect that 14 Iranian generals have gone to Azerbaijan to train Azerbaijani soldiers.

The Armenian newspapers had published material on this subject, citing foreign press.

Azerbaijan

Prime Minister Suret Guseynov Resigns

LD2311200493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] The event of the day can doubtless be considered the resignation of former mutineer Colonel Suret Guseynov as prime minister of Azerbaijan. No comment on this matter from the Azerbaijani leadership has been received.

Foreign Ministry Condemns Attack on Russian Envoy

NC2311170893 Baku Radio Baku International Service in Azeri 1300 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] The group escorting Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, President Boris Yeltsin's special envoy, who arrived in the region to hold talks on the peaceful settlement of the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, was fired on when it tried to cross from Azerbaijan's Kazakhskiy Rayon onto Armenian territory at 1100 on 20 November. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry Press Center has issued a statement on the incident:

The Armenian troops fired on the group with [word indistinct], armored vehicles, and large-caliber machine guns. The group was fired on from an area near Ashagy Askipara, which has been occupied by Armenia. The firing created a serious danger for Russia's diplomats. Consequently, Kazmirov's peace mission failed to achieve its objective. He and his delegation were forced to turn back to the Kazakhskiy Rayon center in Azerbaijan.

Kazimirov arrived in Azerbaijan on 13 November. He has been received by President Geydar Aliyev and other leaders in the Republic. The statement noted:

An open and practical exchange of views took place in the talks with Kazimirov on removing the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan and aligning the two sides' proposals for realizing the schedule of urgent measures. The talks were very important for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 875, and 884.

Considering the approval of the two sides, Kazimirov decided to visit Armenia after concluding his talks in Baku. To facilitate his visit, agreement was reached that he should visit Ashagy Askipara in Kazakhsky Rayon, Armenian military forces occupied that town. The Armenian side was to receive Kazimirov and accompanying officials there.

Armenia was contacted by telephone five times on 19 November. Kazimirov himself reached an agreement with the Armenian side on his delegation's entering Armenian territory. And the Armenian side was informed that Kazimirov and his delegation had arrived before they left Mezam in Kazakhskiy Rayon. Despite the security measures adopted to allow Kazimirov to enter Armenia, the vehicle in which he and his delegation were traveling was fired upon. Azerbaijan's military servicemen escorting Kazimirov were hurt in the incident. The envoy and his delegation couldn't cross into Armenia and had to turn back to Azerbaijan.

The statement said the following:

The Armenian side grossly violated the agreement reached on the security measures required to protect Russia's envoy and his delegation. It thwarted a very important move to find a peaceful solution to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It seems that Armenia thinks it necessary to fire on the diplomatic delegation of a third country that wants to mediate to halt the bloodshed in the region.

Gasanov on CSCE Proposals, Kazimirov Incident

MK2311135093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Aydyn Mekhtiyev report in the "Azerbaijan" column: "'The CSCE Minsk Group Did Not Listen to Our Demands.' Republic's Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov Criticizes the New Peace Settlement Schedule"]

[Text] Today Swedish diplomat Matias Mosberg, the CSCE current chairman's personal envoy, arrives in Baku. This was announced by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov in an interview with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent. According to him, the talks will focus on a revised variant of the "schedule for urgent measures" proposed by the CSCE Minsk group based on the results of consultations in Vienna in the first half of November. As is known, the previous schedule was rejected by Baku officialdom because it contained no mention of the cities of Lachin or Shusha, occupied by Armenian troops last spring. The discussion of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict at the Vienna consultations enabled the Azerbaijani side to hope that the new schedule would fully take account of the republic leadership's demands. As it turned out, however, the formulations envisioning a mechanism for the withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied Lachin and Shusha were not included in the document. "We are not satisfied with the fact that under pressure from Armenia the CSCE Minsk group did not include the question about the fate of Lachin and Shusha in the document," Gasan Gasanov said. "Azerbaijan cannot agree with the fact that the issue of these territories should be buried in oblivion because under no circumstances will our republic agree to a loss of its juridical right to these territories."

As NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent has learned, the new package of proposals by the Minsk group lacks specific mechanisms providing for the pullout of the Armenian expeditionary corps from all occupied territories (at present the Armenian formations control about 25 percent of Azerbaijan's territory). The Baku leadership believes that the document gives an nonobjective definition of the conflict zone while the

Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is presented as a trilateral conflict where Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh are involved, although the Azerbaijani side insists that the conflict is between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Furthermore, Baku believes that the CSCE's latest schedule violates the mandate granted the Minsk group by the CSCE Council of Ministers on 24 March 1992 whereby the Azerbaijani community in Nagorno-Karabakh is entitled to take part in the upcoming peace conference in Minsk on a par with the Armenian community. The new schedule contains no mention about the fate of the Azerbaijani community in Nagorno-Karabakh.

While giving a critical assessment of the CSCE Minsk group's position, the head of the Azerbaijani foreign policy department at the same time spoke positively about Moscow's mediation efforts in settling the conflict. According to him, in the course of the recent talks in Baku between Vladimir Kazimirov, Russian Federation ambassador at large, and the Azerbaijani leadership "mutually acceptable formulas have been found on a whole number of questions." Gasanov said that on 20 November Russian diplomat Vladimir Kazimirov went to Armenia with a package of proposals but unfortunately his visit to the neighboring republic was thwarted through the fault of the Armenian side. On 20 November in Kazakh Rayon, on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, a car accompanying the Russian diplomat came under intense artillery fire from the territory of Armenia. As a result, the car was totally burned while two military servicemen in the car who were accompanying the diplomat were wounded. Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov laid the entire responsibility for the incident on the Armenian leadership, saying that "everything has happened in spite of the fact that Armenia itself fixed the place and time for the Russian Federation's official envoy to cross the border." Gasanov rejected Yerevan's allegations that the car accompanying the Russian diplomat was fired on by the Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijani minister positively assesses the statement that Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev made immediately after the incident. As is known, the head of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry condemned this action and stated that "the Russian Federation leadership will draw serious conclusions after all the circumstances of the incident have been established." Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov stressed in his conversation with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent that the Azerbaijani side has expressed its wish to the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry "that this provocation by the Armenian side should not weaken the Russian Federation's mediation efforts."

Baku Claims Armenians Shell, Raid Border Positions

NC2311180793 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry Analytical Information Service has reported that the relative peace on the frontline has again been disrupted. The Armenian armed formations shelled Terterskiy [Mir-Bashirskiy] Rayon with Grad rockets on 21 November.

At around the same time, our positions in Chayly came under Howitzer fire from the occupied Agdere [Mardakert]. Three of our soldiers were wounded during the shelling.

The Armenian raids on our border regions in Kedabekskiy Rayon have been continuing uninterrupted for the past two days. The enemy, which has massed a considerable number of troops and armored ? equipment at the military base in Krasnoselskiy Rayon, tried to cross the border at 0130 on 22 November. After violating the border, the Armenians launched an attack toward a bridge near (Uruyandag). Our soldiers repulsed the enemy.

Suret Guseynov Chairs Meeting on Bread Shortage

NC2311222893 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] The republic's Prime Minister Suret Guseynov chaired a meeting last night on the bread and fuel problem. Various ministries and leading departmental officials participated.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Adalet Aliyev] The meeting discussed the bread and fuel shortage, which has become more acute in recent days, and increasing the price of these goods.

The officials of the Grain Products Ministry reported on the bread shortage in the Republic and said the problem could be solved by increasing the prices. They noted that grain stocks could last only 27 days. But, in accordance with agreements, it is expected that flour will be brought to Azerbaijan from Ukraine, Russia, and other republics in the coming days. The price of bread products in the near abroad [former Soviet republics] is reportedly many times higher then in Azerbaijan. For example, 1 kg of bread is 420 rubles in Russia and 300 rubles in Kazakhstan.

The Railway Department officials specifically highlighted incidents in which freight trains coming to Azerbaijan were being robbed. They pointed out that it is often hard to transport freight through the northern border of the Republic.

Suret Guseynov issued concrete instructions to the deputy prime ministers and to the relevant ministries and noted the urgency of solving these problems soon. The prime minister also said:

[Guseynov] The goods to be sent to the rayons by the Trade Ministry or Azerittifak should be organized to prevent pilfering. The local administration officials should be instructed to ensure the goods are distributed to the people without pilfering. The government should not remain in the dark on this.

[Aliyev] Several ministers expressed their views on this issue.

[Unidentified official] Foodstuffs are being sent to Saatli, Imishli, Sadrabard, Derbe, Agdzhabedi, Yevlakh, and Mingechaur. Some 150 tons of sugar and 150 tons of butter were given to Azerittifak last month for distribution in these rayons. How these are being distributed should be clarified. We have informed the Council of Ministers on the behavior of some local administrations. [video shows meeting in session, officials, and Suret Guseynov addressing the meeting] [end recording]

Decree Issued on Regulating Prices of Bread Products

NC2311220393 Baku TURAN in English 1416 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 23 (TURAN)—[words indistinct] of Azerbaijan on extra measures on regulation of prices of bread and bread products and on strengthening of the defense of poor strata of society came into force today.

The decree runs that as a result of realization of bread by lower price than its prime cost led to the fact that the population became careless to bread, and this created complications in supply of the population by bread.

To improve the supply of the population by bread and to allot state donations to the social defense of poor strata of society the decree envisages:

—To increase prices of bread and bread products 8.5 times.

—The profits for students and refugees amounting 150 Manats for a person per month, the retired workers and the under age kids from the families, where the profit is lower than two minimum wages are allotted 100 Manats per month.

—Compensation to the parents of small children will be given at the place of work or at the executive power building.

—The ministry of finance is instructed to allot means from budget for money compensations to the population.

22 People's Front Members Arrested 18-22 Nov

NC2411045693 Baku TURAN in English 1416 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 23 (TURAN)—As TURAN Agency was told in the press [words indistinct] recently. So, on November 18 the old Deputy-Minister of Internal Affairs of Nakhichevan Siyavush Mustafayev was arrested. On November 21 he was transported to Baku, where a criminal case was started against him. The old deputy-minister is charged with the organization of a coup on October 24 1992.

22 people were arrested in Nakhichevan during November 18-22. The commander of military guards of Nakhichevan airport Shain Mustafayev (S. Mustafayev's brother) is among the arrested.

The warrants to the arrest of the two close relatives of S. Mustafayev are also given.

According to the latest reports, about 200 PFA [People's Front of Azerbaijan] members and 9 deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Nakhichevan addressed the consulate of Turkey in Nakhichevan with a request to give them a political shelter in this country.

A committee on the defense of rights of the prisoners [words indistinct] branch office of AZADLYG newspaper, is created in Nakhichevan.

[Words indistinct] note: On October 24-26 1992 the PFA supporters in Nakhichevan accused G. Aliyev, then the speaker of Nakhichevani Parliament in non-subordination to President Elcibey. The same days they tried to seize the TV, ministry of internal affairs and other key buildings. After intensive telephone conversations between Baku and Nakhichevan, the opposition were managed to put out.

CSCE Envoy Meets With Supreme Soviet's Dzhalilov

NC2411075093 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televizivasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Afiaddin Dzhalilov today received Matias Mosberg, the plenipotentiary representative of the CSCE chairman. Our correspondent Gulsafa Akhmedova reports:

[Begin Akhmedova recording] The talks held and the measures taken with the participation of the international organizations to settle the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict peacefully and end the almost six-year-old war have produced no results so far. As a result of the aggression by the opposite side, thousands of people have become homeless and cities and towns were burned and pillaged.

Briefing the CSCE's official representative on the tense situation existing in the Republic, Afiaddin Dzhalilov noted with regret that the Armenians have not complied with any of the four resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. Instead, they have resorted to new aggressions.

It was reiterated during the meeting that 18,000 people have been killed, 50,000 have been disabled, 4,000 have been taken hostage, and 1.2 million have become refugees and that more than 1,000 industrial enterprises, hospitals, and social service establishments and more than 800 towns and cities have been destroyed as a result of this deplorable undeclared war. All these statistics show that Armenia is not trying to solve the problem peacefully, but is using force.

Commenting on the purpose of his visit, the CSCE official said that the efforts to settle the Karabakh problem over the last two years have produced no result. The international community's efforts cannot be relied upon because such efforts have not been good enough. The solution to the problem mostly depends on a common agreement between the sides.

The meeting then moved behind closed doors.

Namik Akhundov, head of the Supreme Soviet Commission on International Affairs, and other officials took part in the meeting. [end recording]

Georgia

Talks With Abkhazia Set for 28 Nov in Geneva

LD2311174893 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1600 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Talks between Georgian and Abkhaz sides will be held in Geneva on 28 November. Mr. Levan Aleksidze, chairman of the State Commission for Establishing Facts of Genocide in Abkhazia, will present extensive photo, video, and information materials there.

Further Details Provided

AU2311191293 Paris AFP in English 1851 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Geneva, Nov 23 (AFP)—Leaders of Georgia and the breakaway republic of Abkhazia have agreed to meet face-to-face here in a week's time, UN special representative Edouard Brunner said here Tuesday.

It will be the first time that the two sides have taken part in direct talks since separatists defeated Tbilisi government forces last September to achieve control of Abkhazia.

Brunner, who will chair the meeting, told the Swiss news agency ATS that the agreement on a meeting was "an initial success."

Russia will also be represented at the talks, scheduled to last two or three days, by deputy foreign minister Boris Pastukhov, a diplomatic source said, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will send an official. The representatives of the two main protagonists were not immediately known.

Brunner said the object of the talks, which he had suggested at indirect talks here a month ago, was to define the basis for a political settlement of the conflict.

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze has said that any settlement must take into account Georgian sovereignty, while the Abkhazians have not said they wanted full independence.

Government Forces Raid Opposition Bases in West

LD2411110693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0938 GMT 24 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi November 24 TASS—Several tanks, armoured personnel carriers and large-caliber machine-guns as well as a large amount of ammunition were found in the course of the operation conducted by the Georgian Government forces and law enforcement agencies to liquidate the bases of armed formations supporting ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in the republic's western regions.

According to the press centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, military equipment, arms and ammunition were secreted in caches difficult to access for use in guerrilla warfare repeatedly proclaimed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia in his calls on supporters in western Georgia.

Reported Plot To Kill Ajarian Parliament Chief

MK2311143093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 21 Nov 93 p 2

[Viktoriya Sarykina report under the "Nonstop" rubric: "They Are Not Happy With 'Liberty' in Banana Republic"]

[Text] A provocation. That was how the Ajarian Supreme Soviet called a report by Radio Liberty that during the 11 November meeting in Batumi Aslan Abashidze, Ajarian Supreme Soviet chairman, allegedly asked Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, to take Ajaria and Abkhazia under Russian jurisdiction. The report also quoted Eduard Baltin as allegedly responding that Black Sea Fleet sailors were there at Eduard Shevardnadze's request. Ajaria Republic official circles think that this misinformation contributes to stirring up war in Georgia's sole peaceful region and is aimed at discrediting the Supreme Soviet chairman.

Sources from the Ajaria Government believe that reports such as the one by Radio Liberty may provoke war on the republic's territory because there have already been attempts to bring troops into the republic under any pretext (the protection of a railroad and so forth). Those same sources insist that the anti-Ajarian policy is aimed at eliminating Abashidze. For instance, the republic's information and intelligence administration has detained S., a prisoner of war who has been released, who said that certain top opposition leaders have repeatedly tried to recruit him. S. was detained on suspicion that he may be involved in a plot to assassinate Ajaria Supreme Soviet Chairman Abashidze. Under interrogation, S. named names, titles, and nicknames of recruiters that an ordinary soldier could not be aware of.

In addition, the source said that there is "material evidence" confirming that preparations for an attempt on Abashidze's life were under way: a milkwoman who

was delivering milk to the Abashidzes said that unidentified persons driving a "Mercedes" tried to bribe her, and also maps found on S. and around 7 kg of trinitrotolene discovered outside the entrance to Abashidze's home.

Rebels in West Hand Weapons To Police

LD2311173293 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1600 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Valerian Gogolashvili, the head of the Georgian Interior Ministry Press Center, told the CONTACT news agency this evening that yesterday, 22 November, following a coordinated operation, the Chkhorotsku Rayon Commandant's Office and the police accepted one tank, two BSK-type machine guns, a rocket launcher, and 14 howitzer shells submitted voluntarily by supporters of the ex-president in the Lughela River gorge, near the village of Mukhuri.

On 20 November, the police confiscated one tank, one combat armored carrier, one armored vehicle, one antiaircraft machine gun, and two KamAz trucks loaded with armaments from the armed units of the ex-president in the village of Akhudzi of the same rayon.

Rotation of Black Sea Fleet Units in Poti Reported

PM2311131793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Vladimir Pasyakin report under the "From Our News Bureau" rubric: "Changing of the Black Sea Guard on the Poti Roads"]

[Text] The main forces of the Black Sea Fleet operational tactical grouping sailing under the flag of Fleet Commander Admiral Eduard Baltin, comprising the large amphibious warfare ships Konstantin Olshanskiy and Tsezar Kunikov, the SDK-82 [expansion unknown], the patrol escort ships Sderzhanniy and Pytliviy, the minesweeper Zenitchik, and the salvage tug SB-524, have returned to Sevastopol.

The guards patrol escort ship Krasnyy Kavkaz and the ocean minesweeper Snayper have arrived in the roads of the maritime capital of Georgia to replace those ships and maintain the Black Sea Fleet's presence in Poti.

Russia Reportedly Supplies Tanks, Planes

NC2311214493 Yerevan SNARK in English 1213 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Sukhumi, November 23 (SNARK)—According to the information from the trustworthy sources, Russia has supplied Georgia with tanks T-60, T-72 and military planes SU-27. This information was received by SNARK from IMA-PRESS. The observers expect the beginning of the next offensive of the Georgian Army to Abkhazia till November 27. So, the scheduled Georgian-Abkhazian negotiations in Geneva under the auspices of the UNO will be torpedoed.

Shevardnadze Message Hails Union of Citizens

LD2311224993 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1900 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] As we have already reported, Eduard Shevardnadze took up the leadership of the Union of Georgia's Citizens, a general, national-democratic political organization which was founded at the meeting of representatives of all occupations, nationalities, communities, and regions of the Republic of Georgia held in Tbilisi on 21 November.

The founding of Shevardnadze's party, as it is called, was initiated by members of the Union of Tbilisi Citizens, which had been created as a force challenging the destructive radicalism during the period of confrontation with the ex-president's regime, the Georgian Greens Party, regional associations, political parties and movements of liberal-centrist orientation.

Speaking before the meeting, Eduard Shevardnadze said: Our Union of Citizens stands above party membership. Therefore, the Union of Georgia's Citizens is not a party in a usual meaning of this word. We regard ourselves as heirs to Georgia's national liberation movement, of age-old traditions of struggle for the restoration of Georgia's statehood and real freedom of our motherland, and we direct our activities toward values common to all mankind. Therefore, our activities are based on principles of the rights of an individual, the rights of individuals of all nationalities who inhabit our land.

We have founded a union which tends toward interethnic peace and we are firmly convinced that we will live in friendship and harmony with the Abkhazs, Ossets, Armenians, Azeris, and Russians as we have always lived.

The meeting passed a declaration which says in particular:

The strategic course of the Union of Georgia's Citizens is the achievement of the country's real independence, the soonest possible restoration of its territorial integrity, improvement of law and order, establishment of an efficient system of national security, including the creation of modern and efficient armed forces, and the effective protection of the freedom, rights, and vital interests of all citizens regardless of nationality, sex, and religion.

The Union insistently demands that its jurisdiction be restored over its whole territory. It declares that it strives to achieve this by all acceptable, honorable, and available means, through dialogue and talks.

Among its strategic priorities, the Union of Georgia's Citizens cites the establishment of a strong economy as its major strategic priority, without which there is not and cannot be a steady foundation for our statehood, true freedom, and independence.

In the sphere of foreign policy, the Union will not be reconciled to any position other than the one predetermined by the country's vital interests and historic and contemporary realities. The declaration says: Supporting new relations with a new Russia, we mean proximity and reciprocity of strategic interests of our countries in Caucasia and in the Black Sea region. Our priority is in the sort of policy which ensures Georgia's wide, variable, based on equality and mutually beneficial links with its closest neighbors, independent states, leading countries, and the world community without causing any damages to a third party.

The meeting elected interim steering bodies which will prepare a constituent congress of the Union of Georgia's Citizens.

Estonia

Premier Outlines Plans for EC Membership

LD2311140193 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1200 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Within the next two weeks Estonia will set up a government commission to make preparations for Estonia to join the EC. It will also be drafting an application to this end.

Estonia plans to become a full member of the European Community by around the turn of the century. This is what Prime Minister Mart Laar says in today's POSTIMEES newspaper.

Laar states that Estonia hopes to become a full member of the Community straight away, skipping the status of associate member, which the Central European countries like Poland and Hungary have currently. Laar said that Estonia will use the Nordic model to join the Community: First, a free-trade agreement is concluded and then full membership follows. Talks to conclude a free-trade agreement with the EC are in progress at present. Estonian Ambassador to Brussels Clyde Kull told the Baltic News Service that the EC is due to present draft agreements to the Baltic countries within the next few

Party Skeptical About Membership

WS2311151793 Tallinn BNS in English 1800 GMT 22 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, Nov 22, BNS - The Estonian National Progress Party took a wary step away from Estonia's possible membership in the European Community, saying the seat brings with it a sacrifice of national identity.

While chairman Ants Erm said Monday [22 November] that his party wasn't dead set against Estonia's joining the EC, the country shouldn't make the move without a referendum, he said.

The EC, unlike the Soviet Union, is a civilized union, Erm conceded. "But, do we need it that each person who wants to come here is free to do so?" he asked. "In my opinion, we should retain more rights."

Erm claimed the Progress Party differs from other Estonian conservative parties in that it stresses national statehood. The party hopes to rally the national forces that split in the course of the restructuring of parties. Erm said his party does not exclude merging with some other political party. The party's statutes do not allow former Communist Party members to join it.

The National Progress Party's meeting Saturday was attended by about 40 people, weeks.

Law on Cultural Autonomy for Minorities

WS1711140093 Tallinn Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release in English 16 Nov 93

["Unofficial translation" of the "Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities" prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; received via INTERNET on-line service]

[Text] **Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities**

Chapter I

General Provisions

Article 1

This Law considers as national minorities citizens of Estonia, who: - reside on the territory of Estonia; - maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with Estonia; - are distinct from Estonians on the basis of their ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics; - are motivated by a concern to preserve together their cultural traditions, their religion or their language which constitute the basis of their common identity.

Article 2

1. For the purposes of the present Law, cultural autonomy for national minorities is defined as the right of individuals belonging to a national minority to establish cultural autonomy in order to achieve the cultural rights given to them by the constitution.

2. National minority cultural autonomy may be established by persons belonging to German, Russian, Swedish and Jewish minorities and persons belonging to national minorities with a membership of more than 3000.

Article 3

1. Every member of a national minority has the right to preserve his or her ethnic identity, cultural traditions, native language and religious beliefs.

2. It is prohibited to ridicule and to obstruct the practice of ethnic cultural traditions and religious practices and to engage in any activity which is aimed at the forcible assimilation of national minorities.

Article 4

Members of a national minority have the right: 1) to form and support cultural and educational institutions and religious congregations; 2) to form ethnic organisations; 3) to practice cultural traditions and religious customs if this does not endanger public order, health and morals; 4) to use their mother tongue in dealings within the limits established by the Language Law; 5) to publish ethnic language publications; 6) to conclude agreements of cooperation between ethnic, cultural and educational institutions and religious congregations; 7) to circulate and exchange information in their mother tongue.

Article 5

1. The principal objective of national minority cultural autonomy is: 1) the organisation of education in the mother tongue and monitoring the use of resources provided for this purpose; 2) the formation of national minority cultural institutions, organization of their activities and the organisation of ethnic cultural events; 3) the establishment and bestowment of funds, scholarships and awards for the promotion of national minority culture and education.

2. National minorities have the right, in the interests of their ethnic culture, to form institutions of cultural autonomy, that shall observe the laws of Estonia in addressing issues within their competence.

Article 6

Foreigners residing in Estonia may participate in the activities of cultural and educational institutions and religious congregations of national minorities, but they may not vote or be elected or appointed to the leadership of the institutions of cultural self-government.

Chapter II

National Register of National Minorities

Article 7

1. The application for national minority cultural autonomy shall be based on the national register of national minorities.

2. The national registers of national minorities shall be prepared by ethnic cultural societies or their federations. Regulations for the keeping and use of national registers shall be established by the Government of the Republic.

Article 8

1. The national register contains the following information regarding a person: a) given name and surname; b) date and place of birth; c) sex; d) ethnicity and mother tongue; e) personal code; f) marital status; g) data on children who are minors; h) place of residence; i) religious affiliation; j) signature of the applicant and date.

2. Children under the age of 15 shall be entered in the national register at the request of their parents.

3. A person's name is included in the national register on basis of a personal application. The application may be submitted by mail.

Article 9

A person shall be deleted from the national register: 1) at his or her request; 2) if the person renounces Estonian citizenship or settles permanently in a foreign state; 3) upon his or her death.

Chapter III

Establishment of the Principal Organizations for the Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities

Article 10

Persons belonging to a national minority wishing to establish cultural autonomy shall present the appropriate application to the Government through their ethnic cultural society or federation of societies.

Article 11

1. The principal organizations of cultural autonomy for national minorities are the cultural council of a national minority and the cultural boards governing the activities of cultural autonomy institutions.

2. A cultural council may form the city or county cultural council of a national minority or appoint local cultural representatives.

Article 12

The cultural council of a national minority is elected in direct and uniform elections, by secret ballot. Voting takes place in voting districts, either in person or by mail.

Article 13

1. For the purpose of organizing the elections of a cultural council, an ethnic cultural society or federation of societies shall elect a general election committee, the composition of which shall be confirmed by the Government of the Republic and to which the Government shall appoint its representative so as to monitor compliance with electoral regulations.

2. If necessary, the general election committee shall form local election committees and shall issue organisational directives on procedures for the holding of elections, tabulating and announcing results.

Article 14

Electoral regulations for national minority cultural councils shall be drafted and approved by the Government of the Republic.

Article 15

Electoral lists shall be compiled on the basis of the national register of national minorities prescribed by article 8 of the present Law.

Article 16

1. Elections shall not be held if less than one-half of the persons in the national register have consented to be registered on the electors list.

2. The given national minority may submit an application for the holding of new elections to the cultural council no earlier than three years after any previous application.

Article 17

1. Electoral lists shall be made public no less than two months prior to the elections.

2. Every person entered on the electors list has the right to request that his or her name be deleted from the list, until no later than two weeks prior to the elections.

Article 18

1. The number of members of the national minority cultural council shall be determined by the general election committee, however the number may not be more than 60 or less than 20.

2. The cultural council is elected for a term of three years.

Article 19

Elections to the national minority cultural council are considered to have been held if more than one-half of the electors entered on the electoral list participate in the elections and the election is held in accordance with the present Law and electoral regulations.

Article 20

Protests and complaints regarding the carrying out of cultural council elections shall be resolved by the general election committee no later than two weeks after the announcement of election results.

Article 21

The chairman of the general election committee shall convene the first meeting of the cultural council no later than one month after the results of the cultural council elections have been announced and shall preside over the session until the executive has been elected. Subsequently, the general election committee shall declare its authority to be terminated.

Article 22

At the first meeting of the cultural council, a majority of the council shall adopt statutes regarding cultural autonomy which determine:

1. the procedures for the election of the chairman, the vice- chairman and executive of the cultural council;

2. the procedures for the formation of cultural councils and their jurisdiction;

3. the formation of institutions of cultural autonomy;

4. the rights and duties of cultural autonomy organizations, based on their fundamental purposes as prescribed in Article 5 of the present Law;

5. regulations for the work of the principal organizations of cultural autonomy;

Article 23

Expenses related to the election of the national minority cultural council are paid by the national minority cultural autonomy body. However, expenses related to the election of the cultural council may be provided from the state budget.

Chapter IV

Institutions of Cultural Autonomy and the Financing of Their Activities

Article 24

Institutions of cultural autonomy are:

1. educational institutions providing intensive instruction in the ethnic language or ethnic culture (pre-school institutions and schools);

2. ethnic cultural institutions;

3. ethnic cultural enterprises and publishing houses;

4. ethnic social care institutions.

Article 25

The establishment of a national minority school (class) and the organisation of its work is governed by the provisions of the Law on Private Schools.

Article 26

Institutions of cultural autonomy are independent legal persons, may own real property and are liable for their financial obligations.

Article 27

1. National minority cultural autonomy and its activities are financed from:

a) allocations from the state budget in accordance with the law and from specific contributions for that purpose;

b) contributions specifically allocated from local government budgets to cultural autonomy educational, cultural and social care institutions;

c) cultural autonomy membership fees, the amount of which shall be determined by the cultural council;

d) contributions, donations and bequests;

e) donations from foreign organisations.

2. Resources allocated for the specific purpose of national minority cultural autonomy may be used only in accordance with procedures prescribed for that purpose. The use of the funds shall be monitored in accordance with current legal acts by authorized state auditing bodies.

Chapter V

Termination of the Activities of National Minority Cultural Autonomy

Institutions

Article 28

The Government of the Republic shall terminate the activities of institutions of national minority cultural autonomy where:

1. according to data in the national register of national minorities the number of members of a national minority who are permanent residents of Estonia has been less than 3000 for the previous 5 years;

2. during two consecutive elections for the cultural council it has not been possible to constitute an electoral list according to requirements;

3. less than one-half of citizens entered on the electoral list have participated in two consecutive elections;

4. the cultural council makes a proposal to this effect.

Article 29

Upon the termination of its activities, the property of a national minority cultural autonomy institution shall be transferred in accordance with procedures established by decision of the cultural council.

Chapter VI

Final Provisions

Article 30

The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Law on the Ethnic Rights of Citizens of the Estonian SSR of December 15, 1989 is repealed. (ESSR Gazette 1989, 40, 618)

Decree Allows Retired USSR Soldiers To Stay

LD2311180593 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1700 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] Estonia is relaxing its earlier decisions by allowing some retired USSR professional servicemen to apply for residence permits in the country. The regulations adopted today by the government, on the procedure for granting residence permits to foreign countries' armed forces servicemen in reserve and their family members, envisage that the government will be deciding about the granting of such permits.

According to Peeter Olesk, the population minister without portfolio, the decree will affect about 40,000 individuals, with 11,000 of them retired soldiers, and the rest their family members. The government will set up a commission for the granting of permits, to be headed by the population minister, that will pass on applications to the government.

Ants Erm, chairman of the Estonian National Progress Party, said on Monday that once such a decree is adopted he no longer sees it as possible to support the government. According to Peeter Olesk, the need for regulations for the foreign countries' retired servicemen stems from the Law on Foreigners adopted in the summer.

Charges Against Russian Servicemen Refuted

PM2311132793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Senior Lieutenant Oleg Groznetskiy of the Northwestern Group of Forces Press Center; from the "From Our News Bureau" column: "Leonid Mayorov Continues Tracking Down Estonian Rumors"]

[Text] Colonel General Leonid Mayorov, commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, has sent a letter to Mr. H. Valter, head of administration [kantsler] of the Estonian Defense Ministry, regarding his statement to AP journalist Matti Huuhantanen that Russian servicemen temporarily stationed in Estonia are engaged in illegal arms dealing and are harboring common criminals on their bases.

The letter says that such charges are unfounded and asks the head of administration, if he really does possess any facts, to acquaint the Northwestern Group of Forces command with them.

Latvia

Government Issues Statement on Citizenship

LD2311190993 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1800 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text]At its session today, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a statement on the citizenship issue. In it, all political forces in Latvia are called upon to find a unified and balanced position on the citizenship question; and on the Saeima to adopt a law on citizenship that corresponds to the wishes of the majority of Latvian society. The Cabinet states that irrespective of what kind of citizenship law is adopted by the Saeima, the Cabinet will call on the state president and the Saeima to submit it to a referendum of Latvian citizens. The decisive say on the citizenship question must be given to the people themselves, states today's announcement from the Cabinet of Ministers.

Also on the session agenda was the question of relieving the head of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Maris Plavnieks, of his post. Participants in the session listened to a report from Internal Affairs Minister Girts Kristovskis, and Maris Plavnieks' explanations. It was decided to give a special commission 10 days to examine the work of Plavnieks' activity, and until then to dismiss him from the post.

Plans for Improving 1994 Budget Projected

WS2311152393 Tallinn BNS in English 1943 GMT 22 Nov 93

[Text] Riga, Nov 22, BNS - The Latvian Cabinet's Economics and Finance Committee took its first look at a 1994 budget proposal that projects a 5 percent increase in the gross domestic product and an annual inflation rate of around 7 percent.

The estimated deficit remains around 76 million lats, but the government is still seeking ways to reduce the shortfall. The government plans to take loans from the Bank of Latvia and international organizations, and to issue state bonds to cover the debt.

Another plan targets balancing the state spendings and incomes by redividing budget incomes between state and municipal institutions.

In addition, the government is moving to narrow the circle of tax-payers entitled to profit tax waivers because waivers this year made up 22 percent of the state income from profit taxes.

The Cabinet is scheduled to consider the budget draft at its Tuesday [23 November] session.

In other action, the Economics and Finance Committee set up a working party to distribute 25 million U.S. dollars in a World Bank rehabilitation credit.

The entire 45-million-dollar loan, earmarked for energy industry, agriculture and health care, should be implemented by the end of this year according to the agreement, but, so far, Latvia has used only 20 million dollars.

Another working party was composed to assess a U.S. proposal to lend Latvia 10 million dollars to purchase American farm products.

Lithuania

Chief Election Commission Chairman Resigns

LD2311215293 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 23 Nov 93

[Text] The Seimas complied with the request of Vaclovas Litvinas, the chairman of the Chief Election Commission, to relieve him of his duties. Until the Seimas approves the new chairman, the commission's meetings will be chaired by the head of the State Law Department at Kaunas University, [first name indistinct] Normantas.

At today's meeting of the Chief Election Commission he was elected its chairman.

World Bank To Finance Five Programs

WS2311151393 Tallinn BNS in English 1139 GMT 22 Nov 93

[Text] Vilnius, Nov 22, BNS - The World Bank announced plans to finance five economic programs in Lithuania, including the project for perfecting the banking system and a program for improving the production and use of thermal energy. Lithuania's government must begin stabilizing the national currency and balancing the state budget, said the head of the World Bank's mission in the Baltic states, Lars Jeurling.

Jeurling told journalists Saturday [20 November] that Lithuania was still in the first stage of its transition to a market economy, and the World Bank usually doesn't step in with investments until a country reaches the second stage. The World Bank plans to extend credits to the government, he said, but that does not mean that private enterprise cannot make use of them, said Jeurling.

In addition to energy and banking, the bank also plans to finance programs for reorganizing the country's agricultural system, environmental protection, and social welfare, said Jeurling.

During the next three years, the World Bank will annually extend Lithuanian aid worth as much as 75 million U.S. dollars, he said.

The World Bank has already extended a 60-million-dollar credit to Lithuania for importing goods, especially fuel.

The World Bank's mission in Vilnius was established in 1993.

Status of Refugees To Be Legitimized

WS2411102093 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 2023 GMT 23 Nov 93

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 377]

[Text] Lithuania's position concerning refugees and problems of legitimating their status is the main goal of the deputy chief of Nordic and Baltic department of U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Lennart Kotsalainen who is visiting Lithuania in November 23-25.

Kitsalainen will visit Ministry of Social Affairs here and meet the working group arranging a bill on the status of refugees in Lithuania.

Chief of the working group, head of the migration department of the Ministry Vladimiras Grazulis told ELTA that Lithuania, striving to become a civilized European country, could not delay anymore the legalization of the status of refugees.

Although there are no official refugees in Lithuania (as the law is absent), more and more individuals from Caucasus, Tadjikistan, Russia are applying for the status

of refugees. At the moment, the draft is being coordinated in ministries and should be presented to the government until the end of the year, Grazulis said.

Firm Suspected of Radioactive Load Shipping

WS2411110493 Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 11 Nov 93 No 218 p 3

[Report by Ruta Skatikaite: "Radioactive Contraband?"]

[Text] RESPUBLIKA has already reported that a trailer, belonging to the "Vektronas" motor vehicle firm in Vievis, was found on the premises of the Ignalina nuclear power plant with a recorded level of radiation of 800 microroentgens per hour. Workers of the firm demonstrated their interest in the trailer after one driver felt sick after returning from a trip. An inspection of the trailer, with the aid of a simple dosimeter, recorded a 200- microroentgen-per-hour level of radiation. According to workers of the firm, it was not the first time that their loads left traces of radiation. This time, the firm decided to appeal to the nuclear power station. Without receiving the necessary documents from the Hygiene Center and the Environmental Protection Department, the firm brought the trailer to Visaginas across half of Lithuania. It made a deal with the chief of the decontamination department, who, probably expecting a good reward, accepted the radioactive load without documentation. Specialists at the plant measured the radiation level and found that it was 100, and in some places even 800 microroentgens per hour. I will remind everyone that the natural radiation level is between 8 and 20 microroentgens, while those materials which emit more than 100 microroentgens are termed radioactive waste. Workers at the plant decontaminated the trailer. This will cost "Vektronas" 5,000 litai.

The Environmental Protection Department is currently investigating the source of this load. Employees of the Vievis civil-defense service decontaminated another radioactive trailer. The German Ministry of Environment and Reactors was warned about the possible trafficking of radioactive materials from Lithuania to Germany through Poland. Materials collected at the Environmental Protection Department will be passed on to the Prosecutor General's Office. The current level of radiation in the garage of the "Vektron" firm is 70 microroentgens per hour.